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Bringing America Back to the Future:Reclaiming a Principle of 
Honesty in Property and IP Law 
 
Joshua J. Schroeder* 
 
“If nature has made any one thing less susceptible than all 
others of exclusive property, it is the action of the thinking 
power called an idea, which an individual may exclusively 
possess as long as he keeps it to himself; but the moment it is 
divulged, it forces itself into the possession of everyone. . . . He 
who receives an idea from me, receives instruction himself 
without lessening mine; as he who lights his taper at mine, 
receives light without darkening me. That ideas should freely 
spread from one to another over the globe, for the moral and 
mutual instruction of man, and improvement of his condition, 
seems to have been peculiarly and benevolently designed by 
nature, when she made them, like fire, expansible over all 
space, without lessening their density in any point, and like the 
air in which we breathe, move, and have our physical being, 
incapable of confinement or exclusive appropriation.”1 
 “ [The] truth is great and will prevail if left to herself, that she 
is the proper and sufficient antagonist to error, and has nothing 
to fear from the conflict unless by human interposition 
disarmed of her natural weapons free argument and debate 
errors ceasing to be dangerous when it is permitted freely to 
contradict them.”2 
— Thomas Jefferson, Founder, United States of America 
 
INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM OF INTANGIBLE 
                                                
*Joshua J. Schroeder, holds a J.D. from Lewis & Clark Law School in Portland, 
Oregon. Thank you to Professor Jeffrey Jones for his wisdom, input and support 
through the making of this piece. Also a special thank you to Joseph Ureno for 
his contribution and a thank you to Hon. Darleen Ortega for supporting us all. 
1 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson, Aug. 13, 1813, in 
JEFFERSON: WRITINGS 1291 (Merrill D. Peterson, ed. 1984). 
2 Thomas Jefferson, A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, in JEFFERSON: 
WRITINGS, supra note 1, at 347 (This bill was enacted by the Virginia General 
Assembly with the support of James Madison. It vindicates religious and 
intellectual freedom and was one of the sources that Congress drew upon when 
drafting the Bill of Rights in 1789). 
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PROPERTY 
It has been five years since the global market sunk into a 
“great recession”3 and thus far there has been a serious lack of 
reevaluation. The “tea party” libertarians and the “occupy 
movement” liberals don’t seem to carry us much further than the 
ruminations of F. Scott Fitzgerald and Ayn Rand on the economy.4 
Meanwhile, the deep division between the public interest and 
private property ownership has been rushed to extremes. For 
example, the Tenth Circuit has allowed local government officials 
to sell the freedom of speech in Salt Lake City’s town to the private 
corporate ownership of a religious institution.5 Of course the project 
of defining the scope of public property, public goods, and the 
public interest under the First Amendment has always been at a 
constant tension with private property ownership.6 However, as it 
                                                
3 DAVID A. STOCKMAN, THE GREAT DEFORMATION: THE CORRUPTION OF 
CAPITALISM IN AMERICA 3–5 (1st ed. 2013) (Stockman called the approval of the 
TARP bill bail out the "triumph of crony capitalism."). See generally, Mark 
Szeltner et al, Diminished Lives and Futures: A Portrait of America in the Great-
Recession Era, RUTGERS: WORK TRENDS (Feb. 2013), available at 
http://www.heldrich.rutgers.edu/sites/default/files/content/Work_Trends_Februar
y_2013.pdf. 
4 Compare F. SCOTT FITZGERALD, THE GREAT GATSBY 110 (The Scribner ed. 
1925) ("Can't repeat the past? . . . Why of course you can!"), with AYN RAND, 
ATLAS SHRUGGED 577 (First Plume Printing ed. 1957) ("[Robin Hood] is 
remembered not as a champion of property, but as a champion of need, not as a 
defender of the robbed, but as a provider to the poor. . . . He is the man who 
became the symbol of need, not achievement, is the source of rights, that we don't 
have to produce, only to want, that the earned doesn't belong to us, but the 
unearned does."). 
5 Utah Gospel Mission v. Salt Lake City Corp., 425 F.3d 1249, 1256 (10th Cir. 
2005) (signs informing the public that the town square was no longer "public" 
along with the Mormon Church's purchase of the property including the public's 
easement to traverse the town square ousted the public's free speech rights in Salt 
Lake City's main street plaza including the ability for homosexuals to show 
affection while on the plaza grounds). 
6 Letter From John Adams to James Sullivan, May 26, 1776, in 9 THE WORKS OF 
JOHN ADAMS 375–78 (C. Adams, Ed., 1854) ("Such is the frailty of the human 
heart, that very few men who have no property, have any judgment of their own. 
They talk and vote as they are directed by some man of property, who has 
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was intended by the framers,7 this tension was not meant to protect 
the “human interposition” of dishonest creation, allocation and 
valuation of intangible property that is commonplace in the market 
today.8 After all, it was in the framer’s plan to waylay the dangers 
of “error” by guaranteeing the public’s freedom to contradict them 
with truth.9 Thus, as intangible property is used to cloak error as 
truth,10 thereby disarming the truth of “her natural weapons [of] free 
                                                
attached their minds to his interest. . . . [P]ower always follows property. . . . 
[T]he balance of power in a society, accompanies the balance of property in land. 
The only possible way, then of preserving the balance of power on the side of 
equal liberty and public virtue, is to make the acquisition of land easy to every 
member of society.") (italics added). 
7 Id. 
8 Thomas Jefferson, A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, enacted on 
January 16, 1786, in JEFFERSON: WRITINGS, supra note 1, at 347 (This bill was 
enacted by the Virginia General Assembly with the support of James Madison. It 
vindicates religious and intellectual freedom and was one of the sources that 
Congress drew upon when drafting the Bill of Rights in 1789). 
9 Id. 
10 Thomas Lee Hazen, Volatility and Market Inefficiency: A Commentary on the 
Effects of Options, Futures, and Risk Arbitrage on the Stock Market, 44 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 789, 795 (1987) (noting that options and futures trading can be 
"manipulative and artificial"). C.f. John Letzing, Google Says Patents, Tech Were 
Less Than Half of Motorola's Price, THE WALL ST. J., July 24, 2012, 
http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2012/07/24/google-says-patents-tech-were-less-than-
half-motorolas-price/ ("Google said . . . that $2.9 billion of the purchase price for 
Motorola was attributable to cash acquired, $2.6 billion was related to goodwill, 
$730 million for customer relationships and $670 million for 'other net assets 
acquired.'" Google characterized consumer relationships with Motorola and what 
consumers thought about Motorola as worth billions of dollars when consumer's 
themselves may own their relationships and thoughts); Jon Leibowitz, F.T.C. 
Chairman, Remarks as Prepared for Delivery at the Sixth Annual Georgetown 
Law Global Antitrust Enforcement Symposium, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, 
Sept. 19, 2012, WL 4339298 at 3 (Noting a major circuit split over pay-for-delay 
contracts regarding whether they violate antitrust law between the Third and the 
Second, Eleventh and Federal Circuits: "Eliminating pay-for-delay deals would 
save American consumers $3.5 billion annually and, because the federal 
government accounts for roughly one-third of the nation's prescription drug 
spending, it would lower the federal budget deficit by $5 billion over ten years."). 
See In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 214 (3d Cir. 2012) ("First, we take 
4 JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW & POLICY Vol. 35:1 
argument and debate,”11 the Courts must hold intangible property 
claims to a minimum standard of honesty as a formality.12 
Intangible property springs from the positivist view that 
anything from which value can be derived is “property.”13 Thus, 
intangibles can be defined as any property that is not physical or 
tangible. Intangibles may include the field of law known as 
Intellectual Property (IP), but so far is not limited by it. Stocks, 
futures, mortgages, securities, insurance and other creative business 
tools can be included in the category of “intangible property.” Since 
intangible property is not necessarily connected to real, tangible 
property it is notoriously dubious to valuate.14 In fact, market-wide 
                                                
issue with the scope of the patent test's almost un-rebuttable presumption of 
patent validity."). See also C. Scott Hemphill, Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical 
Patent Settlement As A Regulatory Design Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1553, 
1616 (2006) (Noting that self-help measures like pay-for-delay contracts disrupt 
the balance struck by patent regulation between innovation and competition). 
11 Thomas Jefferson, A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, enacted on 
January 16, 1786, in JEFFERSON: WRITINGS, supra note 1, at 347. 
12 J. H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY, 320 (2d ed. 
1979) (noting that even the claims of innocent owners gave way to "honest sales 
which took place in a market or fair."). See also 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES *448–49 (commenting on market overt, that honesty was so 
important to England's Saxon ancestors in the transfer of title that sales and 
bargains of chattels had to be "contracted in the presence of credible witnesses."). 
13 Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions As Applied 
in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 19 (1913) (hereinafter Hohfeld I). See 
generally Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions As 
Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710, 712–13 (1917) (hereinafter 
Hohfeld II). See Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The New Property of the Nineteenth 
Century: The Development of the Modern Concept of Property, 29 BUFF. L. REV. 
325, 357 (1980). 
14 Brief of Antitrust Economists as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, 23-
24, Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013) (No. 12-416), 
2013 WL 836946 (One of the arguments made to the Supreme Court for not 
limiting pay-for-delay agreements regarding drug patents included the difficulty 
of valuating the agreements due to the central nature of intangibles to them: 
"There is typically significant ambiguity around the value of such agreements 
because they often include the purchase of intellectual property, real options 
(through joint ventures), supply agreements, risk sharing, and the settlement of 
other litigation. Determining the value of such one-of-a-kind business agreements 
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problems with the creation, allocation and valuation of intangible 
property resulted in perpetual cycles of market failure.15 
Seemingly undaunted by global market crisis, intangible 
property owners have pushed their property claims beyond 
precedent.16 In fact, some have voiced their desire for unlimited and 
absolute rights to intangibles.17 Perhaps the most telling example is 
                                                
can be very difficult."); Hazen, supra note 10, at 795; Ben Hirschler, UK 
Watchdog Accuses GSK Over "Pay-For-Delay" Drug Deals, REUTERS, April 19, 
2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/19/us-glaxosmithkline-
antitrustidUSBRE93I07720130419. 
15 STOCKMAN, supra note 3, at 3–5, 361–63, 501–07 (Drawing a correlation 
between market failures due to widespread opportunism and overvaluation of 
intangible property in America). 
16 Compare Milton Friedman, The Need for Futures Markets in Currencies, 31 
CATO J. 635, 636 (Fall 2011) http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/ 
cato-journal/2011/9/cj31n3-15.pdf (advocating for a need for a futures market in 
the 1970's when America's currency was "floated" and no longer backed by a 
promise of gold value in exchange.), with 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES *398 ("By the rules of the ancient common law, there could be 
no future property, to take place in expectancy, created in personal goods and 
chattels."), and Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2590 
(2012) ("The proposition that Congress may dictate the conduct of an individual 
today because of prophesied future activity finds no support in our precedent. We 
have said that Congress can anticipate the effects on commerce of an economic 
activity. . . . But we have never permitted Congress to anticipate that activity 
itself in order to regulate individuals not currently engaged in commerce."). 
17 William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, 
70 U. CHI. L. REV. 471, 517–18 (2003) (explaining how maximized copyright 
protection could be drafted in federal statute to avoid unconstitutionality); 
Richard A. Epstein, The Disintegration of Intellectual Property? A Classical 
Liberal Response to a Premature Obituary, 62 STAN. L. REV. 455, 482, 520 
(2010) (Proposing a "carryover hypothesis" involving the determination of "how 
few deviations from the traditional views of property intangibles need to be made 
in order to develop a sensible system form copyright and patents."); Frank H. 
Easterbrook, Intellectual Property is Still Property, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 
108, 112, 118 (1990) ("Old rhetoric about IP equating to monopoly seemed to 
have vanished, replaced by a recognition that a right to exclude IP is no different 
in principle from the right to exclude in physical property. . . . Except in the rarest 
case we should treat intellectual and physical property identically in the law - 
which is where the broader currents are taking us."). See also Geoffrey Neri, 
Sticky Fingers or Sticky Norms? Unauthorized Music Downloading and 
6 JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW & POLICY Vol. 35:1 
the rise of an unprecedented coalition between powerful American 
content owners and internet service providers called the Center for 
Copyright Information.18 This organization was established with the 
purpose of enforcing self-help measures to eradicate uses of online 
content by the public in the wake of public outcry against the Stop 
Online Piracy Act (SOPA), Protect IP Act (PIPA) and the Anti-
Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) and the resulting 
government rejection of SOPA, PIPA and ACTA.19 According to 
                                                
Unsettled Social Norms, 93 GEO. L.J. 733 (Noting a movement towards the view 
that unauthorized internet downloading is theft "plain and simple.") (quoting 
Press Release, Motion Picture Ass'n of Am., Inc., Motion Picture and Music 
Industries File Suit Against Scour.com (July 20, 2000), available at 
http://www.mpaa.org/Press/ScourPressRelease.htm); Eric H. Holder, Jr., 
Remarks at the Press Conference Announcing the Intellectual Property Rights 
Initiative (July 23, 1999), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/ 
cybercrime/dagipini.htm; Dowling v. United States, 43 U.S. 207, 217 (1985). 
18 About the Center for Copyright Information, (last visited March 25, 2013), 
http://www.copyrightinformation.org/about-cci/ (CCI is a coalition of major 
copyright owner interest groups and ISPs, and they are initiating copyright alert 
systems in violation of net neutrality). See also John Tarnoff, We Don't Need Six 
Strikes, HUFFINGTON POST, March 7, 2013, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/john-
tarnoff/we-dont-need-six-strikes_b_2831489.html; Ernesto, MPAA: BitTorrent is 
the Best Way to Pirate Movies and TV-Shows, TORRENTFREAK, March 23, 2013, 
http://torrentfreak.com/mpaa-bittorrent-is-the-best-way-to-pirate-movies-and-tv-
shows-130323/ ("The MPAA, RIAA and the Internet providers participating in 
the "six strikes" anti-piracy scheme have informed the Congressional Internet 
Caucus Advisory Committee about their plans."); Kneecapping the Future: 
Comcast’s Unjustified Internet Caps and the Plan to Kill Video Competition, 
FREE PRESS, June 25, 2012, http://www.savetheinternet.com/sites/default/files/ 
resources/Comcast%20New%20Caps%20 Factsheet_FINAL.pdf (reporting that 
Comcast has a cap on the data an internet subscriber can download through 
Comcast, but exempted its video provider Xfinity); The Facts About AT&T’s 
Facetime Blocking, FREE PRESS (Sept. 20, 2012), http://www.savetheinternet. 
com/sites/default/files/att-factsheet-fp.pdf. 
19 See Larry Magid, What Are SOPA and PIPA And Why All the Fuss?, FORBES 
(Jan. 18, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/larrymagid/2012/01/18/what-are-
sopa-and-pipa-and-why-all-the-fuss/ (noting that the laws pit the tech industry 
against the entertainment industry); Erik Kain, Final Draft of ACTA Watered 
Down, TPP Still Dangerous on IP Rules, FORBES (Jan. 28, 2012), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/erikkain/2012/01/28/final-draft-of-acta-watered-
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the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) net neutrality 
rules and the First Amendment, these self-help measures are 
illegal.20 The major content owners’ zeal comes from an overblown 
concept of property alone. Not unlike the fate of property claims in 
the African American slaves of 1865,21 the People may eventually 
recognize some of the property claims of the Motion Picture 
Association of America (MPAA) and the Recording Industry 
Association of America (RIAA) as baseless, destructive and 
immoral.22 
Granting absolute claims to intangible property would also 
put unbearable pressure on the U.S. Constitution that was written in 
the time of Blackstone—when property was necessarily physical.23 
                                                
down-tpp-still-dangerous-on-ip-rules/ (noting that ACTA would force the DMCA 
on developing nations and is a dangerous law to pass); David Meyer, ACTA 
Rejected by Europe, Leaving The Treaty Near Dead, ZDNET (July 4, 2012), 
http://www.zdnet.com/acta-rejected-by-europe-leaving-copyright-treaty-near-
dead-7000000255/ (noting that massive protests in Europe prompted the 
European parliament to reject the treaty). 
20 Preserving the Open Internet, 47 C.F.R. § 8 (2011); U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
21 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII (The Thirteenth Amendment abolished property 
rights in people in 1865. This is a perfect example of how human rights can win 
out over property rights). 
22 Compare Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 
83 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1033 (2005) ("Courts and commentators . . . make a 
subconscious move, one that the economic theory of property does not justify: 
they jump from the idea that intellectual property is property to the idea that the 
IP owner is entitled to capture the full social value of her right."), with Hillary 
Clinton, then acting U.S. Secretary of State, Trafficking in Persons Report, at 20, 
THE U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, (June 2012) available at http://www.state.gov/ 
documents/organization/192587.pdf (noting that many corporate supply chains 
have been found to have been tainted with slavery, also noting that an estimated 
20.9 million modern slaves exist today and that it constitutes an estimated $20 
billion dollar industry globally). See also President Barak Obama, Fact Sheet: the 
Obama Administration Announces Efforts to Combat Human Trafficking at 
Home and Abroad, THE WHITE HOUSE, Sept. 25, 2012 (The President said that 
modern slavery should "concern every business, because it distorts markets."). 
23 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *316–17, *396–97 (Noting that 
there is a difference between grant and livery to account for the incorporeal 
aspects of estates. "Grants, concessiones; the regular method by the common law 
of transferring the property of incorporeal hereditaments, or such things whereof 
8 JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW & POLICY Vol. 35:1 
In fact, a strict positivist approach to property would characterize a 
right to free speech as intangible property. Such a 
mischaracterization trivializes violations of the First Amendment.24 
A property right in free speech would make it seem like the 
marketplace-of-ideas in itself is a monetizable commodity.25 If the 
                                                
no livery can be had. For which reason all corporeal hereditaments, as lands and 
houses, are said to lie in livery; and the others, as advowsons, commons, rents, 
reversions, etc., to lie in grant." Also noting that other than physical property "in 
things personal" held in absolute possession, there were natural goods like light 
and water that could only held in a qualified (i.e. less than absolute) possession. 
Finally, Blackstone recognized "property in action" which "depends entirely upon 
contracts." Thus, property was once parsed into categories and absolute rights 
were only granted to physical property held in absolute possession). See 
Vandevelde, supra note 13, at 333 ("The courts of Blackstone's era claimed to be 
protecting the possession of things." As such, incorporeal rights were only 
granted in limitation and depended on contract law until it "had been reified, and 
the resulting thing was owned absolutely."). 
24 See, e.g., DVD Copy Control Ass'n, Inc. v. Bunner, 31 Cal. 4th 864, 881 
(2003) (holding that "[t]he First Amendment does not prohibit courts from 
incidentally enjoining speech in order to protect a legitimate property right.") 
(citing San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 
522, 537–40 (1987) (a trademark case that enjoined the use of the word 
"Olympic" in advertising without permission from the Olympic Committee)). 
25 Compare Utah Gospel Mission v. Salt Lake City Corp., 425 F.3d 1249, 1256 
(10th Cir. 2005) (finding that Salt Lake City's sale of its Main Street Plaza, 
including public use easement, to the LDS church for a total of $13.375 million 
to manage it as an "ecclesiastical park" constituted a relinquishment of any first 
amendment free speech rights in the town square. Thus, private ownership in a 
traditionally public forum ousted public rights to free speech), with Paul 
Barbagallo, Verizon First Amendment Challenge of Net Neutrality Tests Century 
of Regulation, BLOOMBERG BNA, Jan. 24, 2013, http://www.bna.com/verizon-
first-amendment-n17179872014/ (noting that Verizon's recent challenge seeks to 
destroy any First Amendment justification for FCC prophylactic regulation to 
protect free speech over the internet because internet networks are privately 
owned and operated by corporations). See also Nicole Radzievich, Law Professor 
Takes Issue with Free-Speech Restrictions at Steel Stacks, LEHIGH VALLEY'S 
NEWSPAPER: THE MORNING CALL, Oct. 11, 2012, http://articles.mcall.com/2012-
10-11/news/mc-bethlehem-steelstacks-free-speech-20121011_1_seth-moglen-
restrictions-aim-steelstacks (noting that local governments and organizations are 
cleverly drafting free speech restrictions in under the guise of private property, in 
deed restrictions regarding public forums – Unclear wording/sentence structure; 
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rights guaranteed in the Constitution are propertized and valuated, 
some may begin to believe that rights guaranteed by the 
Constitution may not only be purchased, but also placed in the 
“despotic dominion” of a private owner.26 This is exactly the hope 
of those who would maximize copyright and patent rights beyond 
the express limits to the Copyright and Patent Clauses.27 
Before the strong upswing of positivist thought took hold in 
the early twentieth century,28 property in a legal sense was bound to 
be physical and absolute.29 In other words, the protection of 
intangibles was perceived as mere covenant or promise unless or 
until it resulted in a legal claim to actual physical property.30 As all 
property presumably had something physical backing up the 
property claim, it was easy to require due diligence on the part of 
the buyer and seller to value the property correctly before a 
property sale.31 However, buyer’s remorse is not so easily applied 
                                                
do you mean to say:  “in deed restrictions regarding public forums, local 
governments and organizations are cleverly drafting free speech restrictions 
under the guise of private property.” ). 
26 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2. 
27 Landes & Posner, supra note 17, at 517–18. But see Dowling v. U.S., 473 
U.S. 207, 216–17 (1985) (reasoning that a copyright is "no ordinary chattel."); 
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 540 (1985) 
(noting that "[t]he First Amendment's protections [are] embodied in the 
[Copyright] Act's distinction between copyrightable expression and 
uncopyrightable facts and ideas, and the latitude for scholarship and comment 
traditionally afforded by fair use."); Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., No. 
11–697, slip op. at 19, 31 (2013) (noting the objective of copyright in the 
constitution is "Progress in Science and useful Arts," as well as  noting that “the 
Constitution describtes the nature of American copyright law[as] providing 
Congress with the power to 'secur[e]' to '[a]uthors' 'for limited [t]imes' the 
'exclusive [r]ight to their . . . [w]ritings.'") (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8). 
28 Hohfeld I, supra note 13, at 19 (noting that all valuable interests can be 
conceptualized as property). See generally Hohfeld II, supra note 13, at 712–13 
(1917). See Vandevelde, supra note 13, at 357. 
29 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *316–17, *396–97. See 
Vandevelde, supra note 13, at 333–35. 
30 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *316–17, *396–97. 
31 Sherwood v. Walker, 66 Mich. 568, 577, 33 N.W. 919, 923 (1887) (deciding 
that, where the buyer of a cow believes the cow to be a breading cow, and finds, 
10 JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW & POLICY Vol. 35:1 
in cases of intangible property for the simple reason that there is 
nothing physically there to inspect. Thus scholars suggest that 
intangible property rights should be inherently limited.32 However, 
intangible property owners do not seem to share this idea. 
Unheeded by most, the dangers ahead continue to mount as 
intangible assets continue their dauntless course toward 
maximization as an absolute form of property. Companies 
worldwide have been mindlessly criticized for not claiming 
hundreds of billions of dollars of intangible value including 
unclaimed marketplace goodwill.33 In fact, overvalued intangible 
property has proven to have a serious detrimental effect on pension 
funds, retirement and the stock market.34 Shareholders continue to 
                                                
after the fact, that the cow is barren, the buyer does not have a contract remedy 
when the buyer could have inspected the cow beforehand. The court reasoned 
that "the mistake was not of the mere quality of the animal, but went to the very 
nature of the thing. A barren cow is substantially a different creature than a 
breeding one."). See also Wood v. Boynton, 64 Wis. 265, 25 N.W. 42, 44 (1885) 
(deciding that a person who sold a diamond for a dollar, because she was ignorant 
of the "nature and value" of the stone, did not have a contract remedy for making 
a bad bargain. "If she chose to sell it without further investigation as to its 
intrinsic value to a person who was guilty of no fraud or unfairness which 
induced her to sell it for a small sum, she cannot repudiate the sale because it is 
afterwards ascertained that she made a bad bargain."); John Patrick Hunt, Taking 
Bubbles Seriously in Contract Law, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 681, 693 (2011). 
32 Vandevelde, supra note 13, at 357–58 ("This new property had been 
dephysicalized and thus consisted not of rights over things, but of any valuable 
right. The new property had also been limited. It consisted not of an absolute or 
fixed constellation of rights, but of a set of rights which are limited according to 
the situation."). 
33 Tim Boreham, IP assets a closed book for most companies, THE AUSTRALIAN, 
April 5, 2013, http://www.theaustralian.com.au/ business/opinion/ip-assets-a-
closed-book-for-most-companies/story-e6frg9lo-1226612839028 (noting that, in 
a disagreement regarding the going value of international businesses, a possible 
value of $850 billion, $250 billion pertained to the value of unrecorded IP assets 
a possible $850 billion valuation disagreement regarding going value of 
international businesses, $250 billion of which pertained to the value of 
unrecorded IP assets, like brand recognition). 
34 James B. Stewart, Bad Directors and Why They Aren't Thrown Out, N. Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 29, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/30/business/why-bad-
directors-arent-thrown-out.html?_r=0 (noting that HP’s purchase of Autonomy, a 
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have very little recourse when public businesses write off bad 
acquisitions of intangibles worth billions.35 The problem has 
infected our government to the highest levels. For instance, in 2011, 
the U.S. treasury’s valuation of the U.S. varied by $2 trillion from 
Standard and Poor’s valuation.36 Furthermore, estimates of the daily 
U.S. hedging activity including futures and option contracts is 
around $4 trillion. In contrast, the underlying daily trade of physical 
merchandise is only $40 billion.37 This constitutes a 100:1 ratio of 
the trade of intangibles in the form of options and futures to the 
underlying physical property value being traded. Furthermore, 
when contracts involving intangibles are ripe for judicial review, 
judges are told to look the other way.38 Lawmakers should not listen 
to such requests because intangibles have played a central role in 
the generation of massive deadweight losses that have been 
shamelessly foisted onto the U.S. government and the middle class. 
                                                
British software maker, for $11.1 billion, was "the worst corporate acquisition" in 
history, even though HP later attributed $8.8 billion of that price to fraud;  being 
HP's purchase of Autonomy, a British software maker, for $11.1 billion. HP later 
wrote off $8.8 billion of that price, claiming that it had been defrauded—also 
noting that HP's failure had a detrimental effect on New York City's pension 
fund.). 
35 See, e.g., Amy Thompson, Microsoft Drops After Goldman Says PC Market 
Share Will Falter, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, April 11, 2013, http://www. 
sfgate.com/business/bloomberg/article/Microsoft-Drops-After-Goldman-Says-
PC-Market-4427371.php (noting a possible overvaluation of Microsoft Window's 
8 software IP). 
36 Ian Katz &Vinny Del Giudice, S&P's Analysis was Flawed by $2 Trillion 
Error, Treasury Says, BLOOMBERG, Aug. 5, 2011, http://www.bloomberg.com/ 
news/2011-08-06/s-p-s-analysis-was-flawed-by-2-trillion-error-treasury-
says.html (when the going value of businesses and countries are given the color 
of property, future projections of value become fixed in the present as if they are 
real and as such projections can vary wildly.). 
37 STOCKMAN, supra note 3, at 289 (an estimated $3.96 trillion dollar gap 
between future and actual tangible property is traded every day). 
38 Brief of Antitrust Economists as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, 23-
24, Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013) (No. 12-
416), 2013 WL 836946; Friedman, supra note 16, at 636; Hirschler, supra note 
14. 
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This article puts forth one central argument: The hyper-
broad concept of property used to justify absolutist claims to 
intangible property is unconstitutional. This article demonstrates 
how a principle of honesty enforced by the Court can keep 
intangible property claims within the bounds of the constitution. 
Furthermore, a principle of honesty can be used to protect property 
common law from the political fallout driven by the highly 
contentious valuations of intangibles that have escalated to 
differences in valuation within the trillions of dollars. Finally, 
enforcing honesty in the courts will enable the lower and middle 
classes to continue to better themselves by participating in the 
marketplace. 
To arrive at a principle of honesty, this article discusses the 
role of intangible property in constitutional interpretation. In Part I 
it analyzes the recent Sebelius and Kirtsaeng decisions, arguing that 
a reevaluation of Constitutional interpretation is currently 
underway. Then, in Part II this article lays out the current concept 
of property discourse (centered on a Liberal/Libertarian debate) and 
its role in spurring America on a course toward worldwide 
intangible property maximization. Finally, in Part III this article 
will propose that the Court reclaim a standard of honesty in the 
context of property rights analysis as a minimum formality 
requirement. The marketplace allowance of shameless dishonesty in 
the creation, marketing and valuation of intangible property as if it 
is physical or tangible has exacerbated and accelerated market 
failure to a global crescendo in 2008. Thus, all lawmakers should 
take a clearer stance against this type of dishonesty in the future. 
PART I: THE ROLE OF PROPERTY IN CONSTITUTIONAL 
INTERPRETATION 
According to the Commerce Clause, Congress can regulate 
“things” in interstate commerce.39 These “things” Congress can 
regulate are informed by claims to property in a broadening class of 
items. For example, Justice Ginsberg’s concurrence in Sebelius 
sought to assert a strong property right in medical licenses against 
                                                
39 U.S. CONST. art.I, § 8, cl. 3. 
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any poor, lower class citizen who would not have been able to 
afford the costs of necessary medical services. The federal 
government, according to Justice Ginsberg, should be accorded the 
authority to coerce lower class, impoverished Americans to 
purchase insurance to ensure that doctors always get paid. With this 
cart before the horse view, poor people that depend on free medical 
services from licensed professionals are seen as trespassers. This 
section will consider the new Sebelius decision regarding the 
function of the Article I Constitutional grants of legislative power, 
and its possible effect on past decisions. Finally it will discuss the 
Kirtsaeng decision that interpreted common law property rights as a 
limitation on copyright protection. 
The Sebelius Decision 
With its recent decision regarding the Affordable Care Act, 
known popularly as Obamacare, the Supreme Court reached 
perhaps its most pivotal Constitutional law decision since Brown v. 
Board of Education.40 Three concurrences carried the day,41 without 
a clear majority opinion on exactly how the Commerce and 
Necessary and Proper Clauses interact with other Article I grants of 
legislative power. However, one majority found that the Commerce 
Clause could not be used to enact a penalty-tax and mandate for 
Americans to buy health insurance.42 A second majority held that 
nevertheless, the tax clause could justify the penalty-tax and 
mandate even without Commerce Clause support.43 Only Chief 
Justice Roberts found that both of these propositions may legally 
                                                
40 Compare Nat’l Fed. of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012), with 
Brown v. Bd. of Ed. of Topeka, Shawnee County, Kan., 347 U.S. 483, 492 
(1954) supplemented sub nom. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, Kan., 349 U.S. 
294 (1955). 
41 Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2566, 2609, 2642 (Ginsberg, J. concurring in part, 
concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part) (Kennedy, J. 
dissenting). 
42 Id. (Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas and Alito). 
43 Id. (Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Breyer, Kagan, Ginsberg and 
Sotomayor). 
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coexist.44 None of the Justices considered the practical effect of 
their decision as a work around for the Constitutional limit that all 
Federal taxes be “uniform.”45 
None of the Justices intended to underwrite a workaround 
for limits on the legislative grants of power in Article I in general. 
However, Chief Justice Roberts (with the support of the Ginsberg 
concurrence for purposes of the remedy) put forward a hands-off 
approach that may indicate that he would allow de facto 
workarounds.46 Because the Chief Justice also found that states 
cannot be coerced to expand Medicaid, only the states opting in 
would be subject to the penalty-tax. The practical result is a non-
uniform federal tax that only Chief Justice Roberts held up as 
constitutional. 
This penalty-tax is no ordinary tax or penalty.47 In order to 
avoid being struck under the Anti-Injunction Act,48 the Chief 
Justice decided that it was actually a penalty for purposes of the 
statute.49 On the other hand, he decided that the penalty was a tax 
for the purpose of constitutionality under the Tax Clause.50 
However, every Justice other than the Chief Justice agreed that this 
sort of two-sided finagling was either not needed or not justified.51 
                                                
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
46 Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2608 ("the Court does not express any opinion on the 
wisdom of the Affordable Care Act. Under the Constitution, that judgment is 
reserved for the people."). 
47 Id. at 2566 (finding a penalty payable to the IRS.). 
48 Anti-Injunction Act, 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a) (2013) (baring suits to "restrain the 
assessment or collection of any tax."). 
49 Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2584 ("The Affordable Care Act does not require that 
the penalty for failing to comply with the individual mandate be treated as a tax 
for proposes of the Anti-Injunction Act."). 
50 Id. at 2600 ("The Affordable Care Act's requirement that certain individuals 
pay a financial penalty for not obtaining health insurance may reasonably be 
characterized as a tax. Because the Constitution permits such a tax, it is not our 
role to forbid it, or to pass upon its wisdom or fairness."). 
51 Id. at 2609 (Ginsberg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in 
part, and dissenting in part) ("The Chief Justice's crabbed reading of the 
Commerce Clause harks back to the era in which the Court routinely thwarted 
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The Ginsberg concurrence noted that judicial treatment of the 
Commerce Clause should continue to justify tax-like laws like 
this.52 The Kennedy dissent decided that the Affordable Care Act 
should be overturned because the Commerce Clause should not 
justify the law as enacted, and because the individual mandate 
cannot be a penalty for purposes of the Anti-Injunction Act and a 
tax for purposes of the Tax Clause.53 Justice Thomas especially 
made clear in his own concurring dissent that the substantial effects 
test itself should be wholly removed.54 
A majority of the court centered their opinions on a 
determination of the scope of the Commerce Clause. Furthermore, 
the de facto majority did not attempt to give a workable definition 
of interstate commerce other than the one already existing. Thus, 
Chief Justice Roberts’ interpretation of the Necessary and Proper 
Clause as a limit on the Commerce Clause carried the day, but 
should not control future Constitutional interpretation. This reading 
of the Necessary and Proper Clause should still be seen as a 
minority view.55 However, the view that the Commerce Clause is 
                                                
Congress' efforts to regulate the national economy in the interest of those who 
labor to sustain it." Essentially, the tax for one purpose and penalty for another is 
merely dicta in Ginsberg's dissent because the Commerce Clause is already 
sufficient to justify the Affordable Care Act making the legitimacy of Congress' 
tax power to support the individual mandate an "auxiliary holding." She did not 
discuss the Anti-Injunction Act.); Id. at 2647 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("As we 
said at the outset, whereas the precise scope of the Commerce Clause and the 
Necessary and Proper Clause is uncertain, the proposition that the Federal 
Government cannot do everything is a fundamental precept."). 
52 Id. at 2609 (Ginsberg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in 
part, and dissenting in part) (arguing that the Chief Justice's reading of the 
Commerce Clause "should not have staying power."). 
53 Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2656 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("What the Government 
would have us believe in these cases is that the very same textual indications that 
show this is not a tax under the Anti-Injunction Act show that it is a tax under the 
Constitution. That carries verbal wizardry too far, deep into the forbidden land of 
the sophists."). 
54 Id. at 2677 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
55 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (Past Supreme Court decisions about the Necessary & 
Proper Clause stretching back to McCulloch v. Maryland allowed Congress the 
necessary regulatory power to institute effective regulation and remains 
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somehow more limited than it had been is a majority view over 
Justice Ginsberg’s concurrence.56 
Thus, the Sebelius decision seems to announce that our 
constitutional interpretation has shifted, and that the Commerce 
Clause is now more limited than it was in the past.57 In response to 
Chief Justice Roberts’ concern that constitutional provisions are 
being rendered “superfluous” this article will turn to IP law. Past IP 
case law that had relied on an expansive reading of the Commerce 
Clause provides a useful lens to propose an agreeable limit on 
Commerce Clause application going forward. The Article I grants 
of power must coexist, including the limits to each grant of power. 
To this end, by adopting reasonable limits to Congress’s Commerce 
Power informed by the First Amendment and the Copyright and 
Patent Clauses, the Court may also protect property law itself from 
being commandeered by interests in intangible property.58 The 
result would be a rationalized constitutional interpretation that 
functions independently from the economic interests of those who 
                                                
controlling); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 324, 421 (1819) ("Let the end 
be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which 
are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, 
but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional."). See 
also Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 432 (1920); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 
6–19 (1957) (deciding that though the Necessary and Proper Clause may increase 
the scope of regulatory power granted to Congress, Congress may not invoke the 
Necessary and Proper Clause merely to comply with a treaty that would 
otherwise override an express prohibition in the Constitution). 
56 Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2609 (Ginsberg, J. concurring in part, concurring in the 
judgment in part, and dissenting in part) (Justice Ginsberg's constitutional 
interpretation included herself and Justices Breyer, Kagan, and Sotomayor. This 
is a four Justice minority interpretation.). 
57 Id. at 2586 (The Chief Justice seems to have limited his constitutional 
interpretation in such a way as to give every provision effect: "If the power to 
'regulate' something included the power to create it, many of the provisions in the 
Constitution would be superfluous."). 
58 Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., No. 11–697, slip op. (2013) (using 
property common law rights in physical property that may contain copyrighted 
works to limit ambiguous portions of the copyright act). 
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engage in dishonest practices in the creation, valuation and 
allocation of intangibles. 
In fact, an unbridled conception of intangible property rights 
undertook a subtle but powerful role underlying the Sebelius 
decision. In Justice Ginsberg’s concurrence, she noted that the 
legislature enacted the changes to the Medicaid program as a 
solution to a “free-riding problem.”59 Ginsberg implicitly validated, 
and no other Justice challenged, that there actually is a free-riding 
problem in the American health system. The idea that the existence 
of poverty itself creates free-riders, and that being a sick, poor 
person in need of medical help makes a person by their very nature 
a trespasser is an abominable notion. The concept of property itself, 
first adopted to ensure the equality of class,60 becomes an 
oxymoron when it is used to label the weakest and poorest among 
us as trespassers by their very nature of being impoverished and in 
need of care. 
This characterization is an absolutist claim to intangible 
property at work. Medical licenses, the intangibles in play here, are 
not supposed to carry with them a property assurance that all 
services performed by medical professionals will be paid for. It is 
good and right in any society of mortals, that doctors and hospitals 
                                                
59 Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2623 (Ginsberg, J. concurring in part, concurring in the 
judgment in part, and dissenting in part). Cf. Lemley, supra note 22, at 1043 
n.48–54 (giving a number of examples of how IP courts are preoccupied with 
uprooting free riders); Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning Information: Intellectual 
Property and the Restitutionary Impulse, 78 VA. L. REV. 149, 167 (1992) ("A 
culture could not exist if all free riding were prohibited within it."); PHILLIP E. 
AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, 2 THE FUNDAMENTALS OF ANTITRUST LAW 
818 (Aspen Law & Business ed., 2002) ("Our initial examples of free riding on 
another's innovation or property beautification indicate that free riding is both 
widespread and socially tolerated unless society enacts special legislation to 
control it, such as the patent laws."). 
60 Letter From John Adams to James Sullivan, May 26, 1776, in 9 THE WORKS 
OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 6, at 375–78 (arguing that in order to promote "equal 
liberty," voting and property rights should be given to women). See also Thomas 
C. Grey, The Disintegration of Property, in PROPERTY NOMOS XXII 69 (New 
York Univ. Press 1980) ("property conceived as the control of a piece of the 
material world by a single individual meant freedom and equality of status."). 
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would be expected to write off some of their practices to help “the 
least of these.”61 These costs should never be and should never have 
been characterized as free-riding on a type of property. A standard 
of honesty is a practicable way for the Judiciary to adjudicate these 
types of property claims, as they are of the dishonest type that 
nearly destroyed our nation in 2008. Furthermore, such a standard 
would limit the Commerce Clause power in a way not only 
distinguishable from the Lochner era, but hopefully also acceptable 
to Justice Ginsberg herself who feared the era’s reemergence.62 
The Pre-Sebelius IP Cases 
The Second and Eleventh Circuits have drawn upon a 
number of Supreme Court interpretations of the Commerce Clause 
to uphold the copyright bootlegging provision as constitutional. 
Both found that the Copyright Clause does not positively forbid 
Congress “from extending copyright-like protection under other 
constitutional clauses, such as the Commerce Clause, to works of 
authorship that may not meet the fixation requirement inherent in 
the term ‘Writings.’”63 However, both also recognized the Supreme 
Court’s acknowledgement that “in some circumstances the 
Commerce Clause cannot be used to eradicate a limitation placed 
                                                
61 Matthew 25:40 ("Truly I tell you, whatever you did for one of the least of 
these brothers and sisters of mine, you did for me."). 
62 Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2609 (Ginsberg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the 
judgment in part, and dissenting in part). 
63 U.S. v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1280–81 (11th Cir. 1999) (it is notable 
that this case did not consider the "limited times" limit because it was not raised 
in trial whereas Martignon did). See also U.S. v. Martignon, 492 F.3d 140, 149, 
152 (2d Cir. 2007) ("Congress exceeds its power under the Commerce Clause by 
transgressing limitations of the Copyright Clause only when (1) the law it enacts 
is an exercise of the power granted Congress by the Copyright Clause and (2) the 
resulting law violates one or more specific limits of the Copyright Clause." But, 
"[g]iven the nexus between bootlegging and commerce, it is clear that absent any 
limitations stemming from the Copyright Clause, Congress would have had the 
power to enact [the Bootlegging Provision] under the Commerce Clause."). 
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upon Congressional power in another grant of power.”64 However, 
both decisions seized on a weak logical inference from case law; 
that because Gibbons struck a tax law and not a tax-like law for 
being non-uniform, the Commerce Clause could not act as a 
workaround for an actual “copyright law” but could act as a 
workaround for “copyright-like laws.”65 
The Commerce Clause allows Congress to regulate the 
“channels of interstate commerce”, instrumentalities, persons or 
things in interstate commerce, and “intrastate activities that 
substantially affect interstate commerce.”66 Thus, the applicable test 
was “whether a rational basis existed for concluding that a regulated 
activity sufficiently affected interstate commerce.”67 The substantial 
                                                
64 Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1279–80 (citing Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n v. 
Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457, 468–69 (1982) ("[I]if we were to hold that Congress had 
the power to enact nonuniform bankruptcy laws pursuant to the Commerce 
Clause, we would eradicate form the Constitution a limitation on the power of 
Congress to enact bankruptcy laws.")). See also Martignon, 492 F.3d at 149. 
65 Martignon, 492 F.3d at 150 ("[I]n order to demonstrate unconstitutionality, 
Martignon must establish that [the Bootlegging Provision] is a copyright law and 
not just that it is copyright-like.") (citing Gibbons, 45 U.S. at 465; Heart of 
Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. U. S., 379 U.S. 241, 261 (1964); In re Trade-Mark Cases, 
100 U.S. 82, 89 (1879)); Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1280 (citing Gibbons 45 U.S. at 
465; Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 261; Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 89). See 
also Kiss Catalog, Ltd. v. Passport Int'l Prods., Inc., 405 F. Supp. 2d 1169, 1176 
(C.D. Cal. 2005) ("In contrast to [Gibbons], the question is not whether 
legislation empowered by the Copyright Clause—but invalid under it—can 
otherwise be empowered by the Commerce Clause. The question is whether 
matters not encompassed within the Copyright Clause can be addressed by the 
Commerce Clause free of the restrictions of the Copyright Clause. The answer to 
that question is, clearly, yes."). But see Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2586 (2012) 
(the answer is not clearly yes anymore). 
66 Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1275 (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 
558–59 (1995) ("The Commerce Clause empowers Congress to legislate 
regarding three things: (i) the use of channels of interstate commerce; (ii) 
instrumentalities and persons or things in interstate commerce; and (iii) intrastate 
activities that substantially effect interstate commerce.")). See also Martignon, 
492 F.3d at 152–53. 
67 Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1275 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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effects test required a law to “bear more than a generic relationship 
to several steps removed from interstate commerce and it must be a 
relationship that is apparent, not creatively inferred.”68 
Martignon and Moghadam upheld a criminal statute known 
as the Copyright Bootlegging Provision as bearing the requisite 
apparent relationship to interstate commerce.69 The provision 
provides criminal relief of five years of imprisonment (or ten years 
for the second offense) when a person, “without the consent of the 
performer or performers, ‘knowingly’ and for ‘commercial 
advantage or private financial gain’ (1) fixes the sounds or sounds 
and images of a live musical performance in a copy or phonorecord, 
or reproduces copies or phonorecords of such a performance from 
an unauthorized fixation, (2) transmits or otherwise communicates 
to the public the sounds or images of a live musical performance, or 
(3) distributes or offers to distribute, sells or offers to sell, rents or 
offers to rent or traffics in any recording described in (1).”70 
Finally, Congress believed that it was legislating under its grant of 
power from the Copyright Clause so it did not include a 
jurisdictional element to the law, which would normally appear in 
laws enacted under the Commerce Clause.71 Nevertheless, the 
courts decided that the court could, on its own initiative, test the 
                                                
68 Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1275 (quoting United States v. Wright, 117 F.3d 
1265, 1270 (11th Cir. 1997) opinion vacated in part on reh'g, 133 F.3d 1412 
(11th Cir. 1998) (cert denied, 525 U.S. 894) (vacated on other grounds) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
69 Anti-Bootlegging Provisions, 18 U.S.C. § 2319A (2006). 
70 Martignon, 492 F.3d at 142–43 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2319A (2006)). See 
Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1272. 
71 Martignon, 492 F.3d at 143 (citing S. REP. NO. 103-412, at 224 (1994)); 
Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1275 ("Congress thought it was acting under the 
Copyright Clause") (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562–63 ("Congressional findings 
would enable us to evaluate the legislative judgment that the activity in question 
substantially affected interstate commerce, even though no such substantial effect 
was visible to the naked eye. . . . Congress normally is not required to make 
[such] formal findings.")). 
 Bringing America Back to the Future 21 
jurisdictional scope and decide whether the statute fits within the 
limit of interstate commerce.72 
Martignon found that the Bootlegging Provision “regulates 
only fixing, selling, distributing, and copying with a commercial 
motive, activities at the core of the Commerce Clause.”73 But this is 
assuming that intangibles act the same way marijuana, a tangible 
good, does. Moghadam cited to Wickard, a Supreme Court opinion 
about farming wheat that held a Federal law constitutional even 
though it regulated growing wheat for home consumption because it 
depressed interstate commerce.74 Again, wheat is a tangible good. 
Moghadam distinguished itself from Lopez, a Supreme Court 
opinion that struck a law banning guns within 1000 feet of a school 
because it “ha[d] nothing to do with ‘commerce’ or any sort of 
economic enterprise, however broadly one might define those 
terms.”75 In so doing it concluded “the antibootlegging statute has a 
sufficient connection to interstate and foreign commerce to meet the 
Lopez test.”76 
The Second and Eleventh Circuits arrived at their 
conclusions about how bootlegging implicates commerce by mixing 
in an expansive conception of property.77 In fact, Martignon said of 
the bootlegging provisions that “[i]t is, perhaps, analogous to the 
law of criminal trespass.”78 Both Moghadam and Martignon 
included trademark and copyright under the category of 
“Intellectual Property” and decided that trademark laws are thus 
                                                
72 Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1276 ("The absence of such a jurisdictional element 
simply means that courts must determine independently whether the statute 
regulates activities that arise out of or are connected with a commercial 
transaction, which viewed in the aggregate, substantially affect[] interstate 
commerce.") (quoting Lopez 514 U.S. at 561) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
73 Martignon, 492 F.3d at 152 (citing Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 25 (2005)). 
74 Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1276. 
75 Id. (citing Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127–28 (1942); Lopez 514 U.S. 
at 561). 
76 Id. at 1277. 
77 Martignon, 492 F.3d at 150–51 ("[T]hough allocation of property rights is not 
a sufficient condition for calling something a copyright law… it is a necessary 
one."); Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1278. 
78 Martignon, 492 F.3d at 151. 
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copyright-like laws that are entirely enacted under the Commerce 
Clause.79 Thus, both courts decided that copyright-like acts could 
be justified under the Commerce Clause even if they would have 
exceeded limits had they been enacted under the Copyright 
Clause.80 Then the courts distinguished the fact that a law against 
criminal trademark infringement was unconstitutional because there 
was no jurisdictional element to trigger criminal penalties because 
the Trade-mark Cases predated the New Deal expansion of the 
Commerce Clause.81 In effect, the court used property to draw an 
analogy between trademark and copyright that perhaps it ought 
not.82 Then the court used a mere property analogy to infer 
Commerce Clause authority, when trademarks can implicate 
                                                
79 Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1278–79 ("Indeed, modern trademark law is built 
entirely on the Commerce Clause. . . . and we have found no case which suggests 
that trademark law's conferral of protection on unoriginal works somehow runs 
afoul of the Copyright Clause.") (citing Michael B. Gerdes, Getting Beyond 
Constitutionally Mandated Originality As A Prerequisite for Federal Copyright 
Protection, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1461, 1470 (1992) ("The constitutionality of current 
federal trade-mark legislation . . . supports the conclusion that the Copyright 
Clause does not limit Congress's Commerce Clause power to grant copyright-like 
protection."); Martignon, 492 F.3d at 146 ("[W]hen an intellectual property law 
could not have been enacted pursuant to the Copyright Clause because it governs 
works that lack originality, a court should alternatively consider whether it was 
validly enacted under the Commerce Clause.") (citing In re Trade-Mark Cases, 
100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879) (noting that trademark protection does not require 
originality, however that criminal trademark protection was not bound by 
interstate commerce and thus was unconstitutional). 
80 Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1278. 
81 Id. 
82 The Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006) (Trademarks are defined as 
anything that signifies in the minds of consumers the origin of goods or services. 
This means that granting trademarks protection is entirely driven by a goal of 
minimizing customer confusion and is limited by it. This also means that a 
trademark is necessarily connected or affixed to a certain class of good, and alone 
the mark is no trademark and is not protected). See also Chance v. Pac-Tel 
Teletrac Inc., 242 F.3d 1151, 1157 (9th Cir. 2001) (explaining that token uses 
merely to reserve a mark are not enough to create a trademark protection, and that 
to have trademark protection a trademark owner must have engaged in an actual, 
bona fide use of the trademark in connection with goods or services). 
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interstate commerce whether or not they are labeled “Intellectual 
Property” because they are necessarily affixed to goods that are 
bought and sold to minimize customer confusion. Copyright laws 
neither share this inherent nexus with the marketplace for tangible 
goods nor the purpose of minimizing customer confusion. Thus, 
trademark laws are probably not copyright-like laws at all and they 
do not need an analogy to being intangible property to implicate 
interstate commerce. 
The purpose of justifying the bootlegging provisions under 
the Commerce Clause was to address two of the Copyright Clause 
limits it allegedly breached.83 The district court found in Martignon 
that, “Congress may not, if the Copyright Clause does not allow for 
such legislation, enact the law under a separate grant of power, even 
when that separate grant provides proper authority.”84 In fact, this 
finding seems to agree with prior Supreme Court precedent as well, 
that the Copyright Clause is “both a grant of power and a 
limitation.”85 Recognizing these limits, the Second Circuit said that 
the question in Martignon was “the extent to which the Copyright 
Clause can be read to limit Congress’s power to enact legislation 
under the Commerce Clause.”86 However, the Second Circuit 
overturned the district court opinion and offered a work around for 
express Constitutional limits noting that “[s]ometimes Congress can 
enact legislation under one constitutional provision that it couldn’t 
under another.”87 
                                                
83 Martignon, 492 F.3d at 143–44 ("[T]he district court held that [the 
bootlegging provisions] could not be sustained under the Copyright Clause 
because it 'provides seemingly perpetual protection for unfixed musical 
performances.'") (quoting United States v. Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d 413, 423 
(S.D.N.Y. 2004)). 
84 United States v. Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d 413, 425 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) 
vacated and remanded, 492 F.3d 140 (2d Cir. 2007). 
85 Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 5 (1966). 
86 Martignon, 492 F.3d at 144 ("in limited instances, the expressed limitations on 
a clause do apply to externally to another clause") (citing Ry. Labor Executives' 
Ass'n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457, 468 (1982)). 
87 Id. at 146, 148 (The Heart of Atlanta court "simply reasoned that it didn't 
matter if Congress lacked the power to enact anti-discrimination legislation 
covering private actors under the Fourteenth Amendment as long as it possessed 
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Once Moghadam found that the Commerce Clause justified 
the constitutionality of the bootlegging provisions, the court refused 
to consider whether the Copyright Clause, or any other clause, 
sustains the legislation.88 However, had they looked closer at the 
copyright act itself they may have found a major problem with their 
reasoning. The Moghadam Court decided that though public 
performances are not “fixed” they are required to be fixed in order 
to be triggered, and thus concluded that it is not completely adverse 
to the fixation requirement. However, the Copyright Act’s 
definition of fixed already includes these sorts of recordings. 
The bootlegging provision’s fixation trigger directly collides 
with the Copyright Act’s broad definition of fixation that employs a 
legal fiction of “simultaneous fixation” in order to include 
transmissions of sporting events and other live televised 
performances. The Copyright Act states that a work is “‘fixed’ for 
purposes of this title if a fixation of the work is being made 
simultaneously with its transmission.”89 Thus the victims of 
bootlegging may already have a copyright infringement cause of 
action identical to the criminal bootlegging provision that is 
enacted, provided that they prove that they “authored” a recording 
of the performance. Yet televised performances are “copyright” and 
bootlegged televised performances are “copyright-like.” One is 
limited by the Copyright Clause and the other is not. Even so 
Moghadam boldly states that “common sense” dictates that the 
                                                
sufficient power under the Commerce Clause.") (citing Heart of Atlanta Motel, 
Inc. v. U.S., 379 U.S. 241, 250 (1964)). 
88 Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1277 ("[T]he various grants of legislative authority 
contained in the Constitution stand alone and must be independently analyzed.") 
(citing to Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 250 ("[W]e have therefore not considered 
the other grounds relied upon. This is not to say that the remaining authority upon 
which it acted was not adequate, a question upon which we do not pass but 
merely that since the commerce power is sufficient for our decision here we have 
considered it alone.")). 
89 Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (definition of "fixed"); H. R. REP. NO. 
94-1476 (1976) (commenting on the legal fiction of "simultaneous fixation"). 
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bootlegging provision is not at odds with the fixation requirement 
whereas Gibbons was in conflict with the uniform taxation limit.90 
Sebelius arguably overturns both Moghadam and Martignon 
in that the Commerce Clause may no longer be used to supplement 
other grants of legislative power.91 However, it is not clear whether 
the Commerce Clause is limited by definition,92 or by means of the 
Necessary and Proper Clause.93 The practical effect of the opinion 
of the court, which was underwritten by the Ginsberg dissent for 
purposes of the remedy, was that a Constitutional limit can be 
worked around even without the support of another grant of power 
like the Commerce Clause.94 However, according to Chief Justice 
Roberts it is unlikely that the Constitutional grounding will merely 
shift while leaving the ultimate outcome of Moghadam and 
Martignon intact because doing so would render some 
Constitutional provisions “superfluous.”95 Thus, the Court should 
hold that the Article I grants of power must coexist and thus not 
accept a reading of the constitution that leaves portions superfluous 
and without effect. 
Martignon was remanded to decide whether the traditional 
contours of copyright have been abandoned and whether the 
bootlegging provision violates First Amendment Free speech.96 
Though the issue was not decided, the government’s argument that 
it had the authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause might be 
                                                
90 Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1281. 
91 Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2586 (2012). Cf. Martignon, 492 F.3d at 150–51; 
Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1278. 
92 Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2643 (Kennedy, J. dissenting) (Congress cannot force 
someone into an interstate market in order to justify their regulation under the 
Commerce Clause). 
93 Id. at 2592, 2599 (noting that necessary and proper actually precludes 
improper laws). 
94 Id. at 2607; Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2630 (Ginsberg, J. concurring in part, 
concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part). 
95 Id. at 2586 (finding that if the Judiciary continued reading an over-expansive 
Commerce Clause power, "many of the provisions of the constitution would be 
superfluous."). 
96 Martignon, 492 F.3d at 143–44. See generally Moghadam, 175 F.3d (did not 
raise the First Amendment). 
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in conflict with Chief Justice Roberts’ constitutional 
interpretation.97 The Supreme Court has held that copyright law 
itself is not immune to First Amendment scrutiny.98 However, it 
also held that if the traditional contours are abided by, then First 
Amendment scrutiny is unlikely. The traditional contours of 
copyright include fair use and the idea/expression distinction.99 
Martignon and Moghadam pick up on a recurring theme in 
IP law: that international treaties play a significant role in judicial 
and legislative processes. The bootlegging provisions were one of 
the enactments of the World Trade Organization’s Uruguay Round 
Trade Agreements.100 The WTO currently embraces 159 countries 
as signatories to the agreements.101 Any international protection of 
IP must be gained through treaty. Furthermore, treaties are not 
automatically enacted in the United States. In order for a treaty to 
obtain the force of law it must also be enacted by Congress. 
However, treaties find support by those who wish to convince 
Congress to expand IP protection to that effect, as well as convince 
the judiciary that an enacted law is legitimate.102 
                                                
97 Compare Martignon, 492 F.3d at 143–44, with Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2592, 
2599 (noting that necessary and proper actually precludes improper laws). 
98 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219–21 (2003) (copyright acts are not 
"categorically immune to challenges under the First Amendment."). 
99 17 U.S.C. §§ 102, 107 (2013). See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation 
Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 540 (1985) ("[T]he First Amendment's protections [are] 
embodied in the [Copyright] Act's distinction between copyrightable expression 
and uncopyrightable facts and ideas, and the latitude for scholarship and 
comment traditionally afforded by fair use."). 
100 Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 
(1994). 
101 Understanding the WTO: The Organization, Members and Observers, 
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/ 
tif_e/org6_e.htm (159 members as of March 2, 2013) (last visited Apr. 19, 2013). 
102 Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1271 (citing Todd D. Patterson, The Uruguay 
Round's Anti-Bootlegging Provision: A Victory for Musical Artists and Record 
Companies, 15 WIS. INT'L L.J. 371, 380–83 (1997)); Martignon, 492 F.3d at 142. 
Cf. Zack Whittaker, How ACTA Would Affect You: FAQ, ZDNET (Jan. 29, 2012), 
http://www.zdnet.com/blog/london/how-acta-would-affect-you-faq/2773 
(explaining the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) which has not 
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—- 
The bootlegging provisions are only one of many ways 
Copyright law has tried to keep up with the times.103 Accordingly, a 
major law enacted to modernize copyright law was the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA). One of its purposes was to 
prevent pirates from making perfect copies of works that can be 
rapidly disseminated on the internet without restriction.104 Among 
its provisions, the DMCA states that “[n]o person shall circumvent 
a technological measure that effectively controls access to a work 
protected under this title.”105 
Since this anti-circumvention provision modified 
preexisting copyright law, its constitutionality has not been 
challenged in a way similar to the bootlegging provisions for 
exceeding the limits in the Copyright Clause. However, since it was 
presumably enacted under the Copyright Clause without support of 
the Commerce Clause, the Copyright limits are still in play. Thus, if 
the underlying copyright being protected by a DMCA anti-
circumvention provision fails to meet the copyright goal of creating 
“progress” in knowledge and learning then anti-circumvention 
measures should no longer receive DMCA protection.106 
                                                
been adopted, but may have had the same effect as legislation in the long run if it 
were). 
103 S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 2 (1998) ("Copyright laws have struggled through the 
years to keep pace with emerging technology from the struggle over music placed 
on a player piano roll in the 1900's to the introduction of the VCR in the 1980's. 
With this constant evolution in technology, the law must adapt in order to make 
digital networks safe places to disseminate and exploit copyright materials."). See 
The Anti-Circumvention Provision 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2006). 
104 H.R. REP. NO.105-551 (I), at 11 (1998). 
105 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A) (2006). 
106 Compare Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 964 F.2d 965, 
972 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding that a company that made Game Genies was a fair 
user, even though their product allowed users to cheat on their Nintendo games 
without Nintendo's authorization), with MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Entm't, 
Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 950 (9th Cir. 2010) opinion amended and superseded on 
denial of reh'g, No. 09-15932, 2011 WL 538748 (9th Cir. Feb. 17, 2011) 
(deciding that the DMCA anti-circumvention provision could be enforced 
without considering Game-Genie-like fair uses, and rejecting the Federal Circuit's 
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In fact, property principles have been employed to justify 
these constitutionally questionable penalties. It seems that an 
implicit acknowledgement has been adopted by courts that rights to 
liberty and security in anything that seems like property, including 
at least one form of online currency,107 supplements the 
constitutionality of Congress harshly regulating the so called 
hackers. Thus traditional works, like literary, audiovisual, and 
musical works, have been granted broad protection under the anti-
circumvention provisions.108 These protections were justified over 
public outcry for the protection of free speech when a 
circumventing hack, made by a Norwegian teenager, had already 
been distributed widely. In fact, T-shirts bearing the illegal hack 
were made, distributed and worn by members of the public.109 
Arguably, under the court’s decision, the T-shirt wearers could have 
been rounded up and arrested on criminal charges for distributing 
the hack. 
The DMCA has not only been raised to protect traditional 
works, however. One case in the Federal Circuit and another in the 
                                                
requirement of a nexus of the circumvention with a substantial underlying 
copyrighted work). 
107 Compare MDY Indus.629 F.3d, at 935 (protecting Blizzard's right to manage 
its video game's online virtual economy and currency which can be bought and 
sold for real money and valuated in terms of U.S. dollars), with Reuben Grinberg, 
Bitcoin: An Innovative Alternative Digital Currency, 4 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. 
L.J. 159, 174 (2012) (describing many online currencies that exist in a grey 
market and may eventually be found illegal for a number of reasons including tax 
evasion and counterfeiting). 
108 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 459 (2d Cir. 2001); 321 
Studios v. Metro Goldwyn Mayer Studios, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1093 
(N.D. Cal. 2004). See, e.g., Realnetworks, Inc. v. DVD Copy Control Ass'n, 641 
F. Supp. 2d 913, 935 (N.D. Cal. 2009); DirecTV, Inc. v. Randy Borow, No. 03-
C-2581, 2005 WL 43261 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 6, 2005); United States v. Whitehead, 
532 F.3d 991, 992 (9th Cir. 2008); CoxCom, Inc. v. Chaffee, 536 F.3d 101, 105 
(1st Cir. 2008). 
109 Farhad Manjoo, Court to Address DeCSS T-Shirt, WIRED (Aug. 2, 2000), 
http://www.wired.com/science/discoveries/news/2000/08/37941; DVD Copy 
Control Ass'n, Inc. v. Bunner, 31 Cal. 4th 864, 871 (2003) (describing how a 
Norwegian teenager was able to reverse engineer DeCSS, write a circumvention 
code and disseminate it throughout the world on the internet). 
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Sixth Circuit involved plaintiffs who sought to use the anti-
circumvention protections to protect encryptions as copyrighted 
works in themselves, with no other underlying copyright being 
protected.110 One involved garage door openers that had embedded 
anti-circumvention codes to create an obstruction for consumers 
who tried to purchase used “aftermarket” parts, apparently to 
increase the sale of new garage door openers.111 The other involved 
software embedded in ink cartridges for home printers that counted 
the number of pages printed and indicated to the printer that the ink 
was empty before it was actually empty to get consumers to buy 
more ink cartridges.112 The page counting program had an 
encryption that was being circumvented with a hack to allow the 
user to use all the ink they purchased.113 Both of these cases 
decided that there was not a sufficient nexus between these 
encryptions and copyrighted material to use copyright law to 
prosecute the “hackers” otherwise known as the plaintiff’s 
customers.114 The “thin” copyright in the software encryptions 
protecting the garage door openers and ink cartridges was not 
enough.115 
The Kirtsaeng decision might extend to support these 
decisions by balancing ambiguous portions of the anti-
circumvention provision with common law rights in physical 
property.116 Arguably the garage door and ink cartridge anti-
                                                
110 Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v. Skylink Technologies, Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1204 
(Fed. Cir. 2004) (requiring a "critical nexus between access and protection"); 
Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522, 550 (6th 
Cir. 2004) (all three liability provisions of this section of the DMCA require the 
claimant to show that the 'technological measure' at issue 'controls access to a 
work protected under this title,' and that the computer code composing the anti-
circumvention measure was not one of these protected works). 
111 Chamberlain, 381 F.3d at 1183. 
112 Lexmark, 387 F.3d at 563. 
113 Id. at 564. 
114 Chamberlain, 381 F.3d at 1204; Lexmark, 387 F.3d at 550. 
115 Chamberlain, 381 F.3d at 1186; Lexmark, 387 F.3d at 550. 
116 Kirtsaeng, No. 11–697, slip op. at 17, 26 (2013) (especially because 
interpreting "lawfully made under this title" may be similar to interpreting "a 
work protected under this title" as Lexmark and Chamberlain did). See 17 U.S.C. 
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circumvention measures trespassed on the consumer’s common law 
rights to alienate, destroy, and otherwise manage their physical 
property.117 Somehow, it seems that the anti-circumvention 
provision gave printer and garage door opener companies the color 
of legitimacy when they violated physical property rights. 
Similarly, in January, 2013 the Librarian of Congress removed the 
exception to violations of the anti-circumvention provision for 
unlocking cell phones.118 Whether there are physical property rights 
within the purchased machinery of a cell phone for consumers to 
justify unlocking cell phones to switch service providers is 
debatable.119 However, according to the FCC it is likely that 
Congress will limit the DMCA before the question is submitted to 
the Court.120 
The anti-circumvention nexus requirement was rejected by 
the Ninth Circuit in MDY Industries to allow Blizzard’s use of the 
DMCA to protect its management and allocation of digital gold and 
experience in its popular video game World of Warcraft (WoW).121 
                                                
§ 1201(a)(1)(A) (2006) (Outlawing the circumvention of technological measures 
used to protect "a work protected under this title."). 
117 Kirtsaeng, No. 11–697, slip op. at 17 (Interpreting "lawfully made under this 
title" so as to "retain the substance of common law." In this case, the lawful 
consumer's property right to alienation of chattels). 
118 Exemption to Prohibition Against Circumvention, 37 C.F.R. § 201.40 (2013) 
(no longer including an exemption for unlocking cell phones). 
119 Kirtsaeng, No. 11–697, slip op. at 17. 
120 Wireless Device Independence Act of 2013, S. 467, 113th Cong. (2013) 
(Introduced on March 5, 2013); Statement from FCC Chairman Julius 
Genachowski on the Copyright Office of the Library of Cong. Position on 
DMCA & Unlocking New Cell Phones, 2013 WL 812666 (F.C.C. Mar. 4, 2013) 
(asking the legislature to rethink their stance on default criminalization the jail 
breaking of cellphones); Statement of Comm'r Ajit Pai on Unlocking Cell 
Phones, 2013 WL 953595 (F.C.C. Mar. 11, 2013) ("American consumers should 
not face jail time for unlocking their cell phones." Pai also commended 
Congress's movement toward adopting the Wireless Device Independence Act of 
2013). 
121 MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Entm't, Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 950 (9th Cir. 2010) 
opinion amended and superseded on denial of reh'g, No. 09-15932, 2011 WL 
538748 (9th Cir. Feb. 17, 2011). See also Sony Computer Entm't Am., Inc. v. 
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The constitutionality of the DMCA anti-circumvention provision 
for adhering to all of the Copyright Clause limits of “writings,” 
“authors,” “limited times” and “progress,” should arise once a 
nexus requirement is abandoned.122 Otherwise, statements such as 
“the founding social contract of the new millennium [is] the End 
User License Agreement (EULA), [and] not the U.S. Constitution” 
will cease to be metaphorical.123 Blizzard’s EULA and Terms of 
Use agreement (ToU) includes a licensing agreement that regulates 
“valuable in-game currency.”124 The ToU also bans bots and 
hacks.125 
The defendant in MDY Industries created and sold bots that 
were able to mine digital gold and increase the experience of a 
WoW character automatically, playing the game on autopilot while 
the user is away from the game.126 By September 2008, the 
                                                
Gamemasters, 87 F. Supp. 2d 976, 987 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (using the DMCA anti-
circumvention provisions to protect underlying trademark infringement). 
122 Kirtsaeng, No. 11–697, slip op. at 17; Chamberlain, 381 F.3d at 1186; 
Lexmark, 387 F.3d at 550. 
123 Joshua A.T. Fairfield, Nexus Crystals: Crystallizing Limits on Contractual 
Control of Virtual Worlds, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 43, 44 (2011). 
124 Blizzard Entertainment, Inc. and Vivendi Games, Inc. Motion for Summary 
Judgment and Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support, (March 21, 
2008), MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Entm't, Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 950 (9th Cir. 
2010) (No. 206CV02555). See also Battle.net, Terms of Use, Blizzard 
Entertainment, http://us.blizzard.com/en-us/company/about/termsofuse.html (last 
visited April 20, 2013) (prohibiting users from "gather[ing] in-game currency, 
items or resources for sale outside of the Game without Blizzard's 
authorization"); MDY Indus., 624 F.3d at 935 (noting that WoW users gain access 
to "in-game currency, weapons and armor" including a comprehensive economic 
system); World of Warcraft, End User License Agreement, Blizzard 
Entertainment, http://sea.blizzard.com/en-sg/company/legal/wow_eula.html (last 
visited April 20, 2013). 
125 World of Warcraft, End User License Agreement, Blizzard Entertainment, 
http://sea.blizzard.com/en-sg/company/legal/wow_eula.html (last visited April 
20, 2013); World of Warcraft, Terms of Use, Blizzard Entertainment 
http://us.blizzard.com/en-us/company/legal/wow_tou.html (last visited April 20, 
2013) 
126 Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum of Points and Authorities 
in Support of Blizzard Entertainment, Inc. and Vivendi Games, Inc., MDY 
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defendant generated $3.5 million gross revenues in sales of these 
bots.127 His actions, and the use of the bots by purchasers, may have 
breached the EULA and ToU. Thus, breach of contract could have 
decided this case. Nevertheless, the property driven sledgehammer 
of copyright law was invoked instead.128 Furthermore, the use and 
distribution of the bots were found to violate the DMCA even 
though the Warden program that the bots “circumvented” was 
created and implemented by Blizzard after the defendant had 
already created and distributed bots.129 Thus, not only was there 
possibly no underlying copyright infringement being protected by 
this case’s finding, but also there was initially no circumvention 
occurring. 
One scholar has counted the dangers of the use of private 
contract to limit the use of the internet and the DMCA backing up 
digital rights management [DRM] encryptions.130 It is said that the 
effect would be to cast technology as “bad” because it reduces the 
rents earned by copyright owners, or internet and technology 
businesses in general if the nexus requirement is abandoned.131 The 
                                                
Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Entm't, Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 950 (9th Cir. 2010) (No. 
206CV02555) ("Glider users relied on the [MDY bots] to exploit WoW for 
commercial purposes, namely the 'farming' [sic] of in-game assets for the purpose 
of selling the assets in real money transactions outside the game."). 
127 MDY Indus., 624 F.3d at 936. 
128 Peter S. Menell, Governance of Intellectual Resources and Disintegration of 
Intellectual Property in the Digital Age, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1523, 1531 
(2011) ("When the only tool that you have in your box is a hammer, every 
problem looks like a nail."). 
129 MDY Indus.,624 F.3d at 936. 
130 Madhavi Sunder, IP3, 59 STAN. L. REV. 257, 280–82 (2006) (seeing the use 
of “[p]rivate contracts” to enhance the “power of private property holders” to 
back “digital encryption code” with the legal code to “control the people’s access 
to knowledge” as a special challenge for democracy). 
131 Id. (citing Justin Hughes, "Recoding" Intellectual Property and Overlooked 
Audience Interests, 77 TEX. L. REV. 923, 940–66 (1999)). See also TracFone 
Wireless, Inc. v. SND Cellular, Inc., 715 F. Supp. 2d 1246, 1252 (S.D. Fla. 2010) 
(using the DMCA to protect the "goodwill [, trademarks, and other intangible] 
property" from the resale market awarding damages of over $11 million in 
statutory damages); Microsoft Corp. v. EEE Bus. Inc., 555 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 
1059 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (finding that trafficking counterfeit software licensing 
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ultimate result of abandoning nexus will limit the democratizing 
effects of the internet, the success of new authors, and in so doing 
destroy “the liberation potential for poor underclasses” 
worldwide.132 Furthermore, without a nexus requirement, there does 
not seem to be a meaningful distinction that would keep copyright 
from protecting other digital currencies, some of which are actually 
backed by gold and, in the future, could compete with the U.S. 
dollar.133 These currencies exist in a grey market that the U.S. 
government may decide to crack down on for a number of reasons 
including tax evasion and counterfeiting.134 Copyright and contract 
law should not be used to legitimize anti-circumvention protection 
of content that might be illegal, especially when the protected 
content bears no nexus with copyrighted works. 
As were the bootlegging provisions, the anti-circumvention 
provisions are a creature of international law.135 In fact, the 
                                                
keys without authorization is considered a violation of the DMCA); Craigslist, 
Inc. v. Naturemarket, Inc., 694 F. Supp. 2d 1039, 1046 (N.D. Cal. 2010)(finding 
that automated website use that circumvents CAPTCHA keys violates the 
DMCA). 
132 Sunder, supra note 130 at 280–82. Compare Pearl Invs., LLC v. Standard 
I/O, Inc., 257 F. Supp. 2d 326, 349 (D. Me. 2003) (finding that using a VPN 
violates the anti-circumvention provisions), with Ai Weiwei's blog, A Digital 
Rallying Cry, THE ECONOMIST, (April 12, 2011) http://www.economist.com/ 
blogs/prospero/2011/04/ai_weiweis_blog (noting that a contemporary artist and 
Chinese dissident uses a VPN to disseminate his works and cries for national 
transparency via twitter. Also China's golden shield law known as "the great 
firewall" is used to block out western internet businesses to preserve similar 
Chinese businesses that are highly censored by the Chinese government. For 
example, Weibo is the Chinese Facebook and Youku is the Chinese YouTube). 
See also Star Chang, Ai Weiwei's 'Gangnam Style' Video is Banned in China, 
M.I.C. GADGET, (Oct. 26, 2012) http://micgadget.com/31151/ai-weiweis-
gangnam-style-video-is-banned-in-china/ (something that might fall into the 
"parody" category protected by fair use in the U.S.). 
133 Grinberg, supra note 107, at 174. 
134 Id. at 191. 
135 Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v. Skylink Technologies, Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1194 
(Fed. Cir. 2004) (noting that the DMCA was enacted as a condition of the World 
Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty) (citing WIPO Treaty, Apr. 
12, 1997, art. 11, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105–17 (1997)). 
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perception that developing nations are not enforcing IP protection 
enough has inspired global enforcement efforts by Homeland 
Security.136 Not only does the movement to globalize intangible 
property threaten to render “fair use” obsolete and further endanger 
free expression and the public domain,137 it might ensure that 
developing nations never embrace a robust freedom of expression. 
All this to protect the addictiveness of a video game that is unlikely 
to create progress in knowledge and learning at all. 
The DMCA has not expressly invoked the traditional 
contours of copyright per se, but it does have some limits that could 
protect free speech. For example, the Librarian of Congress is 
allowed to adopt circumvention exceptions every 3 years.138 The 
Librarian had adopted exceptions for obsolete software and 
unlocking cell phones. However, in early 2013 the Librarian 
removed the cell phone unlocking exception. Under the Ninth 
Circuit’s nexus-less test, and without a constitutional challenge, this 
could represent a huge antitrust problem in telecommunications that 
essentially overturns the effect of Carterfone.139 There are also a 
                                                
136 Chinese Man Guilty of $100 Million Hi-Tech Software Piracy, THE 
ECONOMIC TIMES (Jan. 9, 2013), http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/ 
2013-01-09/news/36237513_1_piracy-operation-software-titles-copyright ("Li 
mistakenly thought he was safe from the long arm of HSI, hiding halfway around 
the world in cyberspace anonymity.") (quoting ICE Director John Morton). But 
see China's Internet: A Giant Cage, THE ECONOMIST (April 6, 2013), 
http://www.economist.com/news/special-report/21574628-internet-was-expected-
help-democratise-china-instead-it-has-enabled; The Machinery of Control: Cat 
and Mouse, THE ECONOMIST (April 6, 2013), http://www.economist.com/news/ 
special-report/21574629-how-china-makes-sure-its-internet-abides-rules-cat-and-
mouse. 
137 Sunder, supra note 130, at 282. See also Alessandra Garbagnati, The Wrath 
of the Blizz King: How the Ninth Circuit's Decision in Mdy Industries, Inc. v. 
Blizzard Ent. May Slay the Game Genie, 34 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT L.J. 313, 
314 (2012) (explaining how the MDY Indus. decision could overrule the Game 
Genie decision). 
138 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C) (2006). 
139 In re Use of the Carterfone Device in Message Toll Tel. Serv., 13 F.C.C.2d 
420, 424 (1968) (deciding that the Carterfone could compete with the telephone 
service provider's competing device). See F.C.C. Chairman Julius Genachowski 
Statement on Preserving Internet Freedom & Openness, 2010 WL 5179798 
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number of limited exceptions to the anti-circumvention provisions 
enumerated in the DMCA.140 
Fair use in a DMCA context would go unrecognized without 
a nexus requirement.141 In fact, without requiring a nexus there may 
be no copyrighted material to apply the four-part fair use test to in 
anti-circumvention cases.142 Furthermore, a nexus requirement is 
necessary in order to preserve the required protection of First 
Amendment free speech. As a part of the nexus test, a court could 
determine the underlying work’s thinness of protection and its 
situation close to or far from the “core” of copyright protection.143 
This could enable reasonable findings that in some circumstances 
                                                
(F.C.C. Dec. 21, 2010) ("Years after the Carterfone decision, as we entered the 
early days of the Internet age, the Commission reaffirmed its policy of openness 
and competition by protecting freedom on both the access layer and the 
architectural layer of the network."). See also Dan L. Burk, Anticircumvention 
Misuse, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1095, 1139 (2003) (arguing that copyright misuse be 
extended to DMCA violations) (citing Lasercomb America Inc. v. Reynolds 911 
F.2d 970 (4th Cir.) (1990)); Statement from F.C.C. Chairman Julius 
Genachowski on the Copyright Office of the Library of Cong. Position on 
DMCA & Unlocking New Cell Phones, 2013 WL 812666 (F.C.C. Mar. 4, 2013) 
("From a communications policy perspective, this raises serious competition and 
innovation concerns, and for wireless consumers, it doesn't pass the common 
sense test."). 
140 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(D), (a)(2)(D), (b), (d)–(k) (2006) (discussing that The 
Librarian of Congress can publish exceptions to anti-circumvention violation 
every 3 years, there are a few listed exemptions in (d)–(k) and not prohibiting 
acts of individual circumvention that protect alleged copyright rights, that are 
unrelated to access itself). 
141 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (a)(2)(C) (2006) (stating that the DMCA anti-
circumvention provisions should not affect free speech and fair use). 
142 See MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Entm't, Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 950 (9th Cir. 
2010) opinion amended and superseded on denial of reh’g., No. 09-15932, 2011 
WL 538748 (9th Cir. Feb. 17, 2011) (not requiring nexus and not considering fair 
use). 
143 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 586 (1994) (considering 
whether a work was "closer to the core of intended copyright protection than 
others."); Feist Publ’n, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 349 
(1991) ("[T]he copyright in a factual compilation is thin."). 
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protecting EULAs and ToUs with copyright statutory damages and 
criminal punishment may constitute a violation of free speech. 
The effect of Sebelius on a potential constitutional challenge 
of the DMCA that it circumvents the Copyright Clause’s express 
limits and the First Amendment is not yet known. However, 
Sebelius has called into question the Supreme Court’s past 
Constitutional reasoning that the Copyright and Patent Clause 
grants Congress “broad decision-making leeway.”144 Even its recent 
finding that “[n]othing in the text of the Copyright Clause confines 
the ‘Progress of Science’ exclusively to ‘incentives for creation’” 
may require some explaining.145 In fact, the entire utilitarian regime 
underpinning the last era of Intellectual Property jurisprudence may 
rightfully come under attack because the Commerce Clause may no 
longer supplement the entire Copyright and Patent Clause’s grant of 
power.146 
A “free-riding” rationale, buttressed by Utilitarian and 
Lockean thought, has been an essential foundation to the legislation 
                                                
144 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 263 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
(recognizing the "the broad decisionmaking leeway that the Copyright Clause 
grants Congress."). 
145 Golan v. Holder 132 S. Ct. 873, 888 (2012). 
146 Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2588, 2643 (dissenting opinion by Chief Justice 
Roberts and Justice Kennedy, giving a limiting view of the Commerce Clause). 
See also Landes & Posner, supra note 17, at 37–70, 166–209, 294–333 (giving a 
utilitarian rationale for copyright, trademark and patents that works around the 
constitutional limits on IP rights that relies on the marketplace and freedom to 
solve the possible problems with exceeding the Constitution's limits); Wendy J. 
Gordon, Fair Use As Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the 
Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1601 (1982). But 
see Sunder, supra note 130, at 283; Lemley, supra note 22, at 1031 (casting free 
competition as the norm, and IP rights as an exception to the norm); Letter From 
Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson, Doc. 12, Writings 13:333--35, (Aug. 13, 
1813), available at http://presspubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/ 
a1_8_8s12.html ("Stable ownership is the gift of social law, and is given late in 
the progress of society. It would be curious then, if an idea, the fugitive 
fermentation of an individual brain, could, of natural right, be claimed in 
exclusive and stable property."). 
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of an ever-growing body of IP protections.147 Free-riding was also 
used in the Ginsberg concurrence in Sebelius and was not drawn 
upon by any of the remaining Justices in Sebelius.148 Thus, free-
riding can no longer per se justify the constitutionality of federal 
regulation under the Commerce Clause. As made apparent in 
Kirtsaeng, the Court should finally return to its finding in Dowling 
v. U.S., that copyright is “subjected to precisely defined limits,”149 
and its decision in U.S. v. Paramount Pictures that “the copyright 
law, like the patent statutes, makes reward to the owner a secondary 
consideration.”150 
The Kirtsaeng Decision 
The Supreme Court seems to have finally taken a course of 
“simplicity and coherence” when interpreting copyright law.151 The 
Court decided on a reading of “lawfully made under this title” as a 
non-geographical phrase, overturning dicta in Quality King that 
suggested the opposite.152 Thus, the court found that the copyright 
limit of “first sale” applied to works legally sold or distributed 
abroad and copyright owners would not be able to police imports of 
them into the United States.153 To justify its position, the Supreme 
Court drew upon the Constitutional limit of “progress,”154 the 
                                                
147 Lemley, supra note 22, at 1066–67; David McGowan, Copyright 
Nonconsequentialism, 69 MO. L. REV. 1, 2–3, 7, 38, 71–72 (2004). 
148 Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2623–24 (Ginsberg, J. concurring in part, concurring in 
the judgment in part, and dissenting in part); S. REP. NO.105-190, at 2 (1998). 
149 Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207, 216–17 (1985) ("the copyright 
owner . . . holds no ordinary chattel . . . for the copyright holder's dominion is 
subjected to precisely defined limits. It follows that interference with copyright 
does not easily equate with theft, conversion or fraud."). 
150 United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948). C.f. infra note 
255, and accompanying text. 
151 Kirtsaeng, No. 11–697, slip op. at 12 (2013). 
152 Id. at 24–25, 30, 33 (citing Quality King Distributors, Inc. v. L’anza Research 
Int’l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135, 143–154 (1998)). 
153 Id. at 26. 
154 Id. at 19 ("Association of libraries, used-book dealers, technology companies, 
consumer-goods retailers, and museums point to various ways in which a 
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founders’ arguments for copyright as a “limited monopoly,”155 and 
15th Century property common law.156 It also noted that Thomas 
Jefferson and Benjamin Franklin obtained collections of foreign 
books for personal and commercial use in the manner being 
challenged by the plaintiff in this case.157 In fact, this decision 
avoided branding Jefferson and Franklin “pirates and thieves” by 
today’s low bar copyright infringement standards. It also noted that 
a wide variety of items resold internationally bear copies of 
“copyrightable software programs or packaging” and thus copyright 
law could halt the resale of all sorts of physical property.158 
Briefs submitted by libraries, museums, used book sellers 
and technology companies convinced the Supreme Court that 
limiting the first sale doctrine geographically would not create 
“progress” as required by the Constitution or be coherent with other 
Constitutional limits.159 Thus, Constitutional limits have finally 
begun to play a role in stopping copyright expansion in appropriate 
ways. The Court also seemed to hint that readings of “lawfully 
made under this title” that limited first sale geographically were 
                                                
geographical interpretation would fail to further basic constitutional copyright 
objectives, in particular 'promot[ing] the Progress of Science and useful Arts.'") 
(quoting U.S CONST. art. I, § 8 cl. 8). 
155 Id. at 31–32 ("The Constitution described the nature of American copyright 
law by providing Congress with the power to "secur[e] to "[a]uthors" "for limited 
[t]imes" the "exclusive [r]ight to their . . . [w]ritings." Art. I Section 8 cl. 8. The 
Founders, too, discussed the need to grant an author a limited right to exclude 
competition.") (citing Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (July 31, 
1788), in 13 PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 440, 442–43 (J. Boyd ed. 1956) 
(arguing against the grant of any monopoly); Letter from James Madison to 
Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), in 13 PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 14, at 
16, 21 (arguing for a limited monopoly to secure production)). 
156 Id. at 17 ("In the early 17th century Lord Coke explained the common law's 
refusal to permit restraints on the alienation of chattels. ") (citing Charles M. 
Gray, Two Contributions to Coke Studies, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 1127, 1135 (2005)). 
157 Id. at 20–21. 
158 Kirtsaeng, No. 11–697, slip op. at 21 (2013) (including "automobiles, 
microwaves, calculators, mobile phones, tablets, and personal computers."). 
159 Id.at 23. 
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either illogical, disingenuous or both.160 The majority did not 
mention the importance of honesty and seemed to limit its stance to 
requiring precedence.161 Thus it found precedent in a centuries old 
right to alienate physical property recognized in common law, and 
rested its opinion there.162 However, along with the traditional right 
to alienation of physical property found in common law histories, 
there also exists a judicial interest in upholding honesty through 
formalism.163 
Kirtsaeng’s favored canon of statutory interpretation was: 
“[W]hen a statute covers an issue previously governed by the 
common law we must presume that Congress intended to retain the 
substance of the common law.”164 Thus the Court decided that 
Congress must have meant for the first sale doctrine to limit a 
copyright holder’s ability to police parallel market pricing, in order 
to preserve the right to alienate chattels.165 It also noted that no 
framer mentioned that copyright should confer a right to police 
parallel market pricing.166 
Justices Ginsberg, Scalia and Kennedy concurred in a 
dissent that may be the most telling of how far property principles 
have gone astray to justify expansive IP protection.167 The dissent 
called upon the position the U.S. had taken on international 
                                                
160 Id. at 24 (stating that the other readings "require too many unprecedented 
jumps over linguistic and other hurdles that in our view are insurmountable."). 
161 Id. 
162 Id. at 17. 
163 BAKER, supra note 12, at 320; 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 
*449. 
164 Kirtsaeng, No. 11–697, slip op. at 17 (citing Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 
2278, 2290 n.13 (2010)). 
165 Id. at 31–32. 
166 Id. at 32 ("But the Constitution’s language nowhere suggests that its limited 
exclusive right should include a right to divide markets or a concomitant right to 
charge different purchasers different prices for the same book, say to increase or 
to maximize gain. Neither, to our knowledge, did any Founder make any such 
suggestion."). 
167 Compare Kirtsaeng, No. 11–697 (Ginsberg, J. dissenting) (2013), with Letter 
from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson, Aug. 13, 1813, in JEFFERSON: 
WRITINGS, supra note 1, at 1291–92. 
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copyright protection according to TRIPs, the WTO and WIPO.168 
The treaties we have pushed upon most of the developing world do 
not include the same kind of first sale and fair use exceptions that 
we allow our own citizens.169 The treaties have called a cut back on 
the first sale limitation a solution to international copyright 
exhaustion.170 Thus the dissent argued that the copyright act should 
allow copyright owners to police imports of all copies of copyright 
protected items, regardless if they were legally or illegally 
distributed abroad.171 The dissent’s reasons for so arguing rested in 
applying traditional property law concepts to copyright itself.172 
The majority only uses the word property once, when 
quoting the dissent when it argued that “‘the sale in one country of 
a good’ does not ‘exhaus[t] the intellectual-property owner’s right 
to control the distribution of that good elsewhere.’”173 The dissent, 
relying on international agreements and the legislation inspired by 
them, used the word property 15 times.174 International treaties have 
commandeered property law to create an over expansive conception 
of limited monopoly rights. Having rested upon international law, 
the dissent could not avoid legitimizing a copyright-as-property 
view. The majority found that the dicta of Quality King,175 proposed 
by the dissent, was incorrect.176 This decision removes one 
incentive for sending American manufacturing jobs overseas and 
protects purchasers of tangible goods from overbroad IP regulation. 
The result being that the distribution of cheap second hand goods is 
                                                
168 Kirtsaeng, No. 11–697 (Ginsberg, J. dissenting) slip op. at 18–19. 
169 Chang, supra note 132 (something that might clearly fall into the "parody" 
category protected by fair use in the U.S.). 
170 Kirtsaeng, No. 11–697 (Ginsberg, J. dissenting) slip op. at 18–19. 
171 Id. at 20. 
172 Id. 
173 Kirtsaeng, No. 11–697, slip op. at 33. 
174 Kirtsaeng, No. 11–697 (Ginsberg, J. dissenting) slip op. at 3, 12, 18–22, 33. 
175 Kirtsaeng, No. 11–697 (Ginsberg, J. dissenting) slip op. at 3 (citing Quality 
King Distributors, Inc. v. L’anza Research Int’l, Inc., 523 U. S. 135, 143–54 
(1998)). 
176 Kirtsaeng, No. 11–697, slip op. at 30, 33. 
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not kept from American consumers by copyright enforcement at the 
U.S. boarder. 
In fact, it would not be honest to underwrite the view that 
corporations have the right, due to the copyright in the trademarks 
affixed to their products, to charge American consumers more 
money for things they sell to foreigners at a much cheaper price.177 
Nevertheless, the going value of companies that provide 
copyrighted and patented content is often propped up by a blanket 
expectation that Americans pay more,178 so they have global losses 
for every good or service they provide that had not been paid-in-full 
at the prices they set.179 The practice of divvying up the paychecks 
of Americans (or any foreigner) as a matter of property has created 
false security in corporate value that distorts the stock market and 
continues to cause market harm to stock owners.180 The idea that 
                                                
177 Panel Report, China—Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of 
Intellectual Property Rights, WT/DS362/R (Jan. 26, 2009) (Deciding that China 
did not breach Article 61 of TRIPs by interpreting "commercial scale" to mean "a 
significant magnitude of infringement activity." Thus affirming China's 
limitations on criminal enforcement of copyright infringement. The U.S. sought 
to leverage China into cracking down on infringement by criminalizing all 
infringers for the purpose of commercial gain). 
178 Open Letter from Bill Gates to Hobbyists (Feb. 3, 1976), available at 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File: Bill_Gates_Letter_to_Hobbyists.jpg (calling 
hobbyists thieves for not paying him for the software his company provided 
them). 
179 BSA & IDC, 2007 Piracy Study, BUS. SOFTWARE ALLIANCE (last visited 
April 21, 2013), available at http://globalstudy.bsa.org/2007/studies/ 
2007_global_piracy_study.pdf (This study showed higher piracy rates in foreign 
countries like China at 82% and Armenia at 93%, and the U.S. as participating in 
the lowest amount of piracy at 20%, but also recording a $1.34 billion more 
losses in the U.S. as compared to China in 2007). See Mike Masnick, If It's May 
It's Time for the Press to Parrot Bogus Stats Announcement from the BSA, 
TECHDIRT (May, 12 2010), http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20100511/ 
1516059386.shtml; Mike Masnick, BSA's Canadian Piracy Numbers Based on 
Hunches, Not Actual Surveys, TECHDIRT (May, 27, 2009), http://www.techdirt. 
com/articles/20090527/1125035034.shtml. 
180 Letzing, supra note 10 ("Google said . . . that $2.9 billion of the purchase 
price for Motorola was attributable to cash acquired, $2.6 billion was related to 
goodwill, $730 million for customer relationships and $670 million for 'other net 
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through going business value and intellectual property one might 
propertize the future paychecks of others is abominable. This 
practice garners unauthorized value from consumer bank accounts 
by taking for granted value that has not yet been granted. It is a lie 
that lets big business count future business value today, as a matter 
of property. It is also a lie that pulls the curtain over the fact that 
modern slavery has infected many of the supply chains that these 
businesses derive direct benefits from.181 In the end it lets big 
business claim untold property value without earning it and 
subverts the self-evident truth that we are all created equal by 
objectifying the American public and humanity worldwide. In 
practical terms, this helps maximize U.S. consumer spending and 
personal debt even in the wake of a massive debt crisis without 
addressing the most grotesque part of these intangible property 
claims: that some of the value claimed is derived from a growing 
$20 billion global slave trade industry.182 
The dissent’s stance in Kirtsaeng was that copyright should 
be imbued with strong property that override even common law 
property rights in the underlying physical property. From here the 
dissent concluded that the majority “risks undermining the United 
States’ credibility on the world stage.”183 However, the majority’s 
insistence on “simplicity and coherence” is more likely to vindicate 
U.S. credibility abroad.184 The dissent even admitted its argument’s 
“potential inconsistency with United States obligations under 
                                                
assets acquired.'" Google characterized consumer relationships with Motorola 
and what consumers thought about Motorola as worth billions of dollars when 
consumer's themselves may own their relationships and thoughts. Thus Google 
shareholders "purchased" billions of dollars in consumer thoughts and 
relationships that is not stable property because it probably is actually owned by 
consumers); Ben Fritz, Netflix Stock Plunges 25% After Analysts Slash Estimates, 
L.A. TIMES (July 25, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/jul/25/entertainment/ 
la-et-ct-netflix-stock-drop-20120725 (noting that attempts to expand sales 
globally contributed to losses). 
181 Supra note 22. 
182 Id. 
183 Kirtsaeng, No. 11–697, (Ginsberg, J. dissenting) slip op. at 22. 
184 Kirtsaeng, No. 11–697, slip op. at 12. 
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certain bilateral trade agreements.”185 Disingenuous incoherence 
and inconsistency are the true culprits here. Emphasizing honesty, 
coherence and general clarity is the only way to win back 
credibility on the international stage, or any stage for that matter.186 
To be clear, the international credibility of the U.S. 
businessperson is currently deficient. Recently, the U.S. financial 
sector swindled the American middle class and the American 
government out of billions of dollars after destroying the global 
market through dishonest and at least “incoherent” business 
practices.187 Then national and global public outcry stopped SOPA, 
PIPA, and ACTA.188 Now, major American copyright owners are 
resorting to self-help measures, blocking and degrading internet 
access of whomever they find is a copyright infringer.189 These self-
help measures are directly against the interests of most lower and 
middle class copyright owners,190 and they are illegal.191 Even the 
                                                
185 Kirtsaeng, No. 11–697, (Ginsberg, J. dissenting) slip op. at 22. 
186 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.1(a), 7.1, 8.1(a), 8.2(a), 8.4(c) 
(1983). 
187 STOCKMAN, supra note 3, at 631–48 ("No Recovery on Main Street") and at 
3–5 (calling Wall Street a gambling hall). See, e.g., Gretchen Morgenson & 
Louise Story, Banks Bundled Bad Debt, Bet Against It and Won, N.Y. TIMES 
(Dec. 23, 2009), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/24/business/ 
24trading.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (noting the result of "peddling complex 
securities" was to cause billions of dollars in losses to "pension funds and 
insurance companies."). 
188 See Magid, supra note 19 (noting that the laws pit the tech industry against 
the entertainment industry); Kain, supra note 19 (noting that ACTA would force 
the DMCA on developing nations and is a dangerous law to pass); Meyer, supra 
note 19 (noting that massive protests in Europe prompted the European 
parliament to reject the treaty). 
189 About the Center for Copyright Information, CENTER FOR COPYRIGHT INFO., 
http://www.copyrightinformation.org/about-cci/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2013) (CCI 
is a coalition of major copyright owner interest groups and ISPs, and they are 
initiating copyright alert systems in violation of net neutrality). 
190 Tarnoff, supra note 18; Ernesto, supra note 18 ("The MPAA, RIAA and the 
Internet providers participating in the ‘six strikes’ anti-piracy scheme have 
informed the Congressional Internet Caucus Advisory Committee about their 
plans."). See also Kneecapping the Future: Comcast’s Unjustified Internet Caps 
and the Plan to Kill Video Competition, supra note 18 (reporting that Comcast 
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thought of abiding this sort of unilateral, private sector regulation of 
the internet is the embarrassment here. The FCC has championed 
net neutrality and internet freedom in developing countries 
encouraging a serious adoption of free speech globally.192In 
countries where net neutrality and free speech is opposed, the 
internet has been described as a giant cage—actually enhancing the 
maneuverability of authoritarian control.193 By supporting foreign 
censorship, copyright largess is threatening to delay and destroy the 
acceptance of freedom and transparency in countries that 
desperately need it,194 directly undermining the FCC’s international 
support and encouragement of freedom, and violating net neutrality 
and free speech itself.195 
                                                
has a cap on the data an internet subscriber can download through Comcast, but 
exempted its video provider Xfinity); The Facts About AT&T’s Facetime 
Blocking, supra note 18. 
191 Preserving the Open Internet 47 C.F.R. § 8 (2011). 
192 Julius Genachowski, Chairman, F.C.C., Statement on the U.S. Submission of 
Initial Input into the International Telecommunication Union's World Conference 
on International Telecommunications (Aug. 3, 2012) (noting a fight for "internet 
freedom" against "some countries [that] restrict the free flow of information 
online"); Julius Genachowski, Chairman, F.C.C., Prepared Remarks for the 
International Telecommunications Union Global Symposium for Regulators in 
Beirut, Lebanon, ICT: Global Opportunities and Challenges (Nov. 10, 2009) 
(touting the FCC's role to preserve a "free, open and robust Internet" as an 
example to follow on the world stage). 
193 China's Internet: A Giant Cage, supra note 136; The Machinery of Control: 
Cat and Mouse, supra note 136. 
194 Julius Genachowski, Chairman, F.C.C., Statement on the U.S. Submission of 
Initial Input into the International Telecommunication Union's World Conference 
on International Telecommunications (Aug. 3, 2012) (noting a fight for "internet 
freedom" against "some countries [that] restrict the free flow of information 
online"); Julius Genachowski, Chairman, F.C.C., Prepared Remarks for the 
International Telecommunications Union Global Symposium for Regulators in 
Beirut, Lebanon, ICT: Global Opportunities and Challenges (Nov. 10, 2009) 
(touting the FCC's role to preserve a "free, open and robust Internet" as an 
example to follow on the world stage). 
195 Genachowski, supra note 192, Statement on the U.S. Submission of Initial 
Input into the International Telecommunication Union's World Conference on 
International Telecommunications; Genachowski, supra note 192, Chairman, 
Prepared Remarks for the International Telecommunications Union Global 
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—- 
It is unclear how far the inference of real property common 
law to expand the first sale doctrine will extend. A Ninth Circuit 
district court did not extend first sale to the resale of digital copies 
of music in MP3 form.196 Redigi, an online company that facilitated 
the resale of digital music at a discounted price, was thus found 
liable for copyright infringement. The Court did not allow first sale 
to legitimize this kind of resale of used goods. It is unclear how 
property common law rights, like a right to alienate, should bear on 
digital goods. In the wake of the Redigi opinion, consumers may 
opt to purchase physical copies if they wish to have the right to 
alienate the items they purchase. However, if consumers abandon or 
destroy their copies of digital music files, they will be asked to 
purchase a brand new copy at full price. Thus, failing to apply 
property law concepts to digital copies of music only seems to work 
in the seller’s favor. If digital copies are not “property” then 
whether consumers have any rights at all in digital copies of music 
is an open question. 
Though copyright-as-chattel is entirely an analogy,197 the 
underlying information and knowledge from which patents and 
copyrights are formed is actually a public good.198 The project of 
defining public goods seems to be bound up with First Amendment 
interpretation.199 Thus information has a real property explanation 
that is recognized in the constitution, as relatively bounteous and 
                                                
Symposium for Regulators in Beirut, Lebanon, ICT: Global Opportunities and 
Challenges. 
196 Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 12 CIV. 95 RJS, 2013 WL 1286134 
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2013). 
197 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson, Aug. 13, 1813, in 
JEFFERSON: WRITINGS, supra note 1, at 1291  ("It has been pretended by some, 
(and in England especially,) that inventors have a natural and exclusive right to 
their inventions, and not merely for their own lives, but inheritable to their 
heirs."). See generally Bryan Beier, The Perils of Analogical Reasoning: Joseph 
William Singer Property and Sovereignty and Property, 1 GEO. MASON U. L. 
REV. 33 (1994). 
198 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson, Aug. 13, 1813, in 
JEFFERSON: WRITINGS, supra note 1, at 1291–92. 
199 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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subject to only momentary possession like air or fire.200 Thus, a real 
property (no analogy needed) explanation for copyright and patent 
is as a limited monopoly right in a public good (i.e. the public good 
of free flowing information, knowledge and education). If people 
have a right to alienation of their privately held goods, they might at 
least have a right to “proliferate” publically owned goods at least as 
much as they paid a limited monopoly owner in a specific 
expression of that good in order to use or copy that specific 
expression. Thus, through a limited proliferation right based on the 
public’s underlying rights to foster free flowing knowledge and 
information, digital copies of copyrighted works sold online should 
have first sale and other copyright limitations assigned to them. 
PART II: THE AMERICAN CONCEPT OF PROPERTY 
A conception of property seems to be made of two things. 
First, property is formed out of a common sense connection with 
thing-ownership. Things as necessarily physical things once seemed 
to be inferred into our concept of what property was. Second, 
property is a highly political creation. In fact it was originally 
offered as a vehicle to ensure liberty from government and equality 
of class. After the States won the Revolution, overthrowing English 
rule in the Americas, the debate over how property should be 
conceived settled into a struggle between Libertarian and Liberal 
thought. This section explains how the inherent flaws in the 
political conception of property have carried us far afield of the 
common sense idea that property is related to thing-ownership. 
                                                
200 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson, Aug. 13, 1813, in 
JEFFERSON: WRITINGS, supra note 1, at 1291–92. C.f. Susan P. Crawford, The 
Radio and the Internet, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 933, 961 (2008) (noting that 
Congress directed the FCC to auction off licenses to use certain wavelengths of 
energy that exist in the air naturally and had previously been used by TV 
broadcasters: "The 700 MHz auction was designed to sell off licenses to valuable 
beachfront spectrum that television broadcasters have been forced to 
relinquish."). 
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Lost in a Struggle Between Liberalism and Libertarianism 
Before western law recognized personal property, 
feudalistic society only recognized property owned by the king. 
Feudalism was in many ways characterized as a great villain by 
enlightenment thinkers.201 The failure of feudalism to recognize the 
citizenry’s natural freedom and equality of class justified not only 
broad, but absolute rights to personal property in physical things.202 
The dual goals of freedom and equality joined because of a 
common enemy. Since then, many attempts at casting new villains 
in our collective American property story to gather political ground 
have been raised.203 However, none of these new villains have been 
able to unify the interests of the people the way the enlightenment’s 
rally against feudalism facilitated the overthrow of many western 
kingdoms, including the overthrow of England in the Americas.204 
                                                
201 Letter From John Adams to James Sullivan, May 26, 1776, in 9 THE WORKS 
OF JOHN ADAMS supra note 6, at 375–78 ("the only moral foundation of 
government is, the consent of the people"); Grey, supra note 60 (These thinkers 
included Blackstone, Hegel, Adams, Jefferson, Locke and the French and 
American Revolutionaries. "[T]he concept of property as thing-ownership served 
important ideological functions. Liberalism was the ideology of the attack on 
feudalism."). 
202 Grey, supra note 60 ("[P]roperty conceived as the control of apiece of the 
material world by a single individual meant freedom and equality of status."). 
203 Grey, supra note 60; William H. Taft, The Right of Private Property, 3 MICH. 
L.J. 215, 233 (1894) (calling for lawyers to rise up and protect property owners 
against the enflamed and more powerful working class that would otherwise 
bring the evils of socialism and communism to the U.S.); Joseph William Singer, 
The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REV. 611, 646 (1988) [hereinafter 
Singer I] (calling for property reform based on the destructive actions of property 
owners and evil corporations that undermined the free market). 
204 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) ("We hold these 
truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by 
their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty 
and the pursuit of Happiness. . . . But when a long train of abuses and 
usurpations, pursuing invariably the same Object evinces a design to reduce them 
under absolute Despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such 
Government, and to provide new Guards for their future security."); Charles A. 
Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964) ("The institution called 
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It would not have been possible to create the broadly accepted 
convictions necessary to carry out a revolution without the 
assurances of both liberty from the government and equality of 
class as a result. In fact, the convictions about “equal liberty” held 
by the framers, often took shape in discussions over property 
ownership.205 
The role of recognizing private property as an essential 
component to securing freedom and equality quickly settled into a 
debate that carries on in today’s politics.206 Libertarians and 
Liberals hold opposite positions over how to conceive of property 
based on whether freedom or equality is more important.207 
Libertarians maintain that minimizing the government will 
maximize freedom, and have argued freedom should be prioritized 
above securing equality.208 Conversely, Liberals argue that 
government regulation should be used to secure equality, and that 
                                                
property guards the troubled boundary between individual man and the state. It is 
not the only guardian; many other institutions, laws, and practices serve as well. 
But in a society that chiefly values material well-being, the power to control a 
particular portion of that well-being is the very foundation of individuality."). 
205 Letter From John Adams to James Sullivan, May 26, 1776, in 9 THE WORKS 
OF JOHN ADAMS supra note 6, at 375–78. 
206 Joseph William Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property Revisited, 7 
UNBOUND: HARV. J. LEGAL LEFT 112, 116 (2011) [hereinafter Singer II] ("The 
defining characteristic of American property law is the abolition of feudalism."). 
Note that Freedom is "negative" freedom from government control and not a 
positive conception of freedom to. Taft, supra note 203, at 218 ("[W]e inherited 
from our English ancestors the deep seated conviction that security of property 
and contract and liberty of the individual are indissolubly linked. . . . The 
freedom of the citizen is secure. It is the right of private property that now needs 
supporters and protectors."). 
207 Taft, supra note 203, at 218(holding up the villains of anarchy, socialism, and 
communism to justify high protection of individual and corporate property 
because it turns individual greed into public benefit). 
208 Id. at 233 (commenting on property as a "bulwark of freedom."). Cf. RAND, 
supra note 4, at 481  ("I do not seek the good of others as a sanction for my right 
to exist, nor do I recognize the good of others as a justification for their seizure of 
my property or their destruction of my life." Eventually Rand's characters 
compare the public good to "human sacrifices."). 
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any cost to freedom for the cause of equality is worth it.209 It seems 
that the legal discourse about property has devolved into how this 
liberty-equality disagreement interacts with our fundamental rights 
to “life, liberty and property.”210 
This article treats a big versus small government 
conversation as useless. In fact, it is a distraction. The big/small 
government conversation sheds little truth on the concept of 
property because both Libertarian and Liberal movements seem to 
be interested in maximizing property.211 The ends justify the means 
                                                
209 Singer I, supra note 203, at 690–91. Cf. FITZGERALD, supra note 4, at 5 
(Painting a more aristocratic and idle picture of wealthy, upper-crust Americans: 
"The Carraways are something of a clan, and we have a tradition that we're 
descended from the Dukes of Buccleuch, but the actual founder of my line was 
my grandfather's brother, who came here in fifty-one, sent a substitute to the 
Civil War, and started the wholesale hardware business that my father carries on 
to-day."). 
210 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (requiring due process before a government 
deprives someone of their "life, liberty, or property"); JOHN LOCKE, TWO 
TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, ch. II, § 131 (1631) (Claiming that men "give up 
the equality, liberty, and executive power they had in the state of nature" to 
"preserve himself, his liberty and property" and thus "the power of the society, or 
legislative constituted by them, can never be supposed to extend farther, than the 
common good; but is obliged to secure every one's property, by providing against 
those three defects above mentioned, that made the state of nature so unsafe and 
uneasy."). Compare Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53–55 (1905) 
(expanding the Fourteenth Amendment, "life, liberty and property" to invalidate 
state law that infringes on the individual's right to contract), with Goldberg v. 
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 265 (1970) (Also expanding the Fourteenth Amendment, 
"life, liberty and property," to expand state law, and deciding Fourteenth 
Amendment rights include welfare in its capacity to "help bring within the reach 
of the poor the same opportunities that are available to others to participate 
meaningfully in the life of the community."). 
211 Taft, supra note 203, at 231 ("the institution of private property is what has 
led to the accumulation of capital in the world. . . . Without it the whole world 
would still be groping in the darkness of the tribe or commune stage of 
civilization with alternating periods of starvation and plenty, and no happiness by 
of gorging unrestrained appetite."); Lemley, supra note 22, at 1035–36 ("both 
advocates and critics of antitrust enforcement have adopted the maxim that 
intellectual property is just like any other form of property, though they draw 
different conclusions from that assumption") (comparing U.S. Dep't of Justice 
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and the result is a vacuum in discussion about what the ends of 
society and government in fact are.212 Both Liberals and 
Libertarians have been known to raise disingenuous caricatures of 
the other side, not unlike the anti-feudalism sentiments at our 
roots.213 Progressives have even been known to characterize the 
Liberal/Libertarian rhetoric as a “phase” in our journey toward 
ever-deepening modernity.214 However, our conception should not 
                                                
and Fed. Trade Comm'n, Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual 
Property § 2.2 (1995), with Hon. Giles S. Rich, Are Letters Patent Grants of 
Monopoly?, 15 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 239 (1993)). 
212 Compare Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, Berlin, I, 31 (1958) in 
ISAIAH BERLIN, FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY (1969) (concluding that accepting 
pluralism of values that inform our definition of liberty and equality would be a 
"truer" approach than "faith in a single criterion."), with LOCKE, supra note 210 
at ch. II, § 9 ("I doubt not but this will seem a very strange doctrine to some men; 
but before they condemn it, I desire them to resolve me by what right any prince 
or state can put to death or punish any alien for any crime he commits in their 
country." Thus, if not by applying some monist principal that actually endeavors 
to justify the ends of an approach, the social contract cannot be legitimate) and 
G.K. CHESTERTON, HERATICS, 16 (1905) ("Suppose that a great commotion 
arises in the street about something, let us say a lamp-post, which many 
influential persons desire to tear down. A grey-clad monk, who is the spirit of the 
Middle Ages, is approached upon the matter, and begins to say, in the arid 
manner of the Schoolmen, 'Let us first of all consider, my brethren, the value of 
Light. If Light be in itself good—.' At this point he is somewhat excusably 
knocked down. All the people make a rush for the lamp-post, the lamp-post is 
down in ten minutes, and they go about congratulating each other on their 
unmedieval practicality. . . . gradually and inevitably, today, tomorrow, or the 
next day, there comes back the conviction that the monk was right after all, and 
that all depends on what is the philosophy of Light. Only what we might have 
discussed under the gas-lamp, we now must discuss in the dark.”). 
213 Compare Taft, supra note 203, at 232 ("The sovereign today is the people, or 
the majority of people. The poor are the majority. The appeal of the rich to the 
constitution and courts for protection is still an appeal by the weak against the 
unjust aggressions of the strong.") (quoting Citizens' Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. City 
of Topeka, 87 U.S. 655, 658 (1874), saying that forcing tax laws to serve the 
public interest could in fact be a tyranny of the majority), with Singer I, supra 
note 203, at 646, and Singer II, supra note 206, at 112, 114–15 ("I must admit 
that my argument [in Singer I] was more utopian than realistic."). 
214 Grey, supra note 60. 
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be based on political and disingenuous caricatures that easily fall 
into straw man,215 and false alternatives fallacies.216 These fallacies 
highlight the importance of the natural law and state of nature 
arguments proposed by enlightenment thinkers.217 Modern scholars, 
who either marginalize or mischaracterize the role of natural law 
and deductive reasoning as old hat, risk falling into nonsense.218 
Nevertheless, over the past century this seems to be where 
politics is driving us. For example, Libertarians tend to see property 
as a way for private interests to be reclaimed from the 
government.219 In so doing they pressure the courts to strike state 
                                                
215 Andrew Jay McClurg, Logical Fallacies and the Supreme Court: A Critical 
Examination of Justice Rehnquist's Decisions in Criminal Procedure Cases, 59 
U. COLO. L. REV. 741, 832 (1988). Compare Taft, supra note 203, at 222, (Taft 
characterizes the poor as the strong aggressors taking the rich man’s property) 
(citing City of Topeka, 87 U.S. at 832 (to bring attention to a tyranny of the 
majority situation), with Singer II, supra note 206, at 114 (noting that Tea Party 
libertarians are dedicated to dismantling the government to increase the 
constitutional protection for the property of the rich and powerful). 
216 See McClurg, supra note 215, at 805 (1988) (citing Illinois v. Gates 462 U.S. 
213 (1983)). Compare Taft, supra note 203, at 222 ("It follows as a necessary 
conclusion that to destroy the guarantees of property is a direct blow at the 
interests of the working man. . . . Everything which tends to legitimately increase 
the accumulation of wealth and its use for production will give each laborer 
larger share of the joint result of capital and his labor."), with Singer I, supra note 
203, at 638 (Singer argued that "the question [of ownership] is meaningless," 
trivializing the need to identify "ownership" when talking about property rights in 
order to create a "reliance interest in property.” It "encompass[es] the full range 
of social relationships, from relations among strangers, between neighbors, 
among long-term contractual partners in the marketplace, among family members 
and others in intimate relationships, and finally, between citizens and the 
government." Singer argues for a "property shift" when these relationships split 
up). 
217 See, e.g., LOCKE, supra note 210, at ch. II, § 131. 
218 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 136 (1971) (The effect of believing 
Rawls' theory is unearned trust in government decision makers and the basis for 
Justice as Fairness, though hopeful, is complete nonsense). 
219 Local 1330, United Steel Workers v. United States Steel Corp., 631 F.2d 
1264, 1280–81 (6th Cir. 1980); Singer I, supra note 203, at 646 (noting that the 
libertarian “free market” view consists of property being immune from the 
government, advancing certain sort of chastisement of the poor for not making 
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and federal law for unconstitutionally violating private property 
rights.220 They might even support takings claims in non-existent 
property that might have existed had the government acted 
differently.221 In order to reach the Libertarian ideal of a minimized 
government, Libertarians have tried to expand the concept of 
property in order to put pressure on the courts to overturn laws that 
may redistribute wealth away from property owners.222 
Conversely, Liberals have tried to redefine property rights in 
order to redistribute property to the working class and historically 
disadvantaged classes.223 In so doing, they have argued for further 
expansion of the bundle of property rights.224 Not only would 
business owners hold property rights in businesses, but so would 
the workers, the town where the business existed and possibly any 
other person that had a “fluid relationship” with the business.225 
They also put their trust in legislators to find the right balance to lay 
claim to a truly egalitarian society.226 Unfortunately, those 
                                                
themselves rich: “If people are unhappy they only have themselves to blame: 
Wealth and power are there for the taking.”). 
220 Taft, supra note 203, at 232. 
221 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 135 (1978). 
222 Lochner, 198 U.S. at 53–56 (1905). 
223 See Singer I, supra note 203, at 750 (Singer himself is an avowed Liberal and 
advocates this). 
224 Id. (arguing for a "reliance interest" in property); Singer II, supra note 206, at 
114–15 (citing Manufactured Hous. Cmtys. of Wash. v. State, 13 P.3d 183) 
(noting that the libertarian justices on the Supreme Court has had an effect on 
state law); Manufactured Hous. Cmtys. of Wash. v. State, 13 P.3d 183 (2000) 
(granting mobile home owners a right of first refusal when the landward wants to 
sell their homes was a taking); Sunder, supra note 130, at 330 ("[N]ew theories of 
property, from personhood to social relations, enhanced our ability to explain and 
justify legal limits on property, even while they served to bolster some property 
claimants, such as tenants."). 
225 Singer I, supra note 203, at 652–53. 
226 Lochner, 198 U.S. at 72 (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("the public interests 
imperatively demand that legislative enactments should be recognized and 
enforced by the courts as embodying the will of the people, unless they are 
plainly and palpably beyond all question in violation of the fundamental law of 
the Constitution.") (quoting Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U.S. 207, 223 (1903)). See also 
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legislators have actually advanced corporate interests, posturing 
their causes to be in the name of the poor, blue-collar workers and 
minorities.227 As a result of the near complete corporate capture of 
Congress,228 the concept of property has been driven to extreme 
maximization that only a psychopath would find reasonable.229 
This discussion has continued in the IP field as well. Some 
have argued for the application of absolute and maximum property 
protection to IP, as if it were physical property.230 Others have 
proposed the adoption of official workarounds of the Constitutional 
limits on copyright.231 Some have proposed the adoption of moral 
rights.232 Still others have argued that the application of a utilitarian 
                                                
Singer II, supra note 206, at 114–15 (voicing a preference that state laws 
recognizing tenant property interests should not be struck down by courts). 
227 Paul Buchheit, The Corporate Betrayal of America, THE CONTRIBUTOR 
(April 8, 2013, 8:30 AM), http://thecontributor.com/opinion/corporate-betrayal-
america. 
228 Mark A. Lemley, The Constitutionalization of Technology Law, 15 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 529, 532 (2000) 
 (“[I]t is far too easy for Congress to fall into a pattern of responding to private 
demands, rather than thinking proactively about what should be done. To a 
disturbing extent, Congress . . . seems to have abdicated its role in setting 
intellectual property policy to the private interests who appear before it."). See 
also Jessica D. Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72 
CORNELL L. REV. 857, 860–61 (1987) ("[T]he [copyright] statute's legislative 
history is troubling because it reveals that most of the statutory language was not 
drafted by members of Congress or their staffs at all. Instead, the language [of the 
1976 Copyright Act] evolved through a process of negotiation among authors, 
publishers, and other parties with economic interests in the property rights the 
statute defines."); Peter S. Menell, Envisioning Copyright Law's Digital Future, 
46 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 63, 193–94 (2003) (noting that copyright, once a right, at 
some point crossed over became an entire regulatory regime). 
229 See generally Ian B. Lee, Is There A Cure for Corporate "Psychopathy"?, 42 
AM. BUS. L.J. 65 (2005) (commenting and legitimizing the indictment of 
corporate behavior as psychopathic). 
230 Epstein, supra note 17, at 455, 482, 520. 
231 Landes & Posner, supra note 17, at 517–18. 
232 Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 
363 n.314 (1988) (citing Roberta Kwall, Copyright & the Moral Right: Is an 
American Marriage Possible?, 38 VAND. L REV. 1, 69 (1985)) ("Protection for 
creators' personal rights . . . enables society to preserve the integrity of its cultural 
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analysis should not simply assume “goodness” in the maximization 
of creative output.233 At least one scholar has suggested that IP’s 
economic underpinnings should be balanced with cultural 
considerations instead of just relying on the marketplace to decide 
what is best for IP.234 
In fact, there has been a direct collision of the property 
concepts underpinning the expansion of IP rights worldwide with 
culture and identity.235 Over the last century identity politics have 
been used by disadvantaged communities to defend and monetize 
their culture.236 For example, a New Mexican tribe has sued New 
Mexico for using its cultural symbol on the state’s flag without 
authorization.237 They had demanded a million dollars for every 
year since New Mexico chose its current state flag, which came to 
74 million dollars. Moreover, accusations by minority activists 
using the property term of art “cultural appropriation” is increasing. 
For instance, Miley Cyrus was accused of cultural appropriation of 
African American culture after her recent performance on the 
VMA’s.238 Nike pulled a line of women’s exercise clothing because 
it was accused of cultural appropriation for using exclusively male 
                                                
heritage. The public's right to enjoy the fruits of a creator's labors in original form 
and to learn cultural heritage from such creations has no time limit."). 
233 Sunder, supra note 130, at 283–84 ("At times, utility in the intellectual 
property context is defined simply as the maximization of creative output. The 
goal then becomes creating the greatest number of cultural artifacts to be trickled 
down to the greatest number of people."). 
234 Id. at 268–69. 
235 MARILYN STRATHERN, PROPERTY, SUBSTANCE & EFFECT: 
ANTHROPOLOGICAL ESSAYS ON PERSONS AND THINGS 134, 163 (Athlone Press, 
1999) ("Late 20th Century cultural politics makes it impossible to separate issues 
of identity from claims to the ownership of resources."). 
236 See Sunder, supra note 130, at 270–71 (noting a number of groups claiming 
property rights to cultural property that they claim has been or could be 
misappropriated without their permission). 
237 Id. 
238 Hadley Freeman, Miley Cyrus’s Twerking Routine was Cultural 
Appropriation at its Worst, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 27, 2013, 12:00 PM), 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/aug/27/miley-cyrus-twerking-
cultural-appropriation. 
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tattoos from Polynesia to inspire the clothing design.239 Similarly, 
Forever 21 pulled a line of clothing after a high number of Twitter 
posts criticized it for cultural appropriation.240 Some concerned 
person might ask whether allowing the concept of property to 
facilitate the commoditization of cultural identity is going too far. 
Property maximalists might respond with realism: that 
property as “thing” ownership itself was always a legal fiction 
anyway.241 But it would be disingenuous to stop there and allow 
this to be the final say. Realism would also conclude that there are 
limits to expanding the concept of property. One could be the 
“popular mind[‘s]” ability to comprehend a property claim as thing 
ownership.242 This could be recast as a limit against genuine 
dishonesty about property that the average taxpaying American 
would see as incomprehensible.243 At its broadest stroke, realism 
can only give credence to property claims that are not 
unconstitutional and that do not put undue pressure on the 
judiciary.244 
—- 
Blackstone recognized that all property was necessarily 
physical and absolute.245 In other words, there was no such thing as 
                                                
239 Vaimoana Tapaleao, Nike Commits Cultural Faux Pas, THE NEW ZEALAND 
HERALD (Aug. 14, 2013, 5:30 AM), http://www.nzherald.co.nz/business/news/ 
article.cfm?c_id=3&objectid=10912088. 
240 Alexis Kleinman, Forever 21 Apparently has Pulled its Controversial 
Compton Shirts, THE HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 25, 2013) available at 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/09/25/forever-21-
compton_n_3988643.html. 
241 Vandevelde, supra note 13, at 332. 
242 Grey, supra note 60. 
243 Kirtsaeng, No. 11–697, slip op. at 12 (2013) (favoring "simplicity and 
coherence" by refusing to allow American copyright law to continue 
underwriting multiple streams of commerce worldwide). 
244 Lochner, 198 U.S. at 72 (1905) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("the public interests 
imperatively demand that legislative enactments should be recognized and 
enforced by the courts as embodying the will of the people, unless they are 
plainly and palpably beyond all question in violation of the fundamental law of 
the Constitution.") (quoting Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U.S. 207, 223 (1903)). 
245 Id. 
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intangible, limited property. This way property itself would be 
clearly defined and not limited by the government. Also, property 
would actually be connected to a physical “thing,” whose existence 
itself was not necessarily dependent on the market or politics. This 
conception of property as thing-ownership is not only clear; it is 
also what the framers were thinking of when they put property into 
our Constitution.246 
In 1913, Hohfeld proposed the adoption of a positivist 
conception of property.247 The positivists conceived of property as 
anything from which value could be derived.248 Scholars in turn 
began to refer to Hohfeld’s conception of property as the “new 
property.”249 However, the Brandeis-Holmes minority view at that 
time noted that positivism was not a new idea and thus its general 
acceptance by law makers was the only “new” thing about it.250 In 
                                                
246 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson, Aug. 13, 1813, in 
JEFFERSON: WRITINGS, supra note 1, at 1291–92. 
247 Hohfeld I, supra note 13, at 19; Hohfeld II, supra note 13, at 712–13. 
248 Hohfeld I, supra note 13, at 58 (Hohfeld based his conception on eight legal 
relations that he claimed were "the lowest common denominators of the law" 
basically allowing any legal relationship to be expressed as property. The eight 
legal relations are rights, duties, privileges, no rights, powers, liabilities, 
immunities and disabilities.). 
249 Vandevelde, supra note 13, at 361. 
250 Int'l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 250 (1918) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting) ("But the fact that a product of the mind has cost its producer money 
and labor, and has a value for which others are willing to pay, is not sufficient to 
ensure to it this legal attribute of property. The general rule of law is, that the 
noblest of human productions—knowledge, truths ascertained, conceptions and 
ideas—become, after voluntary communication to others, free as the air to 
common use. Upon these incorporeal productions the attribute of property is 
continued after such communication only in certain classes of cases where public 
policy has seemed to demand it."). Id. at 246 (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("Property, 
a creation of law, does not arise from value, although exchangeable—a matter of 
fact. Many exchangeable values may be destroyed intentionally without 
compensation. Property depends upon exclusion by a law from interference."); 
Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75–76 (1905)  (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("[A] Constitution is 
not intended to embody a particular economic theory, whether of paternalism and 
the organic relation of the citizen to the state or of laissez faire. It is made for 
people of fundamentally differing views, and the accident of our finding certain 
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fact, “the all-absorbing legal conception of the [19th] Century [was] 
that of the property right. Everything was thought of in terms of 
property.”251 Nevertheless, Hohfeld’s  “new” property seemed to 
have allowed lawmakers to break free of Blackstone’s requirement 
that property be physical. In fact, scholars have noted that Hohfeld 
characterized Blackstone’s conception of property to be an 
“obsession with things.”252 Positivists also proposed that property 
was not to be absolute or fixed. In Hohfeld’s words: “Since all legal 
interests are ‘incorporeal’―consisting, as they do, of more or less 
limited aggregates of abstract legal relations—such a supposed 
contrast as that sought to be drawn by Blackstone can but serve to 
mislead.”253 Complete acceptance of a Hohfeldian concept of 
property happened when the American Law Institute’s Restatement 
of Property in 1936 included Hohfeld’s eight legal relations as the 
elements and correlatives of property instead of a definition of 
property. These elements and correlatives included potentially 
every valuable interest.254 
                                                
opinions natural and familiar, or novel, and even shocking, ought not to conclude 
our judgment upon the question whether statutes embodying them conflict with 
the Constitution of the United States."). See also Vandevelde, supra note 13, at 
333–34 (discussing an expansion of dephysicalized property in the nineteenth 
century). But see Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howell State Trial 1029, 1066 (K.B. 
1765) (“[T]he eye cannot by the laws of England be guilty of a trespass.”); Boyd 
v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 628 (1886) (adopting the English view). 
251 Dean G. Acheson, Book Note, 33 HARV. L. REV. 329, 330 (1919) (reviewing 
MALCOLM H. LAUCHHEIMER, THE LABOR LAW OF MARYLAND BY MALCOLM H. 
LAUCHHEIMER. JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY STUDIES IN HISTORY AND POLITICAL 
SCIENCE. SERIES XXXVII, NO. 2. BALTIMORE: JOHNS HOPKINS PRESS. PP. 163 
(1919)) (including: "reputation, privacy, domestic relations, and as new interests 
called for protection their success depended upon their ability to take on the 
protective coloring of property."). 
252 Vandevelde, supra note 13, at 360. 
253 Hohfeld I, supra note 13, at 24. 
254 Vandevelde, supra note 13, at 330 (By the beginning of the twentieth 
century, the Blackstonian conception of property was no longer credible. A new 
conception emerged and was stated in its definitive form by Wesley Newcomb 
Hohfeld. This new property was defined as a set of legal relations among persons. 
Property was no longer defined as dominion over only physical things.). 
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As positivism began to run its course, critics lambasted the 
Hohfeldian conception because it threatened to render “property” 
itself meaningless. If all legal relations were given the attribution of 
property, then property “could no longer serve to distinguish one set 
of legal relations from another.”255 It also would no longer prescribe 
a degree of protection for different types of legal relations.256 The 
resulting broad legal acceptance of the “dephysicalization of 
property” expanded property law exponentially.257 It seemed that 
property law was to become all encompassing.258 Swayze correctly 
guessed that business goodwill, trademarks, common law copyright, 
going value of businesses, franchises, and equitable easements 
would finally be included within the ambit of “property.”259 Still, 
mainstream legal thought resisted these critiques in the misguided 
belief that intangible property would remain limited, by not 
including the Blackstonian absolutist bundle of rights.260 However, 
clear limits to modern property law have not yet been implemented 
and many intangible right owners have only pushed for the highest 
protection of intangibles as if they were tangible.261 
In fact, as a result of positivism’s apparent success Grey 
declared the disintegration of property itself.262 “The dissolution of 
the traditional conception of property erode[d] the moral basis of 
capitalism.”263 Thus Grey proposed that social evolution explained 
that in our country’s current developmental phase the old ethical 
                                                
255 Id. at 362. 
256 Id. 
257 Id. at 359–61. 
258 Id. at 329 ("Any valuable interest potentially could be declared the object of 
property rights."). 
259 Francis J. Swayze, The Growing Law, 25 YALE L.J. 1, 10 (1915). 
260 Vandevelde, supra note 13, at 340–57 (however, admitting that trademarks 
were recognized to be absolute rights because of their necessary connection with 
physical property in In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 89 (1879) that extend 
everywhere). 
261 See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
262 Grey, supra note 60. 
263 Id. 
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justifications for our property system are no longer needed.264 Grey 
saw the problem clearly: that positivism had generally reduced 
property to an issue of politics.265 However, his comfort with a 
concept of property that is neither ethically nor morally justified is 
disturbing and general acceptance of such a system would be 
absolutely inappropriate.266 
It seems that after nearly a century of being declared 
obsolete,267 the marketplace still indicates that Blackstone is 
relevant. Take the price of gold for example.268 Historically, in 
times of economic uncertainty consumers have literally stopped 
trading intangibles like stock and actually bought up large amounts 
of physical property. This phenomenon explains why the price of 
gold soared in the wake of the 1930’s stock market crash, the 9/11 
terrorist attacks, the dot.com bubble, and the 2008 mortgage 
crisis.269 Thus, common sense or at least human instinct recognized 
                                                
264 Id. ("Modern capitalist property must be seen as a web of state-enforced 
relations of entitlement and duty between persons."). 
265 Id. 
266 See, e.g., SIR WILLIAM DAVID ROSS, THE RIGHT AND THE GOOD (1877) 
(presenting a moral deontological theory based on relationships which might fit 
the social relations conception of property better than simply no moral 
underpinning). 
267 Vandevelde, supra note 13, at 359 (noting that Blackstone was rendered 
obsolete because of his physicalism and absolutism). 
268 Gold Prices as it Relates to the Global Economy, ITM TRADING, 
http://www.itmtrading.com/gold_global_economy/ (last visited March 27, 2013) 
("Gold is considered an asset more than an investment as you have physical 
ownership of it . . . .") (italics added); Jacob Goldstein & David Kestenbaum, A 
Chemist Explains Why Gold Beat Out Lithium, Osmium, Einsteinium . . . . NPR 
(Nov. 19, 2010, 12:01 AM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/money/2011/02/15/ 
131430755/a-chemist-explains-why-gold-beat-out-lithium-osmium-einsteinium 
(explaining that Gold and Silver are the only elements in enough abundance to be 
traded that are not a gas, and that doesn't corrode or burst into flames and doesn't 
kill you). 
269 Jacob Goldstein, The Gold Bubble Is 4,000 Years Old, And It Won't End 
Now, NPR (Apr. 15, 2013, 3:31 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/money/2013/ 
04/15/177340213/the-gold-bubble-is-4-000-years-old-and-it-wont-end-now 
(noting that Gold demand boomed during the dot.com crash and the housing 
crisis); Floyd Norris & Jonathan Fuerbringer, A DAY OF TERROR: THE 
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that tangible property is more stable than intangible property.270 
Grey noted that the concept of property in “the popular mind” can 
limit the extent lawmakers are willing to extend property rights to 
intangibles.271 Even if we are to fully accept positivism, property 
reification into something “thing-like,” that average commonsense 
citizens can accept as property, still matters to our legal analysis.272 
 In fact, there are “dozens of gold-backed digital currencies” in 
existence today including GoldMoney and Pecunix.273 Bitcoin, a 
more popularly known digital currency is not gold-backed but 
claims to be inflation-resistant because there are a fixed number of 
Bitcoins in existence.274 These digital currencies are traded by 
people that may not trust the U.S. dollar that is subject to inflation 
and fluctuation due to decisions made by a central banking system. 
Digital currencies exist in a grey market partly because the U.S. 
government has a constitutional monopoly on minting currency.275 
However, digital currencies have not yet been subjected to a 
government crackdown, and in fact may be protected by copyright 
                                                
MARKETS; Stocks Tumble Abroad; Exchanges in New York Never Opened for 
the Day, NEW YORK TIMES (Sept. 12, 2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/ 
09/12/business/day-terror-markets-stocks-tumble-abroad-exchanges-new-york-
never-opened-for-day.html (noting that gold and crude oil prices leaped after the 
9/11 attacks); Casey Research, How do Gold Stocks Perform in a Depression?, 
INFLATIONDATA.COM (June 5, 2009), http://inflationdata.com/articles/2009/ 
06/05/how-do-gold-stocks-perform-in-a-depression (noting that gold stocks didn't 
drop during the great depression). 
270 Grey, supra note 60 (In the face of positivism, "[m]ost people [still] 
. . . conceive of property as things that are owned by persons."). 
271 Grey, supra note 60 (when commenting on Penn. Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of 
New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978), "The kind of property that can be taken is 
confined to those conglomerations of rights that, in the popular mind, have been 
reified into 'things' or 'pieces of property.'"). 
272 Id. 
273 Grinberg, supra note 107, at 174 (noting gold-backed digital currencies like 
Pecunix and GoldMoney compete with non-backed digital currencies like 
Bitcoin). 
274 Id. 
275 U.S. CONST. art. I §§ 8, 10. 
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law.276 Some digital currencies have been criticized as a means to 
avoid law enforcement for everything from tax evasion and 
securities fraud to paying for drugs and hit men.277 Others defend 
digital currencies as a commodity itself.278 As one spectator said: 
“A Bitcoin is something that simply exists like gold. . . . Of course, 
it’s not entirely like gold because it also, well, doesn’t [physically 
exist].”279 
Similarly, IP strategists have campaigned tirelessly to 
convince Americans that copyright is also like gold in that 
infringement is piracy and that file sharing is stealing. If a 
significant base of average commonsense Americans accepts a 
concept of absolute intangible property rights, major content 
owners could win ever-increasing protections to their copyrights, 
patents, trademarks, trade secrets and publicity rights.280 In fact, 
stock prices and the going value of businesses are currently being 
                                                
276 Compare MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Entm't, Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 935 (9th 
Cir. 2010) opinion amended and superseded on denial of reh'g, No. 09-15932, 
2011 WL 538748 (9th Cir. Feb. 17, 2011) (This case protected Blizzard's right to 
manage its video game's online virtual economy and currency which can be 
bought and sold for real money and valuated in terms of U.S. dollars), with 
Grinberg, supra note 107, at 174 (describing many online currencies that exist in 
a grey market and may eventually be found illegal for a number of reasons 
including tax evasion and counterfeiting). 
277 Alex Konrad, Feds Say They’ve Arrested ‘Dread Pirate Roberts,’ Shut Down 
His Black Market ‘The Silk Road,’ FORBES (Oct. 2, 2013, 12:08 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/alexkonrad/2013/10/02/feds-shut-down-silk-road-
owner-known-as-dread-pirate-roberts-arrested/. 
278 Sean Vitka, Bitcoin: I’m Not Dead Yet!, SLATE (Oct. 16, 2013, 4:45 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2013/10/silk_road_shutdo
wn_does_not_spell_the_end_for_bitcoin.html. 
279 Hugo Rifkind, How Bitcoin Could Destroy the State (And Perhaps Make me 
a Bit of Money), THE SPECTATOR (Mar. 30, 2013), http://www.spectator.co.uk/ 
columnists/hugo-rifkind/8874321/how-bitcoin-could-destroy-the-state-and-
perhaps-make-me-a-bit-of-money/. 
280 H.R. REP. NO. 112-128, at 21 (2012) (Patent owners "need protection in 
Europe, they need protection in China, they need protection in Korea and Japan 
and other parts of Asia. And to do that, they are incredibly hampered by patent 
systems that are totally misaligned. The AIA [America Invents Act] creates a new 
gold standard for patent systems that has been the U.S. system.") (italics added). 
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inflated by these intangibles which can have a negative effect on 
pensions and innocent purchasers of intangibles that have no 
tangible property backing. When suspect contracts involving 
intangible property had fallen under the purview of the Court, as 
pay-for-delay contracts recently have, the interested parties have 
told the Court to look the other way.281 
Furthermore, public outcry has stifled the growth of 
government protection of IP rights.282 Thus, it seems that the 
commonsense American layperson had not been tracking the 
government’s gradual expansion of intangible property rights. 
Positioned as a modern and progressive trend, property concepts 
have been applied to entitlements,283 the IP field, human rights, in 
personam rights, contract rights, bodily security, liberty and life 
itself.284 The public will not accept all these property interests as 
legitimate, and may reject some property rights as immoral.285 This 
                                                
281 Brief of Antitrust Economists as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 
23-24, Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013) (No. 12-416) 
2013 WL 836946; Hazen, supra note 10, at 795 (1987); Friedman, supra note 16, 
at 636; Hirschler, supra note 14. 
282 See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
283 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 265 (1970); Reich, supra note 204, at 785–
86 (arguing that property exists to serve security and independence and since 
entitlements have been used to protect these values in modern times, entitlements 
should also be included in the new property: "The presumption should be that the 
professional man will keep his license, and the welfare recipient his pension."). 
284 Grey, supra note 60 ("[M]ost property in a modern capitalist economy is 
intangible. Consider the commercial paper, bank accounts, insurance policies—
not to mention more arcane intangibles such as trademarks, patents, copyrights, 
franchises, and business goodwill."); Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, 
Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 
85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1090 (1972) ("life itself will be decided on the basis of 
'might makes right.'"). See Bowman v. Monsanto Co. No. 11-796, slip op. at 1 
(U.S. May 13, 2013) (deciding that a farmer is liable for patent infringement if 
soybeans that have patented DNA reproduce naturally). 
285 Clinton, supra note 22, at 20 (noting that many corporate supply chains have 
been found to have been tainted with slavery, also noting that an estimated 20.9 
million modern slaves exist today and that it constitutes an estimated $20 billion 
dollar industry globally). See also Obama, supra note 22 (President Obama said 
that "[i]t ought to concern every person, because it's a debasement of our 
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has become clear as intangibles have threatened the public’s 
economic and speech interests,286 and physical property rights 
themselves.287 The People may declare these rights disingenuous 
and dishonest for being nonphysical and completely un-thing-like. 
Therefore, the judiciary should return to Blackstone’s 
definition of property as necessarily physical property for purposes 
of constitutional interpretation. The judiciary cannot continue to 
entertain the positivist conception of property as anything from 
which value can be derived because it fails to be constitutionally 
sound. It fails because according to the positivist regime the 
Copyright and Patent acts may be enacted entirely pursuant to the 
interstate commerce power.288 Thus, positivism renders the 
Copyright and Patent Clause superfluous and meaningless. 
Accordingly, the limits expressed in the Copyright and Patent 
Clause have been circumvented, eroding the traditional contours of 
copyright. Despite this the Supreme Court had continued to rely on 
these limits to ensure that IP rights do not impede the free speech 
rights of the First Amendment.289 
Furthermore, the utilitarian analysis inferred by courts into 
the word “progress” in the Copyright and Patent Clause should be 
considered a limit to the preemptory effect of copyright to state 
granted rights inspired by privacy, tort or Hegelian personhood 
theory. Margaret Radin has argued that we make a fundamental 
                                                
common humanity. It ought to concern every community, because it tears at the 
social fabric. It ought to concern every business, because it distorts markets. It 
ought to concern every nation, because it endangers public health and fuels 
violence and organized crime. I'm talking about the injustice, the outrage, of 
human trafficking, which must be called by its true name—modern slavery. Our 
fight against human trafficking is one of the great human rights causes of our 
time and the United States will continue to lead it."). 
286 See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
287 Kirtsaeng, No. 11–697, slip op. at 21 (noting that a copyright in software 
could even halt the sale of a used car). 
288 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 584 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) 
("Things in interstate commerce" and substantial effects tests). 
289 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 191 (2003) ("When, as in this case, 
Congress has not altered the traditional contours of copyright protection, further 
First Amendment scrutiny is unnecessary."). 
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moral distinction between fungible and personal property.290 She 
also argued that fungible property, property that is held for its 
exchange value, should be given less protection than personal 
property, property that is held primarily because it is necessary to 
our sense of self. However, the only kind of property recognized by 
the Court’s current interpretation of the Copyright and Patent 
Clause is “fungible.”291 Thus, property of the “personhood” type 
should be left to the states to regulate. 
The Courts should adopt a more serious conception of 
public property to temper private property claims using Carol 
Rose’s “comedy of the commons” rationale.292 Some property uses 
work in the opposite direction from a “tragedy”293 when it is left to 
public use including public roads, bridges and the Internet.294 
Through custom, prescription and trust, the government has 
recognized a public interest or right in some sorts of property that 
constitute the “social glue” of a society.295 Rose noted that our 
society’s social glue might be our right to free speech and the social 
                                                
290 Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 957–
60 (1982). 
291 Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985) 
("In our haste to disseminate news, it should not be forgotten that the Framers 
intended copyright itself to be the engine of free expression. By establishing a 
marketable right to the use of one's expression, copyright supplies the economic 
incentive to create and disseminate ideas."). 
292 Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and 
Inherently Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 723 (1986) [hereinafter 
Rose: The Comedy]. 
293 Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243, 1244 (1968) 
(Negative externalities are the economic problem. Property rights internalize 
those externalities by allowing private internalization of the some of the positive 
externalities as well.). 
294 Rose: The Comedy, supra note 292, at 768 ("In a sense, this is the reverse of 
the 'tragedy of the commons': it is a 'comedy of the commons,' as is so 
felicitously expressed in the phrase, 'the more the merrier.'"). 
295 Id. at 778 ("[T]he Romans had a category of public property for religious 
structures and places; this makes sense in a society that regards religions as a 
'social glue' that holds the whole together."). 
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activity brought about by commerce itself.296 In fact there is 
compelling historical evidence that the First Amendment was 
crafted to protect public goods.297 Finally, she noted the dangers of 
failing to temper grants of private property with the public interest. 
Rose’s concern was that in cases of holdouts and monopolies, 
unreasonably high rents would be sought in the form of 
prohibitively high prices. She noted that a cause for the higher rents 
may have been brought about by the public’s participation, and not 
the property owner’s personal investment in the property.298 
To this end, intangible property claims should be subjected 
to a strict ethical standard of honesty during creation, allocation and 
valuation.299 This standard would require intangible property claims 
                                                
296 Id. ("Perhaps an important social glue in our own society is free speech rather 
than religion."). See also Thomas Jefferson, A Bill for Establishing Religious 
Freedom, enacted on January 16, 1786, in JEFFERSON: WRITINGS, supra note 1, at 
347 (This bill was enacted by the Virginia General Assembly with the support of 
James Madison. It vindicates religious and intellectual freedom and was one of 
the sources that Congress drew upon when drafting the First Amendment in 
1789, illustrating the symbiotic relationship freedom of speech and freedom of 
religion in the United States.). Cf. Genesis 1:3 ("And God said, 'Let there be 
light,' and there was light."); John 1:1, 14 ("In the beginning was the Word, and 
the Word was with God, and the Word was God . . . . The Word became flesh and 
made his dwelling among us."). For a Judeo-Christian society like the United 
States, creation and authorship itself may clearly be seen as an act of free speech, 
thus Rose's quip that our social glue might be free speech may not be as far from 
the religious values that Ancient Rome based its public right on for the founders. 
297 Roger Williams (1603–1683), A Plea for Religious Liberty, excerpt from THE 
BLOUDY TENENT OF PERSECUTION, FOR CAUSE OF CONSCIENCE (1644), available 
at http://www.constitution.org/bcp/religlib.htm ("[I]t is the will and command of 
God that (since the coming of his Son the Lord Jesus) a permission of the most 
paganish, Jewish, Turkish, or antichristian consciences and worships, be granted 
to all men in all nations and countries; and they are only to be fought against with 
that sword which is only (in soul matters) able to conquer, to wit, the sword of 
God's Spirit, the Word of God."). 
298 Rose: The Comedy, supra note 292, at 749–50. 
299 Singer II, supra note 206, at 113–14 (Courts "have felt that companies are 
'owned' by the shareholders and that the main purpose of a corporation is to 
maximize profits. If that depends on shedding workers, so be it." However, "both 
common law and statutory law impose minimum standards on all K relationships 
to ensure contracting parties do not engage in fraudulent, deceptive or unfair 
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to have a sufficient nexus with actual value backing that does not 
simply arise from a “comedy of the commons.”300 If a property 
claim were to fail this strict honesty standard, then the claim or 
right would be stripped of the legal attribute of property. This 
honesty standard could preserve efforts at the state level to regulate 
fields of law that would otherwise have been swallowed by an over-
expansive concept of property. Adopting these changes to the 
concept of property is the most reasonable way to limit the 
expansion of the Commerce Clause so as to protect the Copyright 
and Patent Clause from being rendered meaningless. 
Some may not believe that we need to enforce honesty in 
the creation, allocation and valuation of intangible property. 
However, in the name of the waning middle class of America, this 
article disagrees vehemently. We are in the wake of a housing 
crisis, a massive corporate buyout by the government, a resulting 
world economic crisis and now an attitude that banks are not only 
too big to fail but also too big to be held accountable. The 
unabashed demand for maximized enforcement of IP rights 
throughout the entire world has only recently been challenged by 
public outcry and the Supreme Court.301 In response, the content 
industry and internet service providers engage in self-help measures 
by slowing or blocking the internet to individuals they perceive are 
violating their economic interest in property rights.302 Such 
measures are a direct violation of FCC net neutrality rules which 
                                                
practices and to ensure that the relationship is subject to minimum standards 
designed to recognize the dignity and humanity of the parties."). 
300 Rose: The Comedy, supra note 292, at 723; Benjamin G. Damstedt, Limiting 
Locke: A Natural Law Justification for the Fair Use Doctrine 112 YALE L.J. 
1179, 1182–83 (2003) (suggesting that public goods are in danger of waste by 
way of underuse instead of waste by overuse. This conception could fit the 
Comedy of the Commons idea into Lockean labor theory). 
301 See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
302 About the Center for Copyright Information, http://www. 
copyrightinformation.org/about-cci/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2013) (CCI is a 
coalition of major copyright owner interest groups and ISPs, and they are 
initiating copyright alert systems in violation of net neutrality). 
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internet service providers are comfortable flouting,303 calling upon a 
conception of copyright-as-property. Furthermore, many U.S. 
Circuits validated the use of self-help measures by patent owners 
who are granted an “almost unrebuttable presumption of patent 
validity.”304 These trends indicate that the dangers to consumers, of 
the unbridled and arbitrary grant of intangible property ownership, 
is great and thus a higher standard of honesty in intangible property 
ownership should be enforced. 
Property Maximization, Public Outcry and the Constitution 
[T]he current subprime crisis has made it abundantly 
clear that the creation of a property right is not a 
self-regarding act. The banking and mortgage 
industries created & marketed subprime mortgages 
which they then securitized and insured with credit 
default swaps lacking any backing. When the 
housing bubble burst, these property rights wrecked 
the world economy.305 
Despite this conclusion about the dangers of granting 
property rights, Joseph William Singer embraced the classic Liberal 
answer that recognizes yet more property rights in intangibles.306 
However, his call for increased diversity in intangible property 
rights through a social relations conception of property only 
                                                
303 Preserving the Open Internet, 47 C.F.R. § 8 (2011). 
304 In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 214 (3d Cir. 2012) ("First, we take 
issue with the scope of the patent test's almost unrebuttable presumption of patent 
validity."). See also Brief of Antitrust Economists as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Respondents at 23-24, Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 
(2013) (No. 12-416) 2013 WL 836946 (this issue is being heard by the U.S. 
Supreme Court). 
305 Singer II, supra note 206, at 114 (His solution, which is actually not apparent 
to all, is to give the legislature a wider leeway to regulate: "It is apparent to all 
that regulations of property are needed to prevent and respond to the externalities 
associated with arrangements that are indifferent to the rights and needs of third 
parties and to the nation as a whole."). 
306 Singer I, supra note 203, at 742–43. 
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legitimizes the creation and marketing of destructive intangible 
property in the first place. To stem the tides of the great injustice of 
opportunism preying upon the middle class, lawmakers must 
recognize the dishonest creation and marketing of intangible 
property for what it is: a lie. Preserving the ability for businesses to 
cloak lies in property in order to shift losses to the weaker classes is 
destructive and purposeless. 
Grey saw the problem perhaps in its most clear 
form―disintegration.307 The problem became unavoidable when 
we began recognizing intangibles as property. Short of 
Blackstonian physicalism, there is no bright line to keep property a 
“distinct legal category from other legal rights, in that they pertain 
to things.”308 Grey said that this is true because “most property in a 
modern capitalist economy is intangible.”309 What he did not 
foresee was that lawmakers would begin to conceptualize 
intangibles as “things” simply because they were given the attribute 
of property and not because they are physical, or even detectable 
with any of our five senses.310 Simply applied to constitutional law 
                                                
307 Grey, supra note 60. 
308 Id. 
309 Id. ("Consider the common forms of wealth: shares of stock in corporations, 
bonds, various kinds of commercial paper, bank accounts, insurance policies--not 
to mention the arcane intangibles such as trademarks, patents, copyrights, 
franchises and business good will."). 
310 Lemley, supra note 22, at 1071 ("My worry is that the rhetoric of property 
has a clear meaning in the minds of courts, lawyers, and commentators as 'things 
that are owned by persons' and that fixed meaning will make it all too tempting to 
fall into the trap of treating intellectual property as an absolute right to exclude."). 
See also Grey, supra note 60; BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF 
COPYRIGHT 74 (1967) (noting that perhaps it would be okay to call copyright 
property as long as we think of property as a general concept); Stewart E. Sterk, 
What's in a name? The Troublesome Analogies Between Real and Intellectual 
Property, Cardozo Law Legal Studies Research, Working Paper No. 88, 43 
(2004), http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=575121 (arguing that "[i]t is far too late to 
expunge the rhetoric of property from dialogue about copyright."); Carol M. 
Rose, Canons of Property Talk, or, Blackstone's Anxiety, 108 YALE L.J. 601, 631 
(1998) [hereinafter Rose: Canons] (despotic dominion is a caricature of property 
rights rather than an accurate description of them). 
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before Sebelius, “things” in interstate commerce became all 
encompassing. Thus, the effect of the positivist movement on 
federalism, state sovereignty and human rights that were once seen 
as free from federal limitation is nothing short of eclipsing. 
There is ample historical evidence to conclude that robust 
protection of intangible property does not result in the “substantial 
direct effect[s] on economic growth” that enforcement of general 
property rights do.311 Furthermore, granting overbroad IP rights 
have been criticized for having the effect of incentivizing too much 
investment into innovation as compared to “other forms of 
production.”312 This “distort[ion of] the general economic 
                                                
311 JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, 
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 92–93 (2008) ("The 
historical evidence, the cross-country evidence, and the evidence from economic 
experiments all point to a marked difference between the economic importance of 
general property rights more generally. With the cross-country studies in 
particular, the quality of general property rights institutions has a substantial 
direct effect on economic growth. Using the same methodology and in the same 
studies, intellectual property rights have at best only a weak and indirect effect on 
economic growth . . . . [T]he empirical evidence strongly rejects simplistic 
arguments that patents universally spur innovation and economic growth. 
'Property' is not a ritual incantation that blesses the anointed with the fruits of 
innovation; legislation of 'stronger' patent rights does not automatically mean 
greater innovation. Instead, the effectiveness of patents as a form of property 
depends critically on the institutions that implement the law. And there appear to 
be important differences in the effectiveness of implementation across different 
technologies and industries."). But see WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. 
POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 379 
(2003) ("making intellectual property excludable creates value."). 
312 Lemley, supra note 22, at 1064. 
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equilibrium”313 may be seen best in the current business decisions 
made by the telecommunications titan known as Comcast.314 
In the past five years, Comcast has purchased 
NBC/Universal, a company that creates and owns copyrighted 
content, and established Xfinity, an Internet video distribution 
company that competes with Hulu and Netflix.315 In fact, Comcast’s 
subsidiary NBC was the sole distributor of the 2012 Olympics in 
the United States.316 These projects represent tens of billions of 
dollars devoted to the involvement of Comcast in copyright 
ownership and distribution. Meanwhile, 30% of America is not 
connected to the Internet at all, and only 8% has an updated fiber 
optic connection.317 Everyone else is still connecting to the Internet 
via copper wiring, and we are quickly losing the global race to high 
                                                
313 Id. at 1062, 1064. See also Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Reexamining Copyright's 
Incentives-Access Paradigm, 49 VAND. L. REV. 483, 491–92 (1996); Brett M. 
Frischmann, An Economic Theory of Infrastructure and Commons Management, 
89 MINN. L. REV. 917, 931 (2005) ("[E]conomic analysis of many infrastructure 
resources fails to fully account for how the resources are used as inputs to create 
social benefits and thus fails to fully account for the social demand for the 
resources."). 
314 Sam Gustin, Is Broadband Internet Access a Public Utility?, TIME (Jan. 9, 
2013), http://business.time.com/2013/01/09/is-broadband-internet-access- 
a-public-utility/ ("Because the U.S. government has allowed a small group of 
giant, highly profitable companies to dominate the broadband market, Crawford 
argues, American consumers have fewer choices for broadband service, at higher 
prices but lower speeds, compared to dozens of other developed countries, 
including throughout Europe and Asia."). See also Crawford, supra note 200 
(“[T]he U.S. is rapidly losing the global race for high-speed connectivity, as 
fewer than 8 percent of households have fiber service. And almost 30 percent of 
the country still isn't connected to the internet at all . . . . All Americans need 
high-speed access, just as they need water, clean air and electricity. But they have 
allowed a naive belief in the power and beneficence of the free market to cloud 
their vision. As things stand, the U.S. has the worst of both worlds: no 
competition and no regulation."). 
315 Gustin, supra note 314. 
316 Id. 
317 Crawford, supra note 200. 
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speed Internet.318 In fact, because of Comcast’s lackluster 
investment in the utility it oversees, some towns have rolled out 
their own last mile fiber optic networks using public funds.319 
The FCC’s net neutrality rules require transparency, no 
blocking and no favoring of Internet traffic by internet providers. 
Verizon has challenged these rules in the Federal Circuit.320 
Without these rules nothing will stand in the way of 
telecommunications companies becoming the largest beneficiaries 
of copyright protection.321 Comcast has every incentive to and 
                                                
318 Id. See also Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 
94, 193 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("For in the absence of an effective 
means of communication, the right to speak would ring hollow indeed. And, in 
recognition of these principles, we have consistently held that the First 
Amendment embodies, not only the abstract right to be free from censorship, but 
also the right of an individual to utilize an appropriate and effective medium for 
the expression of his views."). 
319 See Crawford, supra note 200. 
320 Brief of Respondent-Appellee at 14, 15, 50, 57, 75, Verizon v. Fed. 
Commc’n Comm’n, No. 11-1355 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 16, 2013). See also FEDERAL 
COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, FCC Grants Approval of Comcast-NBCU 
Transaction (Jan. 18, 2011), available at http://transition.fcc.gov/transaction/ 
comcast-nbcu.html#orders (noting that FCC approval of the Comcast/NBC 
merger was made on the condition that Comcast would fulfill a number of public 
interest commitments including “Protecting the Development of Online 
Competition.” Comcast/NBC’s exclusive grant of the copyright in the Olympics 
arguably violates a number of these conditions including “unreasonably 
withhold[ing] programming from Hulu.”); Who Owns the Media?, FREE PRESS, 
http://www.freepress.net/ownership/chart (last visited on Dec. 2, 2013) (showing 
the high consolidation of media industries). 
321 Brief of Respondent-Appellee at 14, 15, 50, 57, 75, Verizon v. FCC, No. 11-
1355 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 16, 2013). See also Marguerite Reardon, Franken: Comcast 
Thumbs Nose at Net Neutrality Rules, CNET (May 7, 2012, 12:20 PM), 
http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-57429373-38/franken-comcast-thumbs-
nose-at-net-neutrality-rules/ (noting that Comcast might be violating net 
neutrality rules by exempting its Xfinity video service from monthly data caps). 
But see Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 973 (4th Cir. 1990) 
(finding that there is a copyright misuse defense inherent to copyright by 
interpreting English common law history of copyright into U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, 
cl. 8. This defense is rarely raised, even more rarely applied, and yet it is the 
antitrust release valve for copyright). 
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actively favors traffic in Xfinity’s favor.322 Since Comcast naturally 
pays the exact minimum rate for connecting itself to the Internet, it 
will be able to offer predatory prices to consumers for similar video 
services provided by Netflix, Apple, Amazon and Google.323 The 
chosen Trojan horse for Internet service providers like Comcast is 
copyright because lawmakers have cloaked copyright in property so 
well, even the Supreme Court has acknowledged it.324 
IP’s complete transformation into a form of property is 
partly due to an outright failure of courts to properly apply a 
utilitarian economic analysis to IP rights.325 Because of the 
difficulties in properly applying a utilitarian analysis, lawmakers 
have fallen to their assumptions while couching those arguments in 
utilitarian terms.326 Some rely on Locke, granting higher protection 
to reward labor.327 Others lean on Mill’s marketplace of ideas, 
limiting grants of IP according to the free-market.328 Thus, courts 
                                                
322 Reardon, supra note 321. 
323 See Tony Bradley, Comcast Toll on Netflix Screams for Net Neutrality, PC 
WORLD (Nov. 30, 2010, 5:57 AM), http://www.pcworld.com/article/211964/ 
comcast_toll_on_netflix_screams_for_net_neutrality.html (explaining how 
Comcast's non-neutral stance toward Netflix stems from its apparent moral 
ground in blocking peer-to-peer file sharing services). 
324 Grey, supra note 60 ("To own property is to have exclusive control over 
something . . . Legal restraints on the free use of one's property are conceived as 
departures from an ideal conception of full ownership."); United States v. 
Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1280 (11th Cir. 1999) ("The [Copyright Clause] 
grant [of legislative power] itself is stated in positive terms, and does not imply 
any negative pregnant that suggests the term ‘writings’ operates as a ceiling on 
Congress' ability to legislate pursuant to other grants. Extending quasi-copyright 
protection also furthers the purpose of the Copyright Clause to promote progress 
of the useful arts by securing some exclusive rights to the creative author."). 
325 Lemley, supra note 22, at 1057 (noting that IP rights are justifiable only to 
the extent that excludability does in fact create value necessary to incentivize 
creation and innovation). See also Richard A. Posner, Misappropriation: A 
Dirge, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 621, 638 (2003) ("[T]he unauthorized use of another's 
IP, unlike unauthorized use of another's physical property, lacks clear normative 
significance."). 
326 McGowan, supra note 147, at 2–3, 7, 38, 71–72. 
327 Lemley, supra note 22, at 1066–67. 
328 Id. 
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fail to address what incentives are appropriate in order to spark 
creation and innovation and have presented a smattering of 
inconsistent and conflicting outcomes.329 This is an indication that 
the current framework underpinning IP law is ineffective. 
Two shortcomings of a legal utilitarian analysis have been 
recognized by IP scholars. First, it is difficult to impossible to 
define utility or even to determine which types of utility are 
favored.330 This adds to the difficulty of applying a utilitarian 
analysis. Second, it lacks a mechanism to encourage dissemination 
of copyrighted and patented materials especially to women and the 
poor.331 In fact, philosophical ethicists have long criticized Mill and 
Bentham for merely supporting a form of Hedonism.332 Other 
                                                
329 DAVID D. FRIEDMAN, LAW'S ORDER: WHAT ECONOMICS HAS TO DO WITH 
LAW AND WHY IT MATTERS 135 (2000) (We have missed the boat, because 
"what we want . . . is not merely an incentive but the right incentive."). See also 
Lawrence Lessig, Intellectual Property and Code, 11 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMM. 
635, 638–39 (1996) ("'Sufficient incentive,' however, is something less than 
'perfect control.' The question we must ask is what kind of control the Net should 
yield to owners of intellectual property."); Lemley, supra note 22, at 1059 
(enumerating the costs of overbroad grant of IP rights as: 1, IP rights distort 
markets away from the competitive nom by creating static inefficiencies and 
deadweight losses, 2, it interferes with other creators' to work (dynamic 
inefficiencies), 3, it creates rent-seeking behavior that is socially wasteful, 4, they 
have high administrative costs and 5, the cause overinvestment in research and 
development itself that is distortionary). Cf. The Sony Bono Copyright Extension 
Act 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (The retroactive provisions gave no new incentive to 
authors to create and yet was not unconstitutional.). 
330 Sunder, supra note 130, at 284. See also JOHN STUART MILL, 
UTILITARIANISM, ch. 2 (referring to high and low pleasures, some being worth 
more than others); ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 5 (1974) 
("Indeed, no proposed decision making criterion for choice under uncertainty 
carries conviction here, nor does maximizing expected utility on the basis of such 
frail probabilities."). 
331 Sunder, supra note 130, at 284 (citing AMARTYA SEN, EQUALITY OF WHAT? in 
CHOICE, WELFARE, AND MEASUREMENT 353, 354, 356 (1982)). 
332 Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Consequentialism, THE STANFORD  
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta, ed. 2012), http://plato. 
stanford.edu/archives/win2012/entries/consequentialism/ ("Classic utilitarians 
held hedonistic act consequentialism."); Andrew Moore, Hedonism, THE 
STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta, ed. 2011), 
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critics have found utilitarianism hopelessly inapplicable and fatally 
undefined.333 Sebelius could represent a necessary shift in 
Constitutional interpretation for courts to adopt a more limited and 
practicable underpinning for IP law.334 Utilitarianism may in fact be 
unworkable. But unless and until the federal government recognizes 
this, the power to regulate by more limited non-utilitarian 
justifications should be left to the states. 
The benefits gained from abandoning utilitarianism would 
be felt on a worldwide level.335 Democracy could spread through 
the Internet to the four corners of the earth. Democracy could 
spread across the globe not through government propaganda or war, 
but by the simple fact that everyone, regardless of class, can equally 
express themselves online. In fact, other values that do not easily fit 
into a utilitarian framework should be considered including 
                                                
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2011/entries/hedonism/ (noting that 
Bentham's utilitarianism was regarded as a "pig philosophy."). 
333 See, e.g., Sinnott-Armstrong, supra note 332 (For example, utilitarianism has 
a hard time explaining why one must tell the truth, or otherwise not lie, if telling 
the truth will cause the teller pain. Utilitarians claim that when there are no 
negative factors against telling the truth, the theory requires one to tell the truth. 
But even here, they cannot say why one should tell the truth if it does neither 
generates nor costs utility to lie. Other criticisms include its failure to clearly 
define the factors measured in a cost and benefit utility analysis.). 
334 Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2644. 
335 Sunder, supra note 130, at 280 (The Internet facilitates a "semiotic 
democracy" by handing us the tools of creation and dissemination). See also ERIC 
VON HIPPEL, DEMOCRATIZING INNOVATION 123–24 (2005) ("democratization of 
the opportunity to create is important beyond giving more users the ability to 
make exactly the right products for themselves . . . [T]he joy and the learning 
associated with creativity and membership in creative communities is also 
important, and these experiences too are made more widely available as 
innovation is democratized."). But see China's Internet: A Giant Cage, supra note 
136 (noting that the current Chinese government has been able to leverage 
internet tools to actually further authoritarian interests); Nicole Perlroth, Hackers 
in China Attacked The Times for Last 4 Months, NEW YORK TIMES (Jan. 30, 
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/31/technology/chinese-hackers- 
infiltrate-new-york-times-computers.html?pagewanted=all (Chinese hackers 
actually cyberattacked the New York Times when they had published political 
criticism of the Chinese government). 
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individual autonomy, sovereign autonomy, culture, equality and 
development.336 Values that we may take for granted in the U.S. 
should not go unconsidered by TRIPs. Nor should they be lost on us 
here at home. 
In fact, the result of continuing to press a utilitarian, 
maximized IP regime onto the world will not be higher profits for 
western IP owners. It will actually end similar to the current 
position of the U.S. in the world economy for merchandise. In 
2001, President Clinton and Congress opened our markets with 
China so that we could sell them products,337 and we actually ended 
up having them sell us toothbrushes, pencils, knick-knacks, etc.338 
As a result we are losing jobs and billions of dollars of our GDP 
because of the lack of forethought that went into our trade 
agreements with China. Now, one of the reasons we passed the 
America Invents Act (AIA) was to meet China’s rise in patent 
grants.339 
                                                
336 Sunder, supra note 130, at 324–25. 
337 Letter to Congress from President Clinton (May 23, 2000), available at 
http://clinton6.nara.gov/2000/05/2000-05-23-letter-from-the-president-to-
speaker-hastert.html ("China—with more than a billion people—is home to the 
largest potential market in the world. To enter the WTO, China has agreed to 
open that market to everything from American wheat to cars to computers . . . If 
Congress makes the right decision, our companies will be able to sell and 
distribute products in China made by American workers on American soil, 
without being forced to relocate manufacturing to China, or to sell through the 
Chinese government, or to transfer valuable technology. We will be able to 
export products without exporting jobs."); Press Release, WTO Successfully 
Concludes Negotiations on China's Entry, WTO NEWS (Sept. 17, 2001), 
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres01_e/pr243_e.htm (Most of the 
agreement was focused on opening China's doors to American businesspeople 
and investors, including in telecom. Not one politician seemed to guess that 
market pressures would facilitate the near opposite result). 
338 U.S. Department of Commerce, Foreign Trade: Trade in Goods with China, 
UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, available at  http://www.census.gov/foreign-
trade/balance/c5700.html (showing that the U.S. has only purchased more 
Chinese goods every year, far surpassing our exports to China. In 2012 we 
bought $315 billion more in Chinese goods than we exported to China). 
339 Floor Statement of Judiciary Committee Chairman Lamar Smith, The 
America Invents Act, H.R. 1249, (June 22, 2011), available at 
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If we keep reacting to countries that do not believe in 
equality, transparency or human rights in general we will lose our 
higher ground not only economically but also ethically. Not only 
will others’ upper classes be the greatest beneficiaries of our IP 
laws,340 but our IP laws will also justify the silencing and 
enslavement of their lower classes.341 As Wal-Mart has proven with 
their record of predatory pricing,342 Main Street America cannot 
compete with businesses that contract with countries that do not 
believe in equality of class.343 EBay has already sold off a portion 
                                                
http://judiciary.house.gov/issues/issues_patentreformact2011.html ("And while 
America's innovators are forced to spend time and resources defending their 
patents, our competitors are busy developing new products that expand their 
businesses and their economies. According to a recent media report, China is 
expected to surpass the United States for the first time this year as the world's 
leading patent publisher."). See also Lee Chyen Yee, China tops U.S., Japan to 
become top patent filer, REUTERS (Dec. 21, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/ 
article/2011/12/21/us-china-patents-idUSTRE7BK0LQ20111221. 
340 Kirtsaeng, No. 11–697, slip op. at 22-23 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) ("[T]he 
Court embraces an international-exhaustion rule that could benefit U.S. 
consumers but would likely disadvantage foreign holders of U.S. Copyrights."). 
341 Clinton, supra note 22, at 20. See also Obama, supra note 22 ("It ought to 
concern every person, because it's a debasement of our common humanity. It 
ought to concern every community, because it tears at the social fabric. It ought 
to concern every business, because it distorts markets. It ought to concern every 
nation, because it endangers public health and fuels violence and organized 
crime. I'm talking about the injustice, the outrage, of human trafficking, which 
must be called by its true name—modern slavery. Our fight against human 
trafficking is one of the great human rights causes of our time and the United 
States will continue to lead it."). 
342 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Am. Drugs, Inc., 319 Ark. 214, 234 (1995) 
(ultimately ruling in favor of Wal-Mart, and deciding that selling goods below 
market value was not predatory or illegal); Edmund L. Andrews, International 
Business; Germany Says Wal-Mart Must Raise Prices, NEW YORK TIMES (Sept. 
9, 2000), http://www.nytimes.com/2000/09/09/business/international-business-
germany-says-wal-mart-must-raise-prices.html; Wal-Mart to Sell 85 Stores in 
Germany, LOS ANGELES TIMES (July 29, 2006), http://articles.latimes.com/2006/ 
jul/29/business/fi-walmart29. 
343 Sam Hornblower, Wal-Mart & China: A Joint Venture, FRONTLINE (Nov. 23, 
2004), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/walmart/secrets/ 
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of its company to Alibaba, a similar company that sells cheap 
products direct from Chinese factories to western consumers.344 The 
need for companies like Costco and Wal-Mart could be undermined 
entirely by the development of international business models that 
they pioneered. 
Non-alienable termination rights may be perceived as a 
safety-valve for unfairness traditionally found in entertainment 
contracts of adhesion that make non-authors the beneficial owner of 
copyrights.345 For instance, original authors of musical works can 
reclaim their copyright “after thirty-five years (in some cases), after 
fifty-six years (in other cases), and sometimes even after seventy-
five years” have passed since the grant was first executed,346 as long 
as it was executed on or after January 1, 1978.347 In this way major 
musical hits can be reclaimed, like the Village People’s YMCA 
song, which was reclaimed in 2012.348 However, termination rights 
do nothing for those who transferred their copyright before 1978,349 
                                                
wmchina.html; Tiejun Cheng & Mark Selden, The Origins and Social 
Consequences of China's Hukou System, 139 THE CHINA QUARTERLY 644 (1994) 
(Those who have a hukou in Beijing or Shanghai receive social benefits like 
healthcare and welfare, while those in the countryside do not). 
344 Alibaba.com Strengthens Position as Go-To Supply Source for U.S. E-
commerce Entrepreneurs with Acquisition of Auctiva, BUSINESS WIRE (Aug. 24, 
2010), http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20100824006735/en. See also 
Sayantani Ghosh & Aurindom Mukherjee, China's Alibaba Buys Back Half of 
Yahoo's Stake, REUTERS (Sept. 18, 2012, 4:02 PM) http://www.reuters.com/ 
article/2012/09/18/us-alibaba-buyback-yahoo-idUSBRE88H0Y520120918 (if 
Alibaba buys Yahoo!, they will be completely tapped into the American 
consumer base). 
345 17 U.S.C. §§ 203, 304 (2013). 
346 Lydia Pallas Loren, Renegotiating the Copyright Deal in the Shadow of the 
"Inalienable" Right to Terminate, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1329 (2010). 
347 17 U.S.C. §§ 203(a)(3), 304 (2013). 
348 Scorpio Music S.A. v. Willis, No. 11CV1557 BTM(RBB), 2012 WL 
1598043 (S.D. Cal. May 7, 2012). 
349 Don Snowden, Fighting for Artists' Publishing Rights, LOS ANGELES TIMES 
(Mar. 1, 1987), http://articles.latimes.com/1987-03-01/entertainment/ca-
6711_1_artists-rights  (noting that Richard Berry reached an amicable settlement 
for half of the publishing rights in the song Louie Louie after he had sold it for 
$750 30 years earlier). 
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and termination rights do not extend to works “made for hire.”350 
Even though termination rights may help even out the balance 
between starving artists and big business, TRIPs continues to leave 
out lower and middle class rights holders from consideration 
altogether.351 
The failure of international IP law to capture the interests of 
the lower and middle classes was masterfully illustrated in the 2013 
Academy Award winning documentary Searching for Sugar 
Man.352 American artist Sixto Rodriguez’s work rose to fame in 
South Africa without him ever getting paid and without him ever 
knowing until Rodriguez’s eldest daughter happened upon a 
website dedicated to him in 1998. In South Africa his songs had 
become the rally cry for Afrikaner apartheid protesters. For years, 
record companies cut and sold his records sending royalties to the 
record company that dropped Rodriguez after his records flopped in 
the United States. Meanwhile, Rodriguez and his family returned to 
their humble beginnings to live out their days in the rough 
neighborhoods of Detroit. 
What is more, TRIPs leverages IP regulation in developing 
nations that haven’t embraced rights to property, security and 
liberty regarding physical property.353 The resulting new regime 
stifles the expansion of the “self-evident” truth that all men are 
created equal.354 Along these lines, Doctors Without Borders 
                                                
350 17 U.S.C. §§ 203, 304 (2013); Michael Cieply, Court Ruling Says Marvel 
Holds Rights, Not an Artist, THE NEW YORK TIMES (July 28, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/29/business/media/disney-wins-marvel-
comics-copyright-case.html?_r=0 (Disney owns Marvel Comics). 
351 Sunder, supra note 130, at 264-65 (noting that the composer of The Lion 
Sleeps Tonight, never benefited economically from its use in Disney's The Lion 
King). 
352 About Rodriguez, Rodriguez Official Website, http://www.rodriguez-
music.com/about/ (last visited Apr. 24, 2013). 
353 Sunder, supra note 130, at 291. 
354 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) ("We hold these 
truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by 
their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty 
and the pursuit of Happiness."). See also Zach Carter, WikiLeaks Reveals Secret 
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reported that patent protection at the level TRIPs requires can 
kill.355 Thus some developing countries are acting to limit TRIPs 
patent protection to preserve human rights and life.356 In general, 
developing countries are under pressure to adopt defensive IP 
policies to protect “poor people’s knowledge.”357 This includes 
traditional knowledge, geographical indications, and biodiversity. 
Finally, Creative Commons offers a Developing Nations Creative 
Commons License. This license is designed to allow third world 
citizens to release artistic expression in the developing world 
without also releasing their work in the developed world.358 
Utilitarianism as a regime that reduces the conception of IP to a 
matter of wealth maximization without considering the costs 
tomorrow has stood in the way of these sorts of efforts to protect 
the poor under classes of the world. 
Abandoning utilitarianism would also create positive 
benefits domestically. First, it would at the very least allow us to 
limit the trend of commoditization and propertization of anything 
from which value can be derived. Scholars have warned that the 
current IP regime is a threat to free speech and the public 
domain.359 IP could finally be aligned with the finding in State v. 
Shack, that “[p]roperty rights serve human values.”360 The current 
                                                
Obama Deal, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 13, 2013, 5:54 PM), http://www. 
huffingtonpost.com/2013/11/13/wikileaks-global-health_n_4269337.html. 
355 See also Zach Carter, WikiLeaks Reveals Secret Obama Deal, HUFFINGTON 
POST (Nov. 13, 2013, 5:54 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/11/13/ 
wikileaks-global-health_n_4269337.html, Cf. Amicus Brief of Antitrust 
Economists, Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Actavis, Inc., No. 12-416, 2013 WL 836946 
(U.S. Feb. 28, 2013); Hazen, supra note 10, at 795; Hirschler, supra note 14. 
356 Sunder, supra note 130, at 291. 
357 Id. at 298. 
358 Id. at 288–89. 
359 MICHAEL F. BROWN, WHO OWNS NATIVE CULTURE? 90  (2003). See Golan v. 
Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 894 (2012) (finding it constitutional for Congress to take 
things that once fell into the public domain and returning them to foreign private 
ownership according to international trade agreements under the Uruguay Round 
Agreements). 
360 State v. Shack, 58 N.J. 297, 304 (1971) (finding that a landowner could not 
"stand between the migrant workers and those who would aid them."). 
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trend of commoditization of culture already threatens local foreign 
cultures, and could end with aspects of our identities (religious, 
racial and cultural) bought and sold worldwide.361 If IP is a 
worldwide “struggle over social relations” we must also count the 
cost to our own culture if major content owners prevail in achieving 
absolute global IP protection.362 As Professor Sunder has remarked: 
In the Participation Age, people with access to a 
computer and relatively cheap but powerful digital 
hardware challenge the hegemony of traditional 
cultural authorities and create new cultural meanings 
from the bottom up. . . . Make no mistake: 
intellectual property law is no mere bystander in this 
culture war. It both empowers and disempowers 
individuals and groups when recognizing (or 
misrecognizing) authors and inventors, pirates and 
thieves.363 
Perhaps we do not need to analogize to property’s “pirates 
and thieves”364 at all. We could just call IP law what it is, statutory 
law.365 Those who do not follow the rules are what the statutes call 
                                                
361 Sunder, supra note 130, at 275 (noting IP measures taken in India to protect 
Indian candies made at a religious site and uniquely woven sarees). See also Zoe 
Alsop, Pictures: China's Fake Disneyland, Overgrown and Ghostly, NATIONAL 
GEOGRAPHIC (Dec. 22, 2011), http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/ 
travelnews/2011/12/pictures/111222-china-fake-disneyland-disney-world-
travel/#close-modal (Someone actually tried to recreate America's main street, 
the way Disneyland did, in China, and now Disney is opening a "legitimate" 
theme park in Shanghai. That is our main street being flung out on the world 
stage.). 
362 Sunder, supra note 130, at 274–75. 
363 Id. at 322–23. 
364 Kaplan, supra note 310, at 74 ("[C]haracterization in grand terms then seems 
of little value: we may as well go directly to the policies activating or justifying 
the particular determinations."). 
365 Compco v. Blue Crest [1980] S.C.R. 357, 372–73 (Can.) ("[C]opyright law is 
neither tort law nor property law in classification, but is statutory law. It neither 
cuts across existing rights in property or conduct nor falls in between rights and 
obligations heretofore existing in common law. Copyright legislation simply 
creates rights and obligations upon the terms and in the circumstances set out in 
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them: infringers. However, in the U.S., this is unlikely because pro-
regulation versus de-regulation is a highly politicized aspect of the 
struggle between Libertarians and Liberals.366 The attribute of 
property gives IP rights just the kind of natural rights legitimacy 
that both Libertarians and Liberals seem to want. Imagine if we 
leveraged poorer, less fortunate nations into adopting strict IP laws 
for anything less.367 The reality is that we probably have. Some are 
certainly dedicated to an IP-as-property-law regime simply because 
it would be embarrassing to go back now. Justices Ginsberg, 
Kennedy and Scalia in their joint dissent in Kirtsaeng seemed to 
think it was an embarrassment to the American government to back 
out of a maximized regime.368 However, the majority found that the 
Constitution called for something more limited, and they had thus 
avoided the more destructive and, as Jefferson recognized it,369 
                                                
the statute."). See also Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and the Regulatory 
Enterprise, 2004 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 335, 336–37 (2004) ("Anyone who does 
not believe that the IP laws are a form of regulation has not read the [statutes] and 
the maze of technical rules promulgated under them. . . . The range of 
government estimation that goes on in the IP system is certainly as great as in 
regulation of, say, retail electricity or telephone service."). 
366 Lemley, supra note 22, at 1074 ("Regulation is out of vogue, and those who 
talk about IP as regulation usually do so to denigrate it.") (citing Thomas B. 
Nachbar, Intellectual Property and Constitutional Norms, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 
272 (2004) ("In the end, 'exclusive rights' are merely another form of regulation 
that Congress may, and frequently does, use to confer economic rents on favored 
special interests.")). 
367 Lemley, supra note 22, at 1074 ("the problem with the property story [is that] 
it brings with it too much baggage"); Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 
383 U.S. 1, 8–9, n.2 (1966) ("Inventions . . . cannot, in nature, be a subject of 
property.") (quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson, Aug. 13, 
1813, in JEFFERSON: WRITINGS, supra note 1, at 1291–92 (Jefferson thought 
giving inventions a limited, exclusive right was an embarrassment, and giving 
inventions the attribute of property was an impossibility)). 
368 Kirtsaeng, No. 11–697, slip op. (Ginsberg, J., dissenting). 
369 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson, Aug. 13, 1813, in 
JEFFERSON: WRITINGS, supra note 1, at 1291–92 ("That ideas should freely 
spread from one to another over the globe, for the moral and mutual instruction of 
man, and improvement of his condition, seems to have been peculiarly and 
benevolently designed by nature."). 
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more embarrassing result of preserving a double standard of 
freedom globally.370 
There has been a lively discussion about what to call IP if 
not property.371 Some are concerned that “it is all too common to 
assume that because something is property, only private and not 
public rights are implicated.”372 This is to call into question the 
                                                
370 Compare Kirtsaeng, No. 11–697, slip op. (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) ("The 
Court’s bold departure from Congress’ design is all the more stunning, for it 
places the United States at the vanguard of the movement for 'international 
exhaustion' of copyrights—a movement the United States has steadfastly resisted 
on the world stage."), with Julius Genachowski, Chairman, FCC, Statement on 
the U.S. Submission of Initial Input into the International Telecommunication 
Union's World Conference on International Telecommunications (Aug. 3, 2012) 
(noting a fight for "Internet freedom" against "some countries [that] restrict the 
free flow of information online."), and Julius Genachowski, Chairman, FCC, 
Prepared Remarks for the International Telecommunications Union Global 
Symposium for Regulators in Beirut, Lebanon, ICT: Global Opportunities and 
Challenges (Nov. 10, 2009) (touting the FCC's role to preserve a "free, open and 
robust Internet" as an example to follow on the world stage). 
371 Lemley, supra note 22, at 1074–75 ("My fear is that a focus on analogies will 
mislead more than it enlightens. If there are sufficient dissimilarities between IP 
and other areas of law, drawing analogies becomes problematic, not only because 
of the caveats that are required ('IP is like any other tort, except in the following 
ways . . . .'), but because those caveats have a way of getting lost over time. This 
may be what has happened with efforts to talk about IP as a form of property: 
over time, it is too easy to rely on the shorthand reference to property and come 
to believe that IP really is like other kinds of property."); Tom W. Bell, Authors' 
Welfare: Copyright As A Statutory Mechanism for Redistributing Rights, 69 
BROOK. L. REV. 229, 235–67, 273–74 (2003); Margaret Jane Radin & R. Polk 
Wagner, The Myth of Private Ordering: Rediscovering Legal Realism in 
Cyberspace, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1295, 1306 (1998); Wendy J. Gordon, 
Copyright As Tort Law's Mirror Image: "Harms," "Benefits," and the Uses and 
Limits of Analogy, 34 MCGEORGE L. REV. 533 (2003); Bruce P. Keller, 
Condemned to Repeat the Past: The Reemergence of Misappropriation and Other 
Common Law Theories of Protection for Intellectual Property, 11 HARV. J.L. & 
TECH. 401, 402 (1998); A. Samuel Oddi, Product Simulation: From Tort to 
Intellectual Property, 88 TRADEMARK REP. 101, 107–08 (1998); KAPLAN, supra 
note 310, at 74; Sterk, supra note 310, at 43. See also Rose: Canons, supra note 
310, at 631. 
372 Lemley, supra note 22, at 1071. But see Shubha Ghosh, Deprivatizing 
Copyright, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 387, 389 (2003) (noting a debate over 
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traditional concept of patents and copyrights as grants of limited 
monopoly in an otherwise public good. Public goods are non-
rivalrous and non-excludable. The idea is that if we do not grant 
some excludability in creative invention and expression, we will not 
achieve the mandate of “progress” called for in the Copyright and 
Patent Clause. However, once the attribute of property began 
mixing with this conception of IP law, the question has been flipped 
on its head. We went all the way from asking how limited we can 
make the grant of these “monopolies” to how broadly we can 
construe progress to grant ever-increasing “private property” 
protection to IP rights.373 
—- 
The cost of allowing dishonesty in the marketplace to 
continue in the area of intangibles is much greater than anyone 
seems to realize. As our global economies continue to intertwine, it 
is obvious that market failures can lead to global crisis. The current 
property and IP regimes contributed to cycles of market failure by 
allowing and encouraging widespread promises of value in 
intangible property that may or may not exist. Then when the 
pension, insurance or stock should pay out, there is little or nothing 
there. These dead weight losses are most frequently endured by the 
middle class. 
There is hope. Unbeknownst to most property legal 
scholars,374 the average American layperson still knows the 
difference between physical property and intangible property. To 
put it in context, the average American individual knows the 
difference between a bar of gold and a promise from their employer 
that they will receive the value of a bar of gold in company shares 
                                                
whether "copyright law serves to protect certain essential private property 
interests or whether copyright law is informed by public, regulatory values."). 
373 Richard Craswell, How We Got This Way: Further Thoughts on Fuller and 
Perdue, 1 ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 1, 12 (2001) (warning that thinking of 
rights as property rights may "exert a sort of psychological force that makes some 
remedies seem more plausible than others"). 
374 Grey, supra note 60 ("[T]he theory of property rights held by the modern 
specialist tends both to dissolve the notion of ownership and to eliminate any 
necessary connection between property rights and things."). 
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after many years of faithful service. When they were forced to 
default on a mortgage that was fatally structured for an economy 
that only ever grew skyward, they kicked themselves and finally 
remembered the story of Babel.375 Now with perfect hindsight, it is 
shocking that any of us could have believed a lie that the housing 
market only ever would increase in value. But most Americans did. 
The housing market crisis represents the greatest redistribution of 
wealth in our country and it was to the rich upper class. Introducing 
new limits to the regulatory power of Congress and modifications to 
our underlying concept of property are not only in order, but 
according to Sebelius these changes are finally underway. 
A Note about Bitcoin and Other Digital Currencies 
Increasing trust in Bitcoin and other digital currencies 
because they are gold-backed, inflation resistant or superior to 
owning a U.S. dollar in any way should be an important signal to 
law makers. Ever since we decided not to back our currency with 
gold, favoring regulation through a centralized banking authority, 
our currency has become worth as much as the U.S. government’s 
word is worth.376 Thus, the success of our economic system rests on 
                                                
375 Genesis 11:1–9; Yalman Onaran, Basel Becomes Babel as Conflicting Rules 
Undermine Safety, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 2, 2013, 6:01 PM), http://www. 
bloomberg.com/news/2013-01-03/basel-becomes-babel-as-conflicting-rules-
undermine-safety.html (describing how the international banking rules make no 
sense, noting that a $639 trillion dollar derivatives market has been forced in to 
clearinghouses where transactions are backed by collateral). See also Bruce I. 
Jacobs, Tumbling Tower of Babel: Subprime Securitization and the Credit Crisis, 
FINANCIAL ANALYSTS JOURNAL, 17 (2009), http://top1000funds.com/ 
attachments/234_Tumbling%20Tower%20of%20Babel-
%20%20Subprime%20Securitization%20and%20the%20Credit%20Crisis.pdf. 
376 Friedman, supra note 16, at 637–38 ("Traditional floats [of currencies] have 
now become respectable." Calling the preserving of gold backing a high price for 
a "trivial . . . gain." Also grounding his argument for debasing world currencies 
and developing a futures market in the U.S. on the belief that "[e]xchange rates 
will almost surely continue to be stated in terms of the dollar. In addition, the 
U.S. has the largest stock in the world of liquid wealth on which the market can 
draw for support. It has a legal structure and a financial stability that will attract 
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the honesty of our government in the creation, allocation and 
valuation of currency. Congress has generally trusted in Friedman 
and others who blindly hoped that the free market would protect the 
U.S. government from “errors” in the creation, allocation and 
valuation of the U.S. dollar.377 This ultimately resulted in the U.S. 
treasury and Standard and Poor’s having had a disagreement in 
valuation within the trillions of dollars.378 Similarly, there is a 
connection with errors in the creation, allocation and valuation of 
intangible property that leads to astronomical dead weight losses 
that are disproportionately endured by the American middle 
class.379 
PART III: RECLAIMING A PRINCIPLE OF HONESTY 
Returning to requirements of honesty and truthfulness is the 
appropriate answer to our recent market failures. History has long 
held that the public has a right to an open and honest 
marketplace.380 Every common American deserves a marketplace 
where the rules are clearly presented and enforced. Deceitfulness 
                                                
funds from abroad. It has a long tradition of free, open, and fair markets."); 
STOCKMAN, supra note 3, at 5, 282–83, 290–91 ("Wall Street has become a vast 
casino where leveraged speculation and rent seeking have displaced its vital 
function of price discovery and capital allocation. The September 2008 financial 
crisis, therefore, was about the need to drastically deflate the Wall Street 
behemoths—that is, dangerous and unstable gambling houses—fostered by 
decades of money printing and market rigging by the Fed. Yet policy veered in 
the opposite direction, propping them up and thereby perpetuating their baleful 
effects, owing to a predicate that was dead wrong."). 
377 See David Corn, Alan Shrugged, MOTHER JONES (Oct. 23, 2008), 
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2008/10/alan-shrugged. 
378 Katz & Del Giudice, supra note 36. 
379 Tami Luhby, Why America's Middle Class is Losing Ground, CNN MONEY 
(Mar. 5, 2013, 11:51 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2013/03/05/news/economy/ 
middle-class-wages/index.html. See generally, Szeltner et al, supra note 3. 
380 BAKER, supra note 12, at 320. See also 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES *449. 
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should not be read into a nature of some forms of property,381 and 
the risks of trading in such property should not be foisted onto 
purchasers as buyer’s remorse. This would undermine contract 
law’s centuries old prohibition of “false purveyor[s].”382 Instead, 
the courts should adopt honesty as a formality similar to the form of 
“special case” which once removed an “unsatisfactory fiction,” 
which equated non-forcible wrongs with wrongs committed with 
“the force of arms.”383 Intangible property claims being defended as 
if they are physical property is a similar unsatisfactory fiction. 
Courts should reclaim the ability to nuance the formal judicial 
consideration of intangibles so as to recognize the deceitful 
creation, allocation and valuation of intangibles. After all, 
establishing the truth is necessary to carrying out justice.384 
In fact, Thomas Jefferson and James Madison so inspired 
Congress to draft the First Amendment based on a vigorous defense 
of religious and intellectual freedom adopted in the Virginia Act for 
Religious Freedom.385 The conflict between the puritans and 
                                                
381 Amicus Brief of Antitrust Economists, Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Actavis, Inc., 
No. 12-416, 2013 WL 836946, at *23-24 (U.S. Feb. 28, 2013); Hazen, supra note 
10, at 795; Hirschler, supra note 14. 
382 U.C.C. § 2-103(b) (2001) ("'Good faith' in the case of a merchant means 
honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair 
dealing in the trade.") (italics added); BAKER, supra note 12, at 278. See 
Somerton v. Colles (1433), in C.H.S. FIFOOT, HISTORY AND SOURCES OF THE 
COMMON LAW: TORT AND CONTRACT 343 (1949). 
383 BAKER, supra note 12, at 329. 
384 U.C.C. § 2-103(b) (2001) ("'Good faith' in the case of a merchant means 
honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair 
dealing in the trade.") (italics added); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 
4.1(a), 7.1, 8.1(a), 8.2(a), 8.4(c) (1983) (saying lawyers may be disciplined if they 
lie). 
385 Thomas Jefferson, A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, enacted on 
Jan. 16, 1786, in JEFFERSON: WRITINGS, supra note 1, at 347 (This bill was 
enacted with the support of James Madison. It vindicates religious and 
intellectual freedom and was one of the sources that Congress drew upon when 
drafting the Bill of Rights in 1789: "[T]he truth is great and will prevail if left to 
herself, [] she is the proper and sufficient antagonist to error, and has nothing to 
fear from the conflict, unless by human interposition disarmed of her natural 
weapons free argument and debate, errors ceasing to be dangerous when it is 
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anyone who held different religious beliefs about God inspired the 
founders to join religious freedom with the freedom of assembly 
and the freedom of speech in the First Amendment.386 This 
decidedly aligned the United States with the views of Roger 
Williams, the founder of Rhode Island, who argued that the sword 
of spirit did not hang “at the loins or side, but at the lips.”387 In fact, 
the arguments of theologians like Williams may not have carried 
the day against the puritans were his vision for the colonies without 
free speech. In fact, the decision to keep the Church and State 
separate was based on the condition that a robust freedom of speech 
would be enforced, because the founders trusted the people to seek 
out the truth for themselves and that if the truth was “left to herself” 
she could naturally defeat lies, seditiousness and untruth. Thus, free 
speech would be protected and the truth would fend for herself. 
However, positivist property concepts have threatened to box in the 
truth, strip her of her “natural weapons,”388 and repurpose them to 
serve private and special interests. 
Dishonesty, Market Failure and IP 
Property law has long been deferent to the common 
practices of the marketplace and society’s accepted 
communications “to the universe.”389 This deference seems to turn 
                                                
permitted freely to contradict them."). Cf. Rose: The Comedy, supra note 292, at 
778 (noting that the Roman Empire recognized public property in connection 
with a society's social glue, which for Rome was religion and noting that our 
social glue might be free speech); Genesis 1:3 ("And God said, 'Let there be 
light,' and there was light."); John 1:1, 14 ("In the beginning was the Word, and 
the Word was with God, and the Word was God . . . The Word became flesh and 
made his dwelling among us."). 
386 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
387 Williams, supra note 297. 
388 Thomas Jefferson, A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, enacted on 
January 16, 1786, in JEFFERSON: WRITINGS, supra note 1, at 347. 
389 Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175 (N.Y. 1805) ("If any thing, therefore, in the 
digests or pandects shall appear to militate against the defendant in error, who, on 
this occasion, was the foxhunter, we have only to say tempora mutantur; and if 
men themselves change with the times, why should not laws also undergo an 
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property cases into a yelling match.390 Courts are often ill-equipped 
to make a fair determination about the specific factual 
circumstances pertaining to who owns what.391 If a party gave up 
possession a court may take it as evidence of a common practice 
indication that party never had ownership, or abandoned 
ownership.392 Thus the court may decide against, as many courts 
have, the allegations of those who let go of physical possession. 
Those who refuse to give away their possession, even if they are 
acting against the common practice and contrary to the public 
interest itself, have a much better chance of holding onto their 
property.393 Often the quickest and loudest person to stake a claim 
by yelling the mainstream culture’s property jargon will prevail. 
                                                
alteration?"); Swift v. Gifford, 23 F. Cas. 558, 559 (D. Mass. 1872) ("The cases 
cited in the argument prove a growing disposition on the part of the courts to 
reject local usages when they tend to control or vary an explicit contract or a 
fixed rule of law."); Heppingstone v. Mammen, 2 Haw. 707, 712 (1863) 
("According to the usage which prevails among whalemen, as I understand it 
from the evidence, if the ‘Richmond’ had fallen in with the whale dead, having 
died of the wounds inflicted on it by the ‘Oregon's’ men the previous evening, 
and the respondent had arrived and asserted his claim to it, before it was ‘cut in,’ 
the libellant must have given it up."). 
390 Carol Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 73, 81 
(1985) ("Possession as the basis of property ownership, then, seems to amount to 
something like yelling loudly enough to all who may be interested. The first to 
say, 'This is mine,' in a way that the public understands, gets the prize, and the 
law will help him keep it against someone else who says, 'No, it is mine.'"). 
391 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *406–07 (Even Blackstone 
wouldn't admit there was any property in a book once it had been communicated 
to the world, but for the Statute of Anne which solved his problem). 
392 Compare Swift 23 F. Cas. 558 at 560 ("In this case the parties all understood 
the custom, and the libellants' master yielded the whale in conformity to it.") with 
Heppingstone, 2 Haw. 707 at 710, 713 ("Libellant went on board and saw the 
respondent, who refused to give him half the whale, whereupon libellant left, 
saying he would see about it at Honolulu . . . It seems to me, that, under all the 
circumstances of the case, the whale may fairly be considered the joint prize of 
both ships."). 
393 Thomson v. Larson, 147 F.3d 195, 202–03 (2d Cir. 1998) (noting that an 
"important indicator" of copyright authorship, which is necessary for owning a 
copyright, is discerning who exercised "decision-making authority" over the 
creation of the work). 
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In the case of the Blackstonian conception of physical 
property, labor theory and utilitarianism’s phobia of inefficiency 
had convinced us to essentially endure the yelling match, so to 
speak, in order to avoid a tragedy of the commons.394 However, the 
underlying equation that once negative externalities become large 
enough that the transaction costs for creating a property rights 
regime is justified cannot support all property claims as positivism 
suggested it should.395 Some scholars fear that copyright and patent 
is no longer creating progress in knowledge and learning as 
lawmakers have seemingly abandoned a conception of a public 
good underlying the grant of copyright and patent rights.396 
Accordingly, they note that lawmakers have stopped considering 
the social costs of granting copyright and patent rights—that these 
rights actually can exclude the public from important information 
and opinions. Information is something Carol Rose might call an 
“inherently public good.”397 Nevertheless, copyright and patent 
rights and remedies seem to have been given the color of private 
property, and has accordingly been used to cast a “tragic” light on 
the public interest in information. 
Other sorts of public goods, like bridges, navigable 
waterways, and access to public roadways tend not to be privatized 
because of the ever-increasing positive externalities they create.398 
This has been called an inverse “comedy” from the generally 
discussed tragedy of the commons.399 Public rights in property have 
                                                
394 Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 
PAPERS AND PROCESS 347, 350–53 (1967). 
395 Id.; Lemley, supra note 22, at n.38–42, 44, 46–47. But cf Landes & Posner, 
supra note 17, at 475. 
396 Peter S. Menell, Tailoring Legal Protection for Computer Software, 39 STAN. 
L. REV. 1329, 1337 (1987). 
397 Rose: The Comedy, supra note 244, at 723; Sunder, supra note 129, at 262–
63 (legal scholars continue to understand IP as solely a tool to solve an economic 
"public goods" problem). 
398 Rose: The Comedy, supra note 292, at 768–69; Frischmann, supra note 313, 
at 931. 
399 Lemley, supra note 22, at 1051 ("The result [of copying and disseminating 
ideas] is that rather than a tragedy, an information commons is a ‘comedy’ in 
which everyone benefits. The notion that information will be depleted by overuse 
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been recognized since Roman times, and had persisted until they 
were picked up again by the framers, to protect goods that consist 
of a society’s “social glue.”400 What’s more is that the framers 
believed that the minimization of costs to the public for access to 
public goods was necessary to foster the socialization that occurs in 
a healthy marketplace.401 This socialization was essential for 
continued peace because “a nation of merchants would scarcely 
reach for its weapons.”402 Thus, the First Amendment protection of 
free speech, the freedom of assembly and the freedom of religion is 
the appropriate place to house the American concept of public 
goods. 
In fact, the interaction of copyrights and patents with 
information and free speech is inverted from the way real property 
interacts with a commons. This highlights an information 
common’s comedic nature. Instead of being a response to “the 
allocative distortions resulting from scarcity . . . it is a conscious 
decision to create scarcity in a type of good in which it is ordinarily 
absent.”403 Without these rights, a public good would remain 
relatively non-excludable and thus, difficult to monetize.404 Public 
goods are also non-rivalrous. Thus, no matter how many times they 
are used, they simply never get used up. In contrast, physical goods 
like apples are rivalrous because they can only be used up once. 
Thus, there is no tragedy of the commons problem solved by 
copyright or patent law. Nevertheless, copyright and patent holders 
have won more protection of their rights than a free market would 
                                                
simply ignores basic economics."); DAVID BOLLIER, SILENT THEFT: THE PRIVATE 
PLUNDER OF OUR COMMON WEALTH 37 (2003) (reverse to "comedy" or 
"cornucopia" or "inverse" commons that occurs with non-depletable 
information); Rose: The Comedy, supra note 292, at 768–69. 
400 Rose: The Comedy, supra note 292, at 777–78. 
401 Id. 
402 Id. n.300, 301. 
403 Lemley, supra note 22, at 1055. 
404 See generally Kirtsaeng, No. 11–697, slip op. (Ginsberg, J., dissenting). 
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protect scarce physical property.405 It follows that today’s copyright 
and patent rights are too robust.406 
Part of the reason why is that copyright and patent rights are 
being conceived of as private property. The term “intellectual 
property” itself may have fueled this shift, a term which became a 
common descriptor in the field when the World Intellectual 
Property Organization (WIPO) was established.407 It seems that 
international interests and a broad concept of property have gone 
hand in hand. WIPO and TRIPs have thus continued to buttress our 
acceptance of Patent, Copyright, Trademark, Trade Secret and 
Publicity Rights as a collective “Intellectual Property” field. The 
Ginsberg dissent in Kirtsaeng argued that U.S. supported TRIPs 
agreements strengthened international copyright to a point where it 
                                                
405 Lemley, supra note 22, at 1055. 
406 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) 
("The monopoly privileges that Congress may authorize are neither unlimited nor 
primarily designed to provide a special private benefit. Rather, the limited grant 
is a means by which an important public purpose may be achieved."); Festo Corp. 
v Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 736 (2002) ("[P]atent 
rights are given in exchange for disclosing the invention to the public."); W.L. 
Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1550 (1983) ("Early public 
disclosure is a linchpin in the [patent] system."); Lemley, supra note 22, at 1052 
("[T]here is no general reason to worry about uncompensated positive 
externalities. Indeed, part of the point of intellectual property law is to promote 
uncompensated positive externalities, by ensuring that ideas and works that might 
otherwise be kept secret are widely disseminated."); Bell, supra note 371, at 231 
("[C]opyright focuses on generating positive externalities . . . [C]opyright 
concentrates on increasing the public good afforded by expressive works."); 
Robert A. Kreiss, Accessibility and Commercialization in Copyright Theory, 43 
UCLA L. REV. 1, 7 (1995) (“[T]he more works that are disseminated, the more 
[copyright's] goal is advanced."). 
407 Lemley, supra note 22, at 1034 (At the very least, the rise of using the term 
"intellectual property" coincided with the rise of the "property rights" view of IP. 
Prior to the 1960's, the term “intellectual property” also showed up in European 
literature) (citing A. NION, DROIT CIVILS DES AUTEURS, Artistes ET Inventeurs 
(1846) (referring to "proriete intellectuelle.")); WIPO Convention Establishing 
the World Intellectual Property Organization, July 14, 1967, art. 2 (viii), 6 I. L. 
M. 782, 784 (WIPO defined intellectual property as including "rights resulting 
from intellectual activity in the industrial, scientific, literary or artistic fields."). 
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overpowered common law alienation rights to physical property.408 
The majority relied on the Constitution and common law to arrive 
at a much more reasonable solution that did not draw upon an 
“intellectual property” rationale.409 
The Kirtsaeng majority’s reliance on a constitutional 
foundation and reluctance to apply property jurisprudence was 
proper. It was proper because it sought to define copyrights by the 
grant of power by which they were created. In the United States, 
copyrights were not created through common law property 
principles, and in fact they are not meant to interfere with the legal 
alienation of tangible property. Similarly, all intangible property 
claims should be tested in court to make sure they fit within the 
bounds of the law that granted them. 
In the age of information, when intangibles from digital 
currencies to a business’s goodwill are being traded on the open 
market globally, courts need a test to guarantee the honest creation, 
allocation and valuation of these “items.”410 These intangibles 
cannot be inspected because they are not detectable by our senses. 
In fact, intangibles can only be comprehended as placeholders for 
something else, like physical property or other valuable backing. 
Thus, the lack of a sufficient nexus with a physical thing should 
indicate that there is no property right in the intangible in question. 
                                                
408 Kirtsaeng, No. 11–697, slip op. at 33 ("Moreover, the exhaustion regime the 
dissent apparently favors would provide that 'the sale in one country of a good' 
does not 'exhaus[t] the intellectual-property owner’s right to control the 
distribution of that good elsewhere.'"). 
409 Id. 
410 See, e.g., Elizabeth Hester & Erik Holm, Citigroup to Sell Umbrella Logo to 
St. Paul Travelers (Update 7), BLOOMBERG, (Feb. 13, 2007, 6:44 PM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aAsp4RJRDG7w 
(After a series of corporate purchases and sales Citibank found that a TM that is 
extremely valuable to Travelers was not valuable to Citi which should raise 
questions about the ‘value’ of these items, and to what extent intangibles can be 
conceived of as ‘items’: "The biggest U.S. bank plans to sell its red umbrella 
trademark to St. Paul Travelers Cos. and operate under the ‘Citi’ name after 
failing to get most consumers to think of anything except insurance when they 
saw the 137-year-old symbol."). 
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De-cloaking intangibles with no actual “thing” backing up 
its value will create a more stable market. The public, main street 
America and the marketplace itself can no longer abide dishonest or 
reckless property claims in intangibles. Furthermore, the blanket 
recognition of the movement of intangibles over state lines to 
justify expansive federal regulation violates the co-existence of the 
grants of legislative power, and federalism. Entertaining regulation 
based on intangible movement creates undue pressure on the 
judiciary to explain how intangibles move or exist relative to state 
geography. In fact, it would be easier for a court to describe the 
movements of God.411 The impossibility of describing how non-
things move is why we have “arising under” jurisdiction through a 
separate grant of constitutional power for copyright and patent laws. 
Nothing would be rejected by the popular mind so quickly as how 
the movement of a non-thing intangible allows long arm federal 
regulation that interferes with the interests of most Americans. This 
was most clearly seen when public outcry shut down SOPA, PIPA 
and ACTA. 
Thus, judicial forbearance requires the Supreme Court to 
continue its revision of Constitutional interpretation. Affirming a 
free-riding problem and an expansive view of medical licenses as 
carrying with them property rights will not do. Allowing the 
Commerce Clause to continue facilitating the circumvention of the 
limits of the other grants of legislative power cannot continue. The 
Court needs to adopt an honest and truthful approach to intangible 
property that reasonably limits its endorsement of highly political 
issues best left to other branches. This should include a closer eye 
on the honest creation, allocation and valuation of intangible 
property rights. 
                                                
411 Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2589 (The Framers "were 'practical statesmen' and not 
metaphysical philosophers."). See, e.g., Kidd v. Johnson, 100 U.S. 617, 619 
(1879) ("The right to use the trade-mark is not limited to any place, city, or State, 
and, therefore, must be deemed to extend everywhere."). 
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Honesty as a Procedural Formality 
Formalism was generally abandoned when the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted stating, “there is but one 
form of action, the civil action.”412 Thus, as long as a plaintiff was 
able to plead in their facts a cause of action a court could hear their 
case, no matter the form in which the facts were pled. A result of 
the shift away from formalism has been that the courts no longer are 
able to develop new causes of action through formalistic 
“evolution.”413 Nevertheless, those causes of action that existed 
when the forms were closed still must be pled, even if informally. 
In this way “the forms of action . . . still rule us from their 
graves.”414 Even so, it was seen as a step forward to cast off 
formalism and allow parties to move U.S. Courts as long as a 
colorable action had been pled in whatever form.415 This practice 
purportedly removed almost any formalistic requirement on a court 
to discuss whether the form of action brought was proper. It is 
precisely because formality has been abandoned that spectators 
have been able to claim “contract is the new copyright”416 and that 
EULA’s are “the new millennium’s founding social contract.”417 
                                                
412 FED. R. CIV. P. 2.; Cf. BAKER, supra note 12, at 60 ("redistribution of so 
much of the law under one 'form' [trespass on the case] introduced a good 
measure of procedural uniformity" which eventually facilitated the abolishment 
of the legal forms in England). 
413 BAKER, supra note 12, at 58–60, 264, 303 ("Most of the law as we know it 
was shaped by this process. Trespass on the case brought new areas of 
jurisdiction to the royal courts, such as defamation; it filled gaps in the praecipe 
actions, by enabling damages to be awarded for breach of parol contracts, for past 
nuisances, and for conversion of goods; and finally it enabled the praecipe 
actions themselves to be replaced."); FIFOOT, supra note 382, at 77. 
414 BAKER, supra note 12, at 61 (quoting Young v. Queensland Trustees 99 CLR 
560(1956) (Eng)). 
415 FED. R. CIV. P. 8 (only requiring pleadings to contain a short and plain 
statement of the claim). But see Bly-Magee v. California, 236 F.3d 1014, 1018 
(9th Cir. 2001) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b) that claims of fraud must be plead 
with particularity to dismiss a claim for lack of particularity in the pleading). 
416 Lydia Pallas Loren, Professor, Lewis & Clark Law School, Classroom 
Lecture on Copyright and Contract (Mar. 20, 2012). See also Marshall v. New 
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Conversely, Ichbal and Twombly arguably have re-adopted a 
formalism in Federal Courts that could straighten out these 
confusions.418 Where once a plaintiff needed only to plead the 
elements of a cause of action that were possible, the Supreme Court 
has increased the formality required by dismissing claims that are 
not “plausible” on the facts. As the Supreme Court explained, 
plausibility lies somewhere between possibility and probability. 
Similarly, minimum formalistic safeguards should be instituted so 
that dishonest creation, allocation and valuation of intangible 
property is not de facto underwritten by the general informality of 
today’s age.419 Requiring truthful claims of intangible property 
would be so small a burden for the Court and so central to its 
project of administering justice under rule 1 that it could fit under 
the plausibility standard put forth in Ichbal and Twombly without 
rising to the type of formalism ousted by rules 2 and 8.420 The 
                                                
Kids On The Block P'ship, 780 F. Supp. 1005, 1008 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) ("The line 
between cases that 'arise under' the copyright laws, as contemplated by § 1338(a), 
and those that present only state law contract issues, is a very subtle one and the 
question leads down 'one of the darkest corridors of the law of federal courts and 
federal jurisdiction.'") (quoting Arthur Young & Co. v. City of Richmond, 895 
F.2d 967, 968-69 (4th Cir. 1990)); Orit Fischman Afori, Implied License: An 
Emerging New Standard in Copyright Law, 25 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH 
TECH. L.J. 275, 294 (2009) ("There is a need for developing a non-contractual 
new standard in copyright law, rather that the proposed development of the 
implied license doctrine would not be a total deviation from legal 
fundamentals."). 
417 Fairfield, supra note 123, at 44. 
418 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (This was a criminal case that 
seems to require a formal standard that a cause of action be pled plausibly on its 
face. This is more than mere possibility); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 
544, 546 (2007) (This was a civil case that also heightened formal standards to 
"plausible" from possible on its face); FED. R. CIV. P. 2. 
419 See, e.g., Gretchen Morgenson, Arcane Market is Next to Face Big Credit 
Test, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Feb. 17, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/ 
02/17/business/17swap.html?ref=creditdefaultswaps&_r=0 (Credit default swaps, 
for instance, could be cabined away from the institution of property when being 
reviewed in court by formalistically deciding they are purely an animal of 
contract law). 
420 FED. R. CIV. P. 1, 2, 8. 
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heightened pleading requirements in Rule 9(b) requiring 
“particularity” in certain circumstances had not seemed to run afoul 
our preference of informal procedure.421 Perjury laws, designed to 
ensure the truthfulness of a Court’s findings, could also harbor a 
procedural enquiry as to an intangible’s honest creation, marketing 
and valuation.422 The definition of “good faith,” including “honesty 
in fact” under the Universal Commercial Code and rules 4.1, 7.1 
and 8.4 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct also support 
such a simple and virtually costless prophylactic formality.423 
Honesty as a formal requirement is minimalist by nature, 
and would quickly ferret out cases on the outset that were not 
properly brought. This is so because the truth is necessary for 
carrying out the administration of justice and without it half-truths 
and lies will slow down the judicial process.424 If someone claims to 
have acquired some newfangled property right, they should be 
obliged to explain on the outset of a case how this right was created, 
who owns it, and the basis of its worth or value. Once this is 
established to the court’s satisfaction they would be allowed to 
proceed under a theory of property. If a party failed to satisfy a 
court’s inquiry into the honesty of their property claims, any claim 
under a property theory should be dismissed. The tradition of 
discussing whether a proper claim had been brought was long 
practiced in English Courts as a matter of procedure. 
Take for instance The Shepherd’s Case, heard in 1486 by an 
English court.425 A writ of trespass on the case was brought against 
a negligent shepherd that let 100 sheep drown of which he was 
entrusted to watch. Before the case could be heard, the judges had 
to discuss whether an “action sur le cas lie[d]” or whether it was 
                                                
421 FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b). 
422 18 U.S.C. § 1621. 
423 U.C.C. § 2-103(b); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.1(a), 7.1, 8.1(a), 
8.2(a), 8.4(c) (1983). See also BAKER, supra note 12, at 306 (noting that actions 
on the case inspired statutes of frauds to ensure more honesty in contracting for 
property). 
424 18 U.S.C. § 1621. 
425 The Shepherd's Case Y.B. 2 Hen.7, Hil. f. 11, pl. 9 in FIFOOT, supra note 382, 
at 86–87. 
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more appropriately an “action of Covenant.”426 Unfortunately, 
modern judges have been stripped of this tool to parse between 
whether a case was properly brought under contract or property. 
Thus, intangible property claims have been allowed to give cases 
the color of legitimacy without question. In this way copyright has 
been used to infuse contracts with heavy remedies that contract law 
was not made to carry.427 
The form of action called “trespass on the case”428 was 
adopted into American common law most famously in Pierson v. 
Post.429 According to a required formality, the court considered 
how a property right in a wild animal may be properly claimed.430 
Similarly, courts should require an explanation as to how property 
rights are created in intangibles. The forms were not federally 
abandoned until the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure in 1938.431 The states that had not yet abolished the 
forms of action in 1938 eventually followed suit and today the 
forms of action have been closed in every U.S. jurisdiction as a 
matter of procedure. Nonetheless, in property law actual possession 
continues to be the rule for claiming property in ferae naturae and 
similar cases, as the Second Circuit has found that the application of 
a foreign sovereign’s patrimony laws required that they had actually 
exercised a possessory interest in the items being claimed.432 Thus, 
abandonment of the forms has only limited the Court’s prerogative 
                                                
426 Id. 
427 See Afori, supra note 416, at 294. 
428 BAKER, supra note 12, at 59 ("The nature of the distinction [between trespass 
and case] was arbitrary and difficult to appreciate. Eighteenth-century 
rationalisation made the test one of directness: 'in trespass the plaintiff complains 
of an immediate wrong, and in case of a wrong that is the consequence of another 
act.' An action of trespass for fixing a spout so that it directed rainwater onto the 
plaintiff's house was therefore struck down by the King's Bench on the ground 
that the proper action was case."). 
429 Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175 (N.Y. 1805). 
430 Id. 
431 The Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2012). 
432 United States v. Schultz, 333 F.3d 393, 405 (2d Cir. 2003) (deciding that 
Egypt had to have taken possessory interest over the artifacts to claim them under 
its patrimony law—this is the same as the old rules for hunting wild animals). 
98 JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW & POLICY Vol. 35:1 
to reconsider established rules of law.433 It has not, however, 
limited the rules that were once established by the formal practices 
of our history or their formal application to the facts. 
The closing of the forms of action purportedly took law 
reform out of judicial review.434 Accordingly, legal scholars have 
cited numerus clausus435 and announced that we should not fear an 
expansion of legally accepted property rights, despite the rise of 
positivism. Property rights in intangibles and the positivist 
movement would be a limited one, by this very principle. However, 
the result seems to have been quite the opposite. Positivism is the 
legal norm, and property rights in intangibles are being claimed 
with a renewed fervor. And now, without the help of an open ended 
formality like trespass on the case—which formally allowed a court 
to consider for example how a property right is created in wild 
animals—courts may be unable to review whether an intangible 
property claim has been properly brought. Requiring honesty in 
intangible property creation, allocation and valuation will take at 
the least, a minimum amount of formalism in requiring plaintiffs to 
plead “honest” property claims, or to call out dishonest property 
claims. Disputes like the one in Pierson v. Post about the nature of 
property rights in a wild fox should be heard in court regarding 
intangibles. Otherwise, the nature of intangibles will be decided by 
old rules that do not fit and the information age will continue to 
binge on the over-allocation, over-creation and over-valuation of 
intangibles. 
CONCLUSION: APPLYING THE TRUTH TO 
                                                
433 BAKER, supra note 12, at 61 ("[T]he posthumous rule of the forms of action 
has tended towards a tyranny which in life they were never permitted. The 
categories of legal thought were closed in 1832 [in England], and where once the 
law might have developed through the recognition of new writs it is now left at 
the mercy of commissions and an overworked parliament. Law reform is no 
longer subject to judicial review [in England]."). 
434 Id. 
435 Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of 
Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 19 (2000) ("The 
numerus clausus is probably at its weakest in the area of intellectual property."). 
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INTANGIBLES 
The concept of property envisioned by the framers and 
embodied in our constitution was necessarily physical property. 
Thus the Constitutional provisions that protect our property and 
security need not usher in a positivist conception of property 
without a heightened scrutiny standard that requires some 
connection to physical property. A standard of honesty seems up to 
the job and should be applied to intangibles by the Court before it 
allocates the color of property. The Court seems an ideal place to 
adjudicate the truth of a matter and it should not shy away from its 
duty to do so. 
The effects of this policy on markets for physical property, 
intangibles valued accurately by real property backing and honest 
business practices will be minimal to none. Only dishonest practices 
that pull value out of nowhere, or that depend on the winds of 
chance for payout, will be removed from the property regime. They 
may continue to subsist under contract law provided they do not 
untruthfully hold themselves out to be trading in a form of property. 
But they will no longer get the implicit approval conferred by the 
attribution of property through the judicial branch. 
It may seem subtle at first, but the de-cloaking of dishonest 
creation, valuation, and allocation of intangible property rights will 
make them much less mobile. Contracts that include intangibles that 
are not cloaked in property would not be subject to buyer’s 
remorse.436 Instead they would be subjected to contract law’s good 
faith and fair dealing requirements.437 The result if a violation is 
found would be to set the parties back to their original position had 
the contract been fair and honest. This would be much more 
                                                
436 Sherwood v. Walker, 66 Mich. 568, 577, 33 N.W. 919, 923 (1887); Wood v. 
Boynton, 64 Wis. 265, 25 N.W. 42, 44 (1885). 
437 U.C.C. § 2-103(b) ("'Good faith' in the case of a merchant means honesty in 
fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the 
trade.") (emphasis added). 
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desirable than the current default of buyer and seller’s remorse 
regarding intangible property transfers.438 
Such a policy would preserve the judiciary and the 
credibility of the U.S. government in general. Imbuing intangibles 
with the attribute of property is risky because it implies judicial 
approval of market practices. The members of the other branches of 
government cannot expect to underwrite too many liars and 
scandals without risking peaceful overthrow by their constituents 
during election time. The politics involved therein demand that the 
judiciary settle a safe distance from the fray. 
Furthermore, our continued credibility on the world’s stage 
depends on a closer eye on marketplace honesty and fairness. All 
cultures and all nations recognize lying as an undesirable if not 
outright unacceptable character trait in a business partner. The 
current trend of underwriting property regimes that aid American 
corporations in the non-truthful creation, valuation, and allocation 
of intangible property is a sure way to destroy our credibility on the 
international market. 
The Supreme Court and all lawmakers should continue to 
recognize information as an inherently public good, and freedom 
and equality as a baseline for the future of IP regulation and 
regulation of intangible property in general. In order to achieve this, 
the Court should adopt a conception of honesty in creation, 
allocation and valuation of intangible property. Reclaiming a 
principle of honesty will ensure that market failures are staved off 
and will protect a continued growth to the American economy and 
the middle class. Furthermore it will safeguard American business 
abroad from being branded dishonest and thus not trusted. Whether 
we see Jay Gatsby or Robin Hood as a greater evil is irrelevant. 
Everyone, including the founders and framers of the U.S. 
Constitution,439 has agreed that dishonesty is disfavored, destructive 
                                                
438 Hunt, supra note 31, at 713 ("Fraud inevitably increases during a bubble."), 
and at 743 (describing ways a court can rescind "bubble contracts."). 
439 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) ("It is a rule not enjoined 
upon the courts by legislative provision, but adopted by themselves, as consonant 
to truth and propriety, for the direction of their conduct as interpreters of the 
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and an obstruction to the administration of justice. Thus, subjecting 
claims of intangible property to a standard of honesty as a matter of 
formal procedure in court is in the best interest of everyone. 
 
                                                
law."), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/home/histdox/fed_78.html. See also 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 1 (Alexander Hamilton) ("In the course of the preceding 
observations, I have had an eye, my fellow-citizens, to putting you upon your 
guard against all attempts, from whatever quarter, to influence your decision in a 
matter of the utmost moment to your welfare, by any impressions other than 
those which may result from the evidence of truth.") available at 
http://thomas.loc.gov/home/histdox/fed_01.html; THE FEDERALIST NO. 2 (John 
Jay) ("Whatever may be the arguments or inducements which have wrought this 
change in the sentiments and declarations of these gentlemen, it certainly would 
not be wise in the people at large to adopt these new political tenets without being 
fully convinced that they are founded in truth and sound policy.") available at 
http://thomas.loc.gov/home/histdox/fed_02.html; THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James 
Madison) ("The instability, injustice, and confusion introduced into the public 
councils, have, in truth, been the mortal diseases under which popular 
governments have everywhere perished.") available at http://thomas.loc.gov/ 
home/histdox/fed_10.html; THE FEDERALIST NO. 85 (Alexander Hamilton) ("The 
perpetual changes which have been rung upon the wealthy, the well-born, and the 
great, have been such as to inspire the disgust of all sensible men. And the 
unwarrantable concealments and misrepresentations which have been in various 
ways practiced to keep the truth from the public eye, have been of a nature to 
demand the reprobation of all honest men.") available at http://thomas.loc.gov/ 
home/histdox/fed_85.html. 
